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I: Unifying Theme 
Most conventional academic works generally offer a highly restricted view of the history and 
nature of classical liberalism. This is perhaps not surprising since most book-length histories 
of the liberal tradition have been written by authors who are either outright ideological oppo-
nents (Harold Laski, The Rise of European Liberalism, Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and 
Decline of Western Liberalism) (1) or at best luke-warm "neo-liberals", out of sympathy with 
core tenets of classical liberalism (Guido De Ruggiero, The History of European Liberal-
ism, Jose G. Merquior, Liberalism, Old and New) (2). Even when the source of that restric-
ted view is fairly obvious - ideological hostility or disdain - and can hence be taken into ac-
count, such accounts suffer from a deeper failure to perceive or portray the character of the 
o 
liberal tradition. However, worse still, in some respects, are works which actually reduce 
liberalism to a vague "tendency" or "attitude", and hence rob it of almost any sort of substan-
tive character or content (Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, Lionel Trilling, 
The Liberal Imagination, Ken Minogue, The Liberal Mind, Arthur A. Ekirch, The Decline 
of American Liberalism) (3). Text book accounts similarly tend to offer selective renditions 
of, for example, "Locke, Smith, Bentham and Mill" (or of some similar but equally restricted 
pantheon), as the sum-total of the liberal tradition (or at least the sum-total of that worthy of 
academic attention) (eg, George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory and John Plame-
natz, Man and Society: A Critical Examination of Some Important Social and Political 
Thought From Machiavelli to Marx) (4). In their choice of intellectual representatives all 
these renditions have in common a version of liberalism which tends to be narrowly economis-
tic in approach and/or restricted to empiricist, positivist, and utilitarian currents of thought. 
Indeed, it is also significant that there is actually no comprehensive, multi-volume history of 
liberalism - in comparison to the many such works on the history of socialism in general or 
Marxism in particular. 
The works submitted in this application for PhD attempt to demonstrate that classical liberal-
ism (or "libertarianism", to employ the more recent neologism for this intellectual tradition) 
was a richer, deeper and more systematic school of thought than is normally portrayed. They 
also try to analyse why that tradition went into decline, and why it has, in recent years, en-
joyed a revival. A number of the essays are also attempts to apply that more systematic per-
spective to a number of topics in different disciplines. 
II: The Nature and History of Classical Liberalism - Its Decline and Rise 
The conception of classical liberalism outlined in my submissions has most notably been 
embodied in the work of, and advocated by, the late Professor Murray Rothbard. In a brief 
obituary study of Rothbard, "Creating a Science of Liberty: The Life and Heritage of 
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Murray N. Rothbard, 1926-1995", I discuss his concept of classical liberalism as a sys-
tematic and hierarchical "science of liberty", an integrated, inter-disciplinary body of know-
ledge both analytical and normative. It was the torn fabric, so to speak, of liberalism which 
Rothbard hoped to weave back into a whole. Surprisingly, amongst all the recent appreciations 
of Rothbard's life and work, my essay is the only one to highlight this central and vital aspect 
of the Rothbardian "project". 
Rothbard attempted further to systematise and then to extend the "praxeological" economics of 
the Austrian School, not merely in the study of market relationships but in a detailed typology 
and critique of all state intervention in the economy. Furthermore, he integrated that economic 
critique of state power with a vigorous moral one, based on a neo-Aristotelian/Thomistic 
natural rights ethics, replacing what he felt was the inadequate utilitarian morality of Von 
Mises. He further developed Austrian economics by recasting its methodological roots in an 
Aristotelian realism, rather than in the vaguer Kantian idealism of Mises and Hayek. In this he 
was, in actuality, returning to the earlier methodological roots of one of the School's founders, 
Carl Menger. It was such a historical rootedness in earlier liberal thought and scholarship that 
characterised much of Rothbard's thought. As Professor Stanislav Andreski has pointed out 
(5), it is one of the major failings of much contemporary scholarship to ignore the work, and 
real discoveries, of earlier thinkers. Rothbard had an comprehensive knowledge of older 
scholarship and long-forgotten thinkers, and productively employed their insights in his own 
work. Indeed, it was this knowledge of the work of the founding fathers of British and French 
liberalism that, with their broader perspectives in historical sociology, led Rothbard to re-unite 
the three strands of original liberalism - its economics, ethics and its class and socio-historic 
analyses. It was this reintegration that Rothbard dubbed a "science of liberty", and although it 
is true that he himself did not complete the "Rothbardian project", its outlines and many of its 
details are perfectly clear. 
The "science of liberty" was, significantly, the phrase used by Peter Gay in his definitive his-
torical analysis, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, to characterise the thought of the 
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philosophes (6). In my review-essay, "The Revolution of Reason: Professor Gay, the En-
lightenment, and the Ambiguities of Classical Liberalism", I argue that liberalism as a 
systematic ideological/intellectual tradition was born in Enlightenment rationalism. The sys-
tematic ethical, political, economic and sociological science created by, for example, the 
"Scottish School" or "Scottish Enlightenment" of Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson and John 
Millar, was one of the most ambitious and integrated versions of liberal doctrine, as Gay 
himself points out. However, my essay's principal contribution is to attempt to answer the 
question of why, after such a flourishing birth, liberalism declined in both scope and influence 
in the face of competing collectivist and statist doctrines. The essay is, to my knowledge, the 
only piece of writing to ask specifically, and attempt to answer, this question. (A paper on the 
same subject by Dr. Stephen Davies, in substantial agreement with mine, was also delivered at 
a conference I organised some years ago) (7). 
My answer to this question is that the key elements of Enlightenment liberal thought all contain 
fatal ambiguities. Specifically, those ambiguities related to : 
* the status of reason and the reason-emotion relationship 
* the nature of human psychology 
* the status of "natural law" 
* the significance and implications of science. 
Within each of these areas a failure to work out problems, or to apply insights correctly, led to 
unresolved problems or inadequate doctrines that enabled collectivist and statist strands of 
thought to emerge as alleged solutions or reactions to liberal formulations. Thus, the Enlight-
enment failure to resolve the reason-emotion dichotomy left the road open to doctrines pro-
claiming the primacy - psychological, political and moral - of the "passions", and hence to 
political movements seeking the fulfilment of alleged higher (or more basic!) emotional needs 
of man. Within psychology, fallacious approaches and emphases - those of Lockean "sensatio-
nalism" and "associationism" - led to the subtle undermining of consciousness and reason. 
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Psychological empiricism minimised, and ultimately led to a denial, of the very existence of 
"reflection", that is, of reason. It hence opened the doors to doctrines of determinism and 
environmentalism. And such doctrines were the rationale for the attack on "freedom and dign-
ity", and for the practice of myriad forms of social engineering and central planning. Within 
ethical and political philosophy, utilitarian approaches undermined the concepts of natural 
rights and failed to challenge the morality of altruism (a doctrine significantly named by the 
arch-collectivist August Comte). In the writings of, for example, the Scottish School, there is a 
constant emphasis on the ethics of "unselfishness" and duty, a strand of what has been called 
"civic humanism", a return to the Platonic doctrine that the individual could only express 
himself fully and ethically by participation in the polis. The individual was thus left morally 
disarmed in the face of moral claims to sacrifice him legitimately for the good of alleged 
"others", the "race", the "nation", the "state", the "proletariat" or whatever. 
A further ambiguity lay within the Enlightenment's concept of science itself. The new mysti-
que of science increasingly manifest itself as "scientism", an attempt to extend the mechanistic 
and determinist methods and concepts of science to subject matter - the humane sciences - for 
which it was inappropriate. Scientism thus ignored the distinctive characteristics of the entities 
to which it was applied, that is, human beings, who possess rational consciousness and free 
will. Moreover, at a social level, it raised as an ideal the concept of social planning, of the 
idea that it was "scientific" to attempt to control society as a whole, by means of central plan-
ning and social engineering. Although Louis Bredvold's characterisation of the whole tendency 
of the Enlightenment as a coercive "brave new world" (in his The Brave New World of the 
Enlightenment) (8) was massively overstated, nevertheless, the seeds of truth, the reality of 
such tendencies, were there. 
It might be argued that my emphasis on the effect of intellectual error and confusion as the 
ruling factor in the decline of liberal ideology and hence liberal hegemony is over-stated. I 
would not deny that other factors of social and economic context also contributed to its decline. 
However, it seems clear to me that if the doctrine had resolved its inner ambiguities it would 
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have been in far better shape to face other problems. If the intelligentsia had remained true to 
liberalism, and if its concepts, assumptions, slogans and so on had continued to permeate 
society (whether by rational acceptance, by tacit consent, inertia, custom, prestige or what-
ever), a major engine and transmission belt of the drive to collectivism and the enhancement of 
state power would have been removed. 
In "The Critical Liberalism of John Mackinnon Robertson, 1856-1933" I demonstrate, 
nevertheless, that the sort of systematic, radical and rationalist liberalism of the Scottish 
School, rooted in historical and class analysis, did continue into the 19th and early 20th centur-
ies. This essay was the first major analysis of the work of Robertson, who is now almost total-
ly forgotten. However, in his time, Robertson was not only a prominent rationalist and free-
thought advocate, but a major Liberal Party figure (and junior minister at one point) and an 
amazingly productive scholar - the author of over a hundred books and monographs (most of 
them substantial works) and hundreds of essays. In a thorough examination of all his political 
and sociological writings, I demonstrated that Robertson was directly linked to the historical 
sociology and class analysis developed by Adam Smith and the Scottish School and by their 
epigoni such as T. H. Buckle in England and Charles Dunoyer and Charles Comte in France -
to all of whom he referred. In a number of major works, most notably Buckle and His Cri-
tics and The Evolution of States (9), Robertson delineated a systematic restatement of liberal 
historical sociology, a form of "economic interpretation of history" and class analysis that 
nevertheless did not suffer from the over-simplifications and crudity of the Marxist approaches 
(which in actuality had stolen, and subsequently distorted, the earlier liberal form of class 
analysis and economic "determinism" - a point Robertson himself explicitly made). It is true 
that Robertson's political beliefs are somewhat ambiguous, and have led many readers into 
confusion over their true nature. He was in many respects torn between the statism of the 
newer "neo-liberalism" and the radical individualism of earlier, that is, real liberalism. It is 
probably fair to say that that ambiguity was never fully resolved in his thought, although the 
later Robertson strikes a more critical note on socialism and statism than the earlier. 
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I further attempt to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Robertson's scholarship. There is a 
deep irony insofar as what I see as Robertson's failings in allowing for a greater degree of state 
interventionism than earlier liberals is implicitly refuted by the analysis contained in his own 
historical sociology. The" scientistic" leanings to state control and regulation that persisted in 
his thought should have appeared obviously utopian to him in the light of his analysis of the 
role of class and special interests in manipulating state power for their own ends. At no point 
did he make any persuasive case as to why greater democratic participation would render the 
struggle to utilise state power for sectional and class interest any the less prevalent or over-
whelming, or why an abstract "public interest" would prevail in a democratic state. Indeed, it 
is hard to understand how Robertson could have remained mired in such a naive utopian out-
look regarding "social progress" and this area of his thought must be seen as the major failing 
of his scholarship. He had no illusions about human nature and its combatative instincts. How 
could he possibly believe that universal franchise would prevent all sorts of competing coali-
tions of special interests from seeking power and profit via the state? His own continued intel-
lectual and political struggle for free trade should have alerted him. Those seeking tariffs were 
not merely entrepreneurs or holders of capital, but employees and unions. Why should the 
interests of entrepreneurs, capitalists or employees in other business concern them - let alone 
the interests of the consumers as a whole? Robertson's failure to apply his own class analysis 
to such questions only demonstrates that the power of wish fulfilment and political idealism can 
overwhelm even the mightiest of intellects. 
Less successful than Robertson's historical sociology was his economics. On the one hand he 
rightly adhered to support for free trade, and criticised the attempt to interfere with market 
relationships and co-ordination. But he seemed to have no basic grasp of the dynamics of 
markets. His major errors emerged in his espousal of a form of proto-Keynesian under-con-
sumptionism. 
I also attempt to link some of Robertson's less developed insights regarding, for example, 
natural rights and the nature of reason and emotion. Although not elaborated in detail, I argue 
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that some of his observations have been developed in a more thorough form by contemporary 
liberals like Karl Popper and Ayn Rand. 
My intellectual resurrection of Robertson culminated in my organising a one-day Adam Smith 
Club Conference on him, at which this paper was read, and which then led to the compilation 
of its papers, together with other material, in a volume edited by Professor G. A. Wells (10). 
In "The New Enlightenment: The Revival of Libertarian Ideas", I outline the contemporary 
revival of libertarian and classical liberal ideas. Although this is not the first or only such at-
tempt to survey the modern liberal revival (see, for example, the works by Henri Lepage, 
David Green, and Norman Barry amongst others) (11), it is the first to do in explicit compari-
son with the birth of liberalism in the Enlightenment. The essay also contrasts with most 
journalistic accounts of the liberal revival, which invariably focus on its economic components. 
It also criticises the imprecise and misleading application of the term "New Right" to modern 
liberalism. I demonstrate that many of the contributors to the modern libertarian revival are, 
inadvertently, dealing with precisely the areas in which the Enlightenment's flaws led to its 
subsequent decline. Thus, the collapse of the Enlightenment's vision of science into an erron-
eous "scientism" has been vigorously explored and refuted by the scholarship of Hayek, Karl 
Popper and Michael Polanyi. Indeed, the philosophy of science, has in their hands, I attempt to 
show, been transformed into a foundation for concepts of the open society and the free market. 
Science can progress only in a context open intellectually to bold "conjecture and refutation", 
whilst the free market constitutes very much the social embodiment of the same process. The 
scientistic vision of a planned, an allegedly "scientific" society, has been refuted as an imposs-
ibility. The knowledge necessary to do such planning is simply not accessible to any individual 
or group of individuals, but can emerge only out of the polycentric processes of market compe-
tition. Similarly, I show that the prevailing varieties of determinism and environmentalism that 
gained hegemony in forms of Freudianism or Behaviourism, have also been challenged by a 
massive and emergent "humanistic" movement in both psychology and psychotherapy. The 
reality of the rational and autonomous individual has hence been reaffirmed on far more secure 
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foundations, in the works of scholars like Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow, and by more 
recent psychologists - like Nathaniel Branden and Peter Breggin - who make the link between 
their psychological theories and their political theories even more explicit. 
I also demonstrate how Thomas Kuhn's concept of the successive rise and fall of different 
"paradigms" can also be fruitfully applied to the rise, fall and revival of classical liberalism. 
Kuhn demonstrated that science generally progressed spasmodically. A dominant world view, 
of greater or lesser degree of approximation to the truth, would generally prevail at anyone 
time. Scientific research would then largely take place on the basis of, and within the confines 
of, that ruling "paradigm". Approaches based on different assumptions would generally be 
ignored or despised. However, the inadequacies of such a ruling paradigm, anomalies it 
cannot deal with, gradually accumulate and ultimately reach a "crisis point". Only then, with 
the arrival of a new generation of scientists, will a new paradigm gain general acceptance (12). 
Kuhn's sociology of science has been applied with varying degrees of success to the history of 
different disciplines, and although the relativist conclusions he appears to draw from it should 
be rejected, it is a productive perspective on many areas. It can be applied, as I attempt to do, 
to the broader hegemony of political ideologies as well. Thus, whilst the Enlightenment liberal 
paradigm proved unable to deal with various anomalies, flawed alternative views were to gain 
hegemony - the statist and collectivist paradigm. But the even greater practical anomalies that 
arose as a result of collectivism's intellectual and political sway could not indefinitely be ig-
nored. The manifest collapse of central planning and the perverse and counter-productive ef-
fects of virtually all forms of state interventionism and social engineering presented very real, 
concrete and obvious anomalies that could not be explained in terms of the theory and claims 
of collectivism. It was thus notable that the "Chicago School" of economics developed its 
vindication of free market economics from a background of detailed studies of the failure of 
various forms of interventionism. Moreover, the so-called "public choice" or economics of 
politics which grew out of the Chicago School approach also added substantially to the class 
analysis of original liberalism. Whilst that earlier analysis provided clear and valuable macro 
concepts of class, class conflict and exploitation, the Chicago School developed a micro analy-
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sis that gave us the tools (albeit occasionally unfortunately mired in an excessively mathemati-
cal form) to understand the detailed dynamics of bureaucracy, coalition and interest group 
formation, of "rent seeking", the workings of the political market (eg the concentrated and 
immediate benefits of special interest seeking versus the dispersed and delayed benefits of the 
"pubic interest" as a whole), of the electoral process, the size of nations, and much more. 
Since my essay was written that scholarship has multiplied enormously. 
It has thus been the "crisis period" of statism that has enabled a reformulated libertarianism to 
emerge - a New Enlightenment without the weaknesses of the original Enlightenment. 
The modern "libertarian" synthesis, I attempt to show, thus parallells the original Enlighten-
ment vision, indeed, can be seen as an attempt to complete successfully that project on which 
the original Enlightenment embarked. I also argue that this emergent body of thought consti-
tutes the beginning of that "science of liberty" as conceived by Murray Rothbard. 
III: Applications - Social Theory and Sociology 
The next related group of essays attempt to apply the perspective of systematic Enlightenment 
liberalism. "Against the New Mercantilism: The Relevance of Adam Smith" situates its 
analysis historically. I attempt to show that Adam Smith's work is far deeper and wider than 
the classical economics that is now seen as his principal importance and heritage. Whilst a few 
other writers have made this point in the past, my essay was, when published, one of the first 
contemporary discussions of the broader significance of Smithian class analysis. The paper 
demonstrates that Smith's economics were in reality part of a larger and more ambitious form 
of liberal historical sociology and class analysis, an attempt to explain "the general principles 
of law and government and the different revolutions they have undergone in different periods 
of society" . 
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I also attempt to show the continued relevance of Smith's approach as an analysis and critique 
of our "present establishments". Smith's economic and class analysis were conducted in the 
context of that system of power and privilege called "Mercantilism". Classic Mercantilism 
was far more than simply a policy of obtaining a favourable balance of payments based upon a 
fallacious confusion of gold and silver with real wealth. It involved an increasingly complex 
policy of state regulation of the entire economy, an attempt to harmonise competing and con-
flicting economic groups and functions and co-ordinate allegedly chaotic competition. Smith, 
of course, demonstrated that in spite of its professed noble intentions (or, at least, slogans) the 
system represented in reality a "wretched spirit of monopoly", and was "prompted always by 
the private interest of particular traders". I attempt to show that the "present establishments" of 
our time can largely be characterised as a form of neo-Mercantilism, and that the burden of 
Smith's critique of 17th century Mercantilism is as relevant and as effective in the context of 
contemporary neo-Mercantilism or "corporatism". Neo-mercantilism and corporatist doctrines 
have proved remarkably resiliant in both theory and practice. Following the apparent demise of 
the 1970' s versions that I outlined in this essay, they have once again emerged in recent years 
in the writings of, amongst others, Barry Jones, Simon Reich, Will Hutton, John Gray, Simon 
Reich, various prophets of the virtues of the alleged success of the "Asian Tigers", and many 
others (13). 
I further demonstrate that a growing body of evidence supports this position. The view that 
state intervention in the economy grew as a reaction to the depredations of business, in order to 
serve the public interest by restraining or controlling corporate excess, is a myth that is in-
creasingly being undermined by the findings of many scholars. From the so-called Left, the 
work of American "New Left" historians (14) has shown that state interventionism in America 
came about as a result of the efforts of business to restrict an increasingly competitive econ-
omy. Apolitical scholars arrived at similar findings, and Chicago School economists and its 
"public choice/economics of politics" spin-off have also offered a more realistic analysis of 
how groups compete for power and privilege in the political or non-market realm. 
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Historically, sociology has largely been associated with and dominated by doctrines that were 
collectivist in both analytical and normative terms. In more recent years, however, that collec-
tivist predominance has been challenged by a growing number of "radical", "reflexive" and 
"humanist" schools. In "Change and Pseudo-Change in Sociology", I analyse the approaches 
of two major efforts at alternative sociologies, those of Dennis Wrong and Monica Morris 
(15). Wrong offers a particularly telling critique of what he terms the "over-socialised" man, 
the predominant view of human nature within orthodox sociology, a view which minimises 
human choice and autonomy and is a travesty of reality. Wrong is also particularly valuable in 
his recognition that many new forms of "symbolic interactionism" are still imbued with a 
passive "social self" view of man, albeit functioning on a lower level. Monica Morris, in turn, 
attempts to survey the various forms of phenomenological, ethnomethodological and interac-
tionist strands of thought, all of which call into question positivist methodology and determin-
ist assumptions. She rightly indicates, however, that many of these approaches suffer from 
pretentious prolixity. Although both writers offer many interesting perspectives which together 
go a long way in deconstructing the collectivist, holist and determinist assumptions of conven-
tional sociology, neither author offers - I attempt to show - a really systematic alternative to 
that mainstream. 
Where that alternative does lie I try to indicate in "Man, Concepts and Society". In a discus-
sion of I. C. Jarvie's Concepts and Society (16), I attempt to show the importance of the pre-
cepts of methodological individualism, as outlined by Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, J. 
W. N. Watkins and Sir Karl Popper. Methodological individualism is the view that social 
phenomena can be explained only in terms of the individual behaviour and choices of individ-
uals, and that explanations in terms of "social forces", determinism and the requirements of 
social collectivities are all erroneous. Jarvie endorses this position and argues that society, and 
especially social change, can be understood only in terms of the beliefs of social actors. Jar-
vie's work shows the fruitfulness of applying that methodology to such subjects as the role of 
children and teenagers, the nature of social class and the validity of the sociology of know-
ledge. His discussion of class is especially valuable and insightful, emphasising that in a free 
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society social class cannot be understood in terms of readily and objectively identifiable social 
groups - that it is the theories of class held by individuals, and their consequent behaviour, that 
explains "class" phenomena. Jarvie's work, alas, as I attempt to show, is not without its 
faults. It tends to be somewhat disjointed and does not extend the insights of the founders of 
methodological individualism. Indeed, in some respects Jarvie's exposition of methodological 
individualism is less exact than those of Von Mises and Hayek. Nevertheless, it does demon-
strate the potential that this school of social theory possesses to explain social phenomena. 
In "Freedom, Responsibility and Justice: The Criminology of the 'New Right!!' I describe 
and evaluate the contributions of contemporary libertarian and conservative approaches in 
criminology. Those contributions stem from a number of diverse roots, principally: a restate-
ment of natural rights ethics; a rigorous application of the conceptual tools of free market 
economics; a vindication of elements of traditionalist conservatism regarding punishment; and 
a critique of the manifest failure of the contemporary legal system and law enforcement. The 
first offers a clear basis on which actually to define crime. A major consequence for social 
policy is thus to reject the panoply of "victimless" crimes (drug use, unconventional sex, 
gambling, drinking, pornography, prostitution etc) as rightful concerns of the law. Resting as 
it does upon a radical assertion of the reality of free will, and a rejection of determinism, 
natural rights libertarianism disputes all forms of criminological and sociological excuse-
making for criminality. Crime is not a result of poverty. Punishment is also defended as it has 
traditionally been recognised, as a manifestation of justice. An emphasis upon restitution, the 
debt owed by the criminal not to "society" but to his actual victim, is also a central feature of 
libertarian criminology. Free market economists, sharing many of the same assumptions as the 
libertarian ethical and political thinkers, have also established that criminals are no less ratio-
nal maximisers than other individuals, and that an unbiased examination of the statistical 
evidence demonstrates that deterrence through effective law enforcement and punishment, 
including capital punishment, does work. Traditionalist conservatives in this context also 
share many of the same assumptions of free will and the importance of justice. Along with 
libertarians and economists, they also have recognised the perverse consequences of indiscri-
12 
minate welfarism, its demoralisation of its recipients and its contributions to a moral environ-
ment of irresponsibility and criminal egotism. And although stemming from a less coherent 
intellectual position a number of "new realist", empirically oriented scholars have also arrived 
at similar conclusions. 
In spite of elements of diversity in all these approaches, a common theme emerges, as I show. 
It is a restatement of the relevance of ethics; the importance of free will and individual re-
sponsibility; the working of deterrence; and the pivotal role of "pauperisation", of the moral 
hazards of welfare, in encouraging criminal behaviour. This perspective, misleadingly termed 
the "New Right" by some, I argue, offers a coherent and convincing alternative to main-
stream contemporary criminology, with its disdain for responsibility, punishment, deterrence 
and liberal concepts of rights. 
IV: Applications - History 
The many economic writings of J . K. Galbraith have been subjected to devastating refutation 
by other economists (albeit with little impact upon his continued fame or popularity). My "An 
Economic Misinterpretation of History: A Critique of J. K. Galbraith's Account of 
American Capitalism" is the first and only critique of Galbraith's assertions regarding the 
history of capitalism, specifically that of 19th century America. In The Age of Uncertainty 
(17) Galbraith portrayed the so-called "Gilded Age" of American capitalism as one in which 
rampant laissez-faire led to the despoiling of worker and consumer, and in which the doctrines 
of "Social Darwinism" were offered by self-consciously guilty and mercenary apologists for 
such predation as William Graham Sumner. This essay demonstrates that this is a wilful tra-
vesty of the truth. Such corruption and predation as did occur, I show, was as a result precise-
ly of the infringements of laissez-faire that were taking place. Social Darwinist doctrines 
were not intellectually predominant in the defense of capitalism, and the only real libertarian 
Social Darwinist, Sumner, was actually a critic of the plutocracy and corruption that did exist. 
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Galbraith's confusions, I attempt to show, stem from a failure to understand the vital distinc-
tion contained in the class analysis of liberalism, as expounded by Smith and as developed by 
others, including Sumner himself. That analysis distinguishes between the "economic" means 
to wealth (peaceful production and trade within the market) and the "political" means (interven-
tionism and the use of state power). Ironically, as Sumner had demonstrated, the very inter-
ventionism advocated by Galbraith was the real source of whatever corruption existed in his 
time. Meanwhile, real productive businessmen (like J. J. Hill, Commodore Vanderbilt, Henry 
Frick, George Westinghouse etc) transformed the American economy with unprecedented 
technical and marketing innovations. As a result the American economy became the most 
successful and prosperous in the world - a fact which somehow escapes Galbraith's attention. 
V: Applications - Political Philosophy 
The next three essays deal with Political Philosophy. In "The Moral Case For Private 
Enterprise" I analyse and advocate the distinctive "rational egoist" or Aristotelian/Natural 
Rights ethical approach expounded by the modern libertarian thinker Ayn Rand. This essay 
was the first on Rand's thought to be published in England. In it I attempt to demonstrate that 
the mainstream of classical liberalism failed to develop a proper moral justification for individ-
ual liberty. Repeatedly, when examining the history of classical liberal thinkers we find them 
conceding the moral high ground to collectivism. As I attempt to show with representative 
quotations from such thinkers as William Lecky, Henry Sidgwick, and Adam Smith himself, 
liberalism consistently conceded the altruist premise, that the essence of morality was the 
submersion of the individual to the good of others or of some collective. I also demonstrate, by 
representative quotations from Marx, Hitler, the Webbs and Richard Titmus, that it is precise-
ly the morality of altruism - with its rejection of individual rights and of individual happiness 
as a standard of value - that is the essence of collectivism. By accepting altruism and versions 
of utilitarianism, Liberalism, I argue, could offer no principled defense against those who 
wished to sacrifice the individual in the name of varied "higher goods". If sacrifice is the 
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standard of morality then there will always be those ready to collect, indeed, to enforce, the 
sacrifice. 
I then briefly outline Rand's vigorous development of the sort of eudaemonistic ethics that 
characterised classical philosophy. In this view morality is a system of values required by 
human nature to guide its choices. Its standard is the survival of the entity according to its 
nature. The requirements of human survival and flourishing qua human being are those of 
productive endeavour and trade. Primary morality is thus a self-regarding system ("virtue as 
self-directed art" or "the practical business of living intelligently", as other Aristotelian scho-
lars have put it). Human rights are those requirements generalised to all human beings - what 
Spencer called the "law of equal liberty" . This position thus rejects the idea that moral action 
is action primarily dictated by the benefits of others rather than of self, that the individual is 
morally obliged to submit to the requirements or dictates of others or the alleged requirement 
of collectivities. It thus offers a fundamental challenge to, and bulwark against, the ethical 
views that undergird virtually all forms of collectivism and statism. 
A perennial form of critique of capitalism and the open society has been in terms of asserting 
the value of "community". In "Co-operation Without Community" I analyse an allegedly 
libertarian attempt to demonstrate the allegedly "communitarian" aspects of liberalism. I argue 
that Professor Richard Hiskes' Community Without Coercion: Getting Along in the Mini-
mal State is, for a work by a professional philosopher, appallingly confused and wrong-
headed. It endlessly elides different senses, some descriptive and some normative, of the word 
"community" (18). Moreover, Hiskes' work also seems to be an exercise in ethical appease-
ment. He apparently believes that, in order to justify classical liberalism it must be morally 
recast as a doctrine of self-sacrifice and the submersion of individual liberty for alleged higher 
goods or purposes - in other words, that it be rendered into a form of statism and collectivism! 
In contrast to Hiskes, I attempt to show that social co-operation and the benevolent recognition 
of mutual rights are characteristics of liberalism and do not necessitate the sort of sacrifice of 
the individual and his rights that "communitarians" urge. In other words, "co-operation" is 
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possible without "community" (as the communitarians understand it). 
Historically, the creation of constitutions and the idea of enshrining basic freedoms in a 
fundamental document, have been strongly associated with liberalism. In "The Case Against a 
Bill of Rights", I discuss the role of a written constitution in the preservation of the rule of 
law. In spite of the traditional emphasis placed upon the letter of constitutionalsm by many 
liberals, especially, but not solely, American ones, I argue that those who emphasise the 
mechanics of written constituions or the design of other constitutional mechanism are mistaken. 
My essay is, to my knowledge, the first specific liberal critique of constitutionalism ever writ-
ten (although a more conservative critique was subsequently penned by Professor Ken Min-
ogue). 
The mistake, I attempt to show, is based on misunderstanding how freedom in society is both 
attained and maintained. Thus, although one of the freest nations on earth, the United States, 
was built upon a written constitution, the other, the United Kingdom, was noted precisely for 
its unwritten constitution. My argument rests upon the following basis. Freedom is attained 
in social life only when the ideas favourable to freedom gain intellectual predominance or 
hegemony. Freedom cannot be imposed mechanistically, so to speak. It is the product of an 
evolutionary process. I am not advancing an exclusively "intellectual interpretation of his-
tory" here. The role of economic interest and of predatory violence (both at an individual 
level and as exercised through those social agencies we term "government" or the "State") all 
play their part. Indeed, what is so depressing in the study of human history is precisely the 
contingent nature of human freedom, the fact that it took the remarkable convergence of so 
many favourable, but exceptional, factors to create the "European miracle". Ultimately, 
however, it is the fundamental ideas and values of a society which dictate its institutional form. 
The point about the American Constitution and its Bill of Rights is that these were the manife-
station of a long tradition of Anglo-American ideas, ideas which had gained a virtual hegem-
ony in both countries. The views of the 18th Century Commonwealthmen, the Levellers, 
16 
John Locke, Natural Law, the Scottish Enlightenment, emerging free market economic theory 
- these were just some of the myriad forms and varieties of classical liberalism which had 
permeated society from top to bottom. The American Constitution and the Bill of Rights were 
simply the triumphal keystone, the manifestation of this ideological power. 
Bills of Rights and written constitutions, I argue, thus do not actually maintain freedom. To 
put it crudely, if the civic order is dominated by liberal mores and ideas then a Bill of Rights 
isn't necessary. If it is not, then a Bill of Rights will not help you. Constitutionalists basic-
ally suffer from a form of social reification. A constitution or Bill of Rights is simply a 
document. It has no reality except as a piece of paper other than in terms of the ideas and 
behaviour of individuals. Thus, it was not the paper "checks and balances" of the American 
Constitution which maintained American freedom, it was the "invisible", but actually more 
real, ones constituted by the beliefs and behaviours of millions of Americans. Many people at 
an earlier period of American history went hungry rather than accept state welfare. Others 
simply would not put up with the sorts of interventionism now accepted as commonplace by 
contemporary Americans. This is what I mean by the real power of ideas as social forces. It 
is the power of the social order, of civic society, not scraps of paper, that limited the American 
state. And it was the same social power that limited the power of the British state in the ab-
sence of a written constitution. 
I should make it clear that I am not actually opposing constitutions per se. It could well be 
argued that, as in the American example, having a clear written description of rights and the 
powers of government does slow down the slide into statism, or that it becomes easier to see 
when liberty, in the form of enumerated rights, is being revoked. "Common lawyer" defenders 
of the "Ancient Constitution" or of the "fundamental law" embodied in the British Constitution 
have thus always had something of a problem of identifying any specific measure as being a 
major breach of that constitution and of that fundamental law - especially if it has been passed 
with all the due process and Parliamentary legitimacy that they also hold to be part of the same 
constitution. A Bill of Rights or written constitution, it might be argued, thus serves as a sort 
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of thermometer, a scale by which to judge basic infringements of the constitution. To mix our 
metaphors somewhat, it is a line in the sand the stepping over of which is a clear warning of a 
threat. However, as current American experience shows, one can never overestimate the 
degree to which wilful obfuscation of the clear meaning of words can take place once an intel-
lectual climate has changed. Nevertheless, even clever procedural tricks and word-twisting, 
which might satisfy the wilful ideological false consciousness of its practitioners amongst the 
political class and the intelligentsia, is less effective with ordinary people. "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peacefully to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances ... A well regulated mili-
tia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to bear arms shall not 
be infringed". Such statements are pretty clear to ordinary people, and as for sophisticated 
dialectical readings and reinterpretations - well, as George Orwell once put it, there are some 
things so stupid only an intellectual would believe them. 
However, we must return to the point that even before the more recent degradations of the 
American constitution there had been countless quite blatant infringements of clear constitu-
tionalliberties, and assumptions of non-constitutionally mandated powers and functions by the 
state. Paper barriers to tyranny are no barriers at all in the absence of the beliefs and will 
necessary to preserve constitutional liberty. We can willingly concede that it is quite conceiv-
able that at some point in the future when libertarian ideas have gained hegemony that the 
limits to state power might well be listed in some form of document. What would be an error, 
however, is to believe that that document can itself preserve freedom in the absence of the 
continued hegemony of those ideas and the continued existence of a civil order that is condu-
cive to liberty. 
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VI: Applications - Culture and Literature 
Finally, I deal briefly with the cultural dimension and relevance of classical liberalism. In 
"Life, Liberty and the Stars: The Ideological Significance of Science Fiction", I demon-
strate why this genre has proved so popular with contemporary libertarians and, indeed, why 
so many Science Fiction authors are actually libertarians. Albeit fairly brief, my essay is one 
of the few works attempting to offer a clear definition of the nature of the genre, and possibly 
the only one to place the libertarian impulse at the centre of such a definition. 
The defining characterises of Science Fiction as a genre, I argue, are not belletristic ones rela-
ting to matters of style, form or symbol, but are, rather, primarily ideological ones, a nexus of 
values and views regarding man and the universe. Science Fiction embodies metascientific 
values relating to the power and desirability of reason and the virtue of enterprise. I use the 
term metascientific deliberately, since Science Fiction is not merely a literary exploration 
of particular scientific, cosmological or technological ideas, extrapolations of the individual or 
social effects of particular inventions or social trends (although it can be all these things) but 
because it embodies what Peter Medawar has called "the new spirit", the intellectual outlook 
not in itself science, but conducive to science". It embodies the Faustian or Promethean 
impulse, the spirit of individualism, of self-confident rationality, of bold conjecture and refuta-
tion, the assumption of the accessibility of reality to human intelligence and the possibility 
and desirability of enhancing human existence. Whilst much of "mainstream" literature sank 
into increasingly trivial realm of the novel of manners, into realist and naturalist doctrines that 
saw individuals as determined by environmental or other forces, or into frequently irrationalist 
avant guard "experiments", Science Fiction embodied a sense of life that was rationalist, 
heroic, individualist and progressive. 
My essay also deals with the varied approaches to the problems of human liberty offered by a 
number of leading Science Fiction authors. Major figures in the genre, such as Robert Hein-
lein, H. Beam Piper and Poul Anderson, have devoted many works to exploring the dilemmas 
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of achieving liberty, or asking whether liberty is ever fully or permanently achievable. This 
literature is far removed from crude propaganda. It constitutes a genuine attempt to embody 
philosophical and political speculation in literary form, and in some cases comes to quite 
pessimistic conclusions regarding the prospects for freedom. I also describe what I term 
"applied science fiction", the activist role in the promotion of liberty, science, technology and 
space exploration taken by authors and devotes of the genre. 
In "Ernest Hemingway and the Failure of Nihilism", I attempt to apply what might be 
termed an ideological approach to the work of a mainstream literary writer, Ernest Hemi-
ngway. This is not, needless to say, to offer a crude sort of "socialist realist" type of argumen-
tation that evaluates art merely in terms of its explicit political and ideological content. But 
nevertheless, there is a truth hidden at the basis of certain Marxist approaches - that values do 
have some involvement with literary and artistic creation. This insight has been forcefully 
argued by the contemporary libertarian Ayn Rand (and suggested briefly in one of Nietszche's 
observations) and this essay is an attempt to apply her view on the centrality of "sense of life" 
in artistic and literary analysis. 
In an overview of Hemingway's major works I thus attempt to show that the profound nihilism 
of Hemingway's sense of life limited the possibilities of his artistic achievement, in terms of 
character delineation, strength of symbolism, and intellectual grasp. Hemingway's outlook 
thus results in characters who become repetitive cliches of stiff-upper lip masculinity; in a 
repetitive symbolism that seems to leave certain natural features as the only embodiment of 
value; and in a glaring lack of any mature philosophical content, any serious thought about 
the themes of his novels. 
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VII: Conclusion - The Nature and Prospects of Liberalism 
In the space of a generation classical liberalism has moved from being a despised tradition with 
a minuscule intellectual following - its intellectual obituary being repeatedly read - to a vigor-
ous contender both for intellectual and political hegemony. It would be premature to say that 
intellectual hegemony has been already been attained - the remnants of Marxism and of var-
ious forms of collectivism still hold great sway in many disciplines and many academic de-
partments. However, liberalism's greatest competitor is now a strange brew of postmodernism 
and deconstructionism, doctrines and work so intellectually shoddy and bizarre that it is hard to 
see them as being sustainable in the long run. 
The current revival of classical liberalism as I have outlined it in "The New Enlightenment" 
has continued. The narrow neo-classical economism and positivism that characterised the later 
liberalism of the 19th and 20th centuries no longer defines contemporary libertarian thought. 
Its scope is now far broader: social theory, history, psychology, and aesthetics have been 
added to an economics which itself is far more satisfactory in both methodology and scope (eg 
public choice theory and the economic analysis of non-market individual and institutional 
behaviour). The idea that to analyse class, social conflict, or exploitation necessitates recourse 
to socialist or Marxist concepts is no longer tenable. The long-standing and little or weakly 
answered moral case against markets and liberalism are increasingly and vigorously being 
answered. The psychological and scientific errors that have buttressed the case for socialism 
have been thoroughly demolished. Classical liberalism has been reborn as a vigorous and broad 
intellectual paradigm. There is, of course, much work to be done. But the outline for future 
progress is, in my view, clear. 
In practical terms free market economics have gained hegemony. And although a long retreat 
of statism is being fought in terms of claims about the necessity of "regulation" or corporatist 
state/market partnership, the superiority of the market mechanism is now almost universally 
recognised. The collapse of "Thatcherism" (never in itself a completely liberal phenomenon) 
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and of the Conservative Party in Britain does not refute this assertion. The Blair tendency in 
Labour is openly wedded to a predominantly market perspective in economic policy. It is 
continuing the process of privatisation, and even appears to have recognised (in private) the 
failure of the NHS and the necessity for its replacement (19). Indeed, in some respects - such 
as the collapse of the work ethic as a result of indiscriminate welfare and the collapse of stan-
dards in the schools - Labour are showing greater signs of awareness of problems and of the 
necessity for action greater than the previous Conservative Government. They are also drawing 
upon the "self-help", "mutualist" and co-operative traditions that the early Labour movement 
shared with classical liberalism and radicalism before socialism proper gained hegemony over 
it (20). 
In political terms, the principal opposition to the free market and to liberalism now comes in 
two forms. The first is "health fascism", a paternalist project exaggerating the dangers of 
various habits or foods, and asserting the primacy of imposing health on people for their own 
good (21). The second, and more serious, is that of environmentalism. However, a movement 
which is so blatantly reactionary, which in its most extreme forms actually desires the extermi-
nation of humanity for the sake of sacred "Gaia", Mother Earth, lacks the long-term appeal of 
socialism - certainly to ordinary people, rather than small groups of psychotics. Socialism at 
least claimed to offer a future of abundance and prosperity. A movement which offers no-
growth stagnation and austerity at best, and a return to primitive tribalism and ultimate extinc-
tion at worst, lacks a certain staying-power (22). Moreover, both health fascism and environ-
mentalism also rely upon "junk science", persistent scientific fraud and legerdemain. Both are 
thus highly vulnerable to falsification. 
I have largely dealt in my essays with explaining the rise of liberalism in terms of internal 
intellectual causes. But although it is not true that "the hand mill will give you a society with a 
feudal lord, the steam mill a society with the industrial capitalist", as Marx asserted in The 
Poverty of Philosophy (in fact the reverse is true: the prevalence of particular ideas and hence 
social practices and forms generates the possibility of technological and scientific progress), 
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there is an ongoing inter-relationship of social context and conditions with intellectual and 
political thought. It is the complicated reality of such an inter-relationship that gives some 
credibility to the absurd assertions of Marxist historical materialism, which reduces the reality 
of human thought and initiative to "phantoms of the mind", the epiphenomena of the "mode of 
production" (23). None of my comments below should in way be misconstrued as an endor-
sement of such a blatantly absurd (yet tragically influential) determinism. 
We are, in my view, now in a position to understand properly the nature of the inter-action of 
social, political and technological forces and their effects upon the prospects for liberty and 
liberalism. And, significantly, we can do so by employing some of the conceptual tools of 
liberalism. 
Specifically, we can now utilise the economics of politics/public choice analysis of government 
and an understanding of the "economy of violence". The latter was explored by Frederic C. 
Lane in his seminal essay "Economic Consequences of Organised Violence" (24). The state, 
he argued, when not a purely predatory activity, is constrained by its "productive" aspects, its 
role as a provider of defensive and legal circumstances. Following the Middle Ages, that 
economy of violence has largely favoured the rise of large centralised states with a heavy 
investment in the machinery of war. The nature of industrial production, and of the sort of 
weaponry prevailing up to now, has further led to increasing returns to violence and to its 
centralisation. 
The sort of industrialisation made possible by the free market and its subsequent scientific and 
technological progress had also increased the returns to violence. The steam mill did give one 
large-scale, centralised, heavy industries. Such industries were, due to their size and centralis-
tion, more vulnerable to coercion and predation both by private violence (trade union sit-ins 
and coercion) and public violence (state taxation and regulation). 
The current wave of technological innovation constitutes nothing less than a second Industrial 
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Revolution, that already is beginning to affect the returns to violence and the nature of the 
dispersion of industry itself. New technology, and especially the internet, has already created 
greater globalisation of capital. Currency transactions and movements can now be effected in 
the blink of an eye. Moreover, effectively unbreakable encryption available to anyone with a 
standard personal computer can render those transactions, and all electronic communications, 
totally secret. The ultimate effect upon the state's ability to regulate or prevent such capital 
movements, to monitor private communications, political or commercial, and to tax private or 
corporate income is obvious. 
The transition to an "information economy", rather than one based on heavy industry, obvious-
ly minimises the centralisation and vulnerability of enterprise to extortion. This will be magni-
fied enormously by the forthcoming revolution in "nanotechnology" - molecular engineering 
(as outlined by K. Eric Drexler, Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology 
(25). Already in experimental development and design, this amazing but unarguably feasible 
technological revolution will mean that even for firms which still deal with manufactured 
products, and which benefit from large economies of scale, the production process will be less 
concentrated. It will be easier to decentralise and far more mobile. They will be able to shift 
production location with an ease that was never an option for old-style heavy manufacturing. 
Even a General Motors will no longer be as dependent upon massive, centralised, capital 
intensive and "heavy" plant. It too will become more of a "virtual" corporation. Any attempt at 
private or public extortion could lead to activities and assets fleeing the jurisdiction in which 
the extortion is taking place. 
"Cybercommerce", and the predicted and probably inevitable emergence of a private cyber-
currency, can only add to the already existing fiscal crisis of the welfare state. The economy 
of violence will also be affected by the possibility of "cyberwarfare", the vulnerability of mili-
tary and commercial functions to electronic attack. The means of attack and defence of such 
systems are further decentralised. Lone individuals will be able to take on states and large 
corporations - and indeed already have done. 
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The returns to violence will have thus been drastically reduced. The mobility of capital, pro-
duction facilities, and intellectual and business talent will drastically limit the ability of the 
state to exploit them. 
Information technology and nano-technology will also have further economic effects. They 
reduce the natural resources input into production process. They will lower the scale of enter-
prise as talent and innovation become more important that existing size and market position. 
They will lower capital costs and barriers to entry. They will reduce the administrative size of 
the firm and over-all labour force costs. The internal transaction costs of firms will also 
decrease. Individual smaller-scale entrepreneurship will thus flourish one again. There will be 
a subsequent reduction in the separation of ownership and control and of the managerial "cap-
ture" of the firm and its resources. 
Although there will be, and already are, attempts to restrict or prevent it, the logic of the new 
technology is clear and its growth and inevitable effects unstoppable. States which try to re-
strict such forces will inexorably decline, and those that do not will at least be hosts to econo-
mic success. If existing states are to survive in a recognisable form they will have to drastical-
ly "downsize" and "marketise" themselves. Unable to milk their inhabitants by taxation, to 
engage in redistribution or projects of alleged national glory, their only scope will be to prac-
tise their role as providers of defence and other possible service functions desired by what are 
increasingly their customers, rather than their subjects. Governmental jurisdiction will, for 
the first time, face effective global competition on the basis of quality and price. 
Thus, the old logic of heavy industry and increased returns to violence that favoured high-cost 
regimes with captive citizenries will have been replaced with a logic favouring hospitality to 
elusive capital and talent. Those states that do not adapt will eventually wither and die, and the 
possibility of the evolution of non-state forms of protective agency also cannot be ruled out. 
The over-all effects of the emergent Second Industrial Revolution will be the empowering of 
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the individual (26). It is hard to envisage liberalism, the normative philosophy of individual-
ism and individual liberty, and the analytical "science of liberty", not finding a more suppor-
tive and receptive environment in such a world. 
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1: CREATING A SCIENCE OF LIBERTY: 
THE LIFE & HERITAGE OF MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, 1926-1995 
Contents: 
I: Economics 
II: Political Theory 
III: History 
IV: A Science of Liberty 
*** 
The death of Murray N. Rothbard in January of this year, at the age of 68, came as a shock to 
me. Since the mid-1960s his intellectual presence in my life (along with that of Ayn Rand and 
a few other libertarian pioneers) had been constant and central. What has Rothbard said about 
this issue or that? What would Rothbard say about this or that? Is he right about this or that? 
What books, articles, or movies is he recommending? What is he working on now? What 
political alliances or tactics is he currently urging? These were questions that engaged me, and 
most of my comrades, for decades. That there could be a world without Rothbard ... well, the 
possibility never occurred to one. 
And now we are in a world without Rothbard, and it is a much poorer one for that. "Rothbard 
is Right" was a slogan on a badge in the late 60s, specifically supporting one of his obiter 
dicta on the feminist movement. I didn't think he was right (or, at least, entirely right) on that 
issue, or indeed, on a number of other political, historical, or tactical questions. But on virtu-
ally all the fundamentals, in the general approach of his work, Rothbard was indeed right. 
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In economics, methodology, political philosophy, and so on, Rothbard truly established what 
he used to call the "plumb line" of correct libertarian analysis. To quibble over whether he 
always hung it perfectly and without error is beside the point, and churlish in an obituary. 
Even when he was wrong (and there is a touch of lese majeste in pronouncing a thinker of 
Rothbard's stature as wrong), what he wrote was clear, unambiguous, tightly reasoned, and 
always worth reading. What a contrast with the pretentious verbiage and obscurantisms of 
most contemporary scholars, of those upon whom academic honoraria and position are la-
vished! 
Rothbard's life was one of ideas and intellectual activism. He received his Ph. D. in Econo-
mics from Columbia University in 1956, taught at New York Polytechnic from 1963 to 1985, 
and from the mid 1980s until his death was Distinguished Professor of Economics at the 
University of Nevada. He also latterly served as Vice-President of the Ludwig Von Mises 
Institute at Auburn University. His academic output was prodigious, and not simply confined 
to the discipline of economics in which he was primarily trained: ethics, political philosophy, 
history, the social sciences, the history of ideas, cultural and artistic topics were all recipients 
of his attention. 
I: Economics 
In economics Rothbard further refined the "praxeological" Austrian School economics of his 
teacher Ludwig von Mises, developing (in, for example, Man, Economy and State) new in-
sights in the theory of capital and interest, competition and monopoly theory, monetary and 
business theory, and taxation. In Power and Market, he extended that analysis even further 
in a systematic typology and critique of all government intervention in the economy - indeed, 
of government per se. 
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II: Political Theory 
In political theory, in For a New Liberty and The Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard extended the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law-natural rights approach (that he shared with Ayn Rand, with 
whom he was briefly associated in the early 1950s) into a similarly systematic and consistent 
radical libertarianism. The economic case against the statism and the state was accompanied by 
an ethical, political, social, and historical critique. 
III: History 
In history Rothbard wrote a 4 volume history of colonial and revolutionary America, Con-
ceived in Liberty. Its central theme was, of course, the never ending struggle between liberty 
and social co-operation on the one hand and statism and coercion on the other. But the histori-
cal perspective was not merely confined to such books or essays on history itself. It informed 
all of Rothbard's work. One of the grievous failings of modern scholarship, as Professor 
Stanislav Andreski has pointed out, is a myopic obsession with current scholarship, and a loss 
of the real discoveries in social studies which have been made. When modern scholarship gets 
it right, it all too frequently is merely rediscovering what had been learnt before (and usually 
expressing it less clearly, succinctly, and accurately). One of the joys of Rothbard's work is 
the constant citation of his great classical liberal and classical economist forebears and their 
analytical breakthroughs - individuals and analyses that had frequently been consigned to the 
memory hole by the academic establishment and forgotten even by libertarians. 
IV: A Science of Liberty 
Rothbard's knowledge of the history of radical and libertarian thought was amazing, and his 
reclamation of our intellectual heritage helped to correct the many grievous errors into which 
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the mainstream of classical liberal thought had fallen. Thus, while that mainstream had 
become dominated by an increasingly rarefied form of value-free economics, Rothbard reuni-
ted sound economics with the profoundly radical class, social, and historical analyses that had 
characterised the work of most of the founding fathers of British and French liberalism. 
Twentieth century liberalism had fallen into a pattern of overly abstract analysis, a certain lack 
of engagement with the most pressing and concrete problems of the real world. The "left" had 
appropriated and distorted class and social analyses that were in origin liberal. What strength 
and purchase on reality various forms of Marxism and socialism possessed frequently stemmed 
precisely from that stolen work. Rothbard thus reunited the three strands of original liberal~ 
ism, - its economics, ethics, and its class and socio-historical analyses - into what classical 
liberalism/radicalism had originally striven to be: a "science of liberty" that sought both to 
understand the world and to change it. 
Rothbard's historical perspective also led him to examine carefully the reasons for liberalism's 
decline: reasons that lay not merely in analytical errors but in a failure to think carefully, or 
even to think at all, about political strategy and tactics. Rothbard wrote and spoke extensively 
on such matters, and attempted to lead the libertarian movement in line with his favoured tacti-
cal and strategic analyses. One's evaluation of the correctness of his analyses - and Rothbard 
changed his tactics a number of times - can legitimately differ, I believe. I would argue that 
there was a constant core of validity beneath what appeared as contradictory shifts, but that 
Rothbard sometimes overstated the mutual exclusivity of particular approaches. 
I have heard it said that if Rothbard had not spread his intellectual talents so widely he might 
have received more established academic recognition, that if he had devoted himself to extend-
ing the scope and conceptual understanding of the Austrian School in economics alone he 
might have earned himself a Nobel Prize. Somehow I doubt it. Although some of the Chica-
goites have ascended to such honours, the more deep and extensive departure from positivist 
orthodoxies inherent in the Austrian approach is too strong a meat for the table of most con-
temporary academics. And anyone with experience of academic life knows that Rothbard's 
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give-no-quarter, wholehearted commitment to justice and liberty also upsets too many acade-
mic applecarts and cosy intellectual cartels. We have also yet to see the Nobel Committee 
mshing to bestow their honours upon say, a gifted Austrian specialist like Israel Kirzner, or 
upon a specialist libertarian philosopher like Tibor Machan. The parade of lacklustre and 
intellectual mediocrities upon whom laureatures are generally bestowed is still a worthy equi-
valent to that of the "ex"-terrorists and present despots who receive the "Peace" Prize. 
Such comments also ignore the tme intellectual significance of Rothbard. Certainly, he could 
have distinguished himself as an ultra-specialist within one discipline, but consider the limits of 
such specialisation. The bane of contemporary social sciences (and arguably the physical ones 
too) is the lack of unifying principles. The common view that modern specialisation or the 
"difficulty" of various sciences makes it impossible to be a "Renaissance Man", an able gener-
alist with a grasp of the whole world of knowledge is, I believe, wrong. Fundamental princi-
ples of human nature and scientific methodology make a coherent understanding of all the 
social sciences accessible. Tmly scientific principles are currently swamped by the contem-
porary obsession with publish-or-perish specialisation and intellectual fragmentation. It 
doesn't have to be that way and it should not be. Basing his scholarship upon an Aristotelian-
Thomistic philosophical foundation meant for Rothbard, and rightly so, that the science of 
liberty was not at root divorced from science as a whole. The philosophy of man, including 
the normative values that derive from our natures, is as much part of tme knowledge as any 
laws of physics or chemistry. The errors of "scientism", the mistaken understanding of the 
nature of science, are in Rothbard's work swept aside. Tme knowledge, as an integrated, 
hierarchical whole - the goal aimed at (and often closely approached) by many of the great but 
neglected Thomists - was once more put at the centre of the intellectual agenda by Rothbard. 
The "Rothbardian system" was not completed by Rothbard. Alas, his history of economic 
thought only reached up to Smith (albeit in two volumes!). His history of America reached 
only the revolutionary period (in 4 volumes!). Sorely missed is the study of the pivotally 
important Progressive period in America, upon which he was working. One wishes too that he 
36 
had written extended treatments of his insights into the philosophy and methodology of history 
and the social sciences, and on the history of sociological thought. But the key foundation 
stones and much of the structure of the Rothbardian system is there. How many others could 
boast of such an achievement? 
I have said little about Rothbard the man. My own contacts with him, whether in agreement or 
disagreement, were fairly few and far between. It must be left to others to testify to his daunt-
less wit, his wide-ranging and jovial friendships across the political spectrum, his political 
manoeuvres and rivalries. But at the end of the day what is important is Rothbard the think-
er, the intellectual heritage which will educate and inspire for countless generations. The 
grand system, the vision of a science of liberty based on praxeological economics, methodolo-
gical individualism, class analysis, and natural law ethics, will be completed by others. That 
work is even now continuing, at the Von Mises Institute, in The Journal of Austrian Econo-
mics, and in the ongoing scholarship of numerous individuals at other institutions or working 
independently. If humanity is to have any sort of decent future, perhaps even a future at all, it 
will be because Murray Rothbard's vision of liberty and justice for all will have triumphed. 
*** 
Originally published in: Free Life: A Journal of Classical Liberal and Libertarian 
Thought, No. 23, August 1995, pp. 7-8. (1739 words) 
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2: THE REVOLUTION OF REASON: PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT 
AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 
"The time will come, then, when the sun will shine 
only on free men on this earth, on men who will recognize 
no master but their reason." Condorcet 
*** 
Contents: 
I: A Rationalist Interpretation of History 
II: Liberty and Capitalism 
III: The Reversal of the Enlightenment 
IV: The Nature of Reason 
V: Psychology and Reason 
VI: Natural Law and Natural Rights 
VII: Science and Scientism 
VIII: The Ambiguities of the Enlightenment 
Notes 
*** 
In his seminal essay "Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty" (1), Professor Murray Roth-
bard delineated a libertarian interpretation of history, an interpretation which saw the larger 
part of humanity I s existence on earth before the 18th Century as dominated by a distinctive 
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"Old Order". Whether in the form of the primitive tribe, Oriental despotism or feudalism, the 
Old Order was a "society of status" distinguished by tyranny, fixed class or caste, exploitation, 
stagnation and hopelessness. It is indeed significant, as we shall see, that this interpretation is 
at once both a libertarian, and, as Karl Popper has put it, a rationalistic one. For Rothbard 
and Popper alike, the dismal record of human history is interrupted by but a few enthralling 
periods distinguished by (in Popper's words) "the efforts of men to free themselves, to break 
out of the cage of the closed society, and to form an open society." (2) Undoubtedly the 
three most important landmarks on the as yet uncompleted journey to an "open society" were 
those of Graeco-Roman civilization, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment. But it was this 
last period, the Enlightenment of the 18th Century, which provided the most revolutionary 
fulfilment of what had been in its predecessors at best only a tenuous promise. As the eminent 
French historian Paul Hazard put it, it was in the period from 1715 that "there became appar-
ent an effervescence and a diffusion of ideas so remarkable in its nature, so far-reaching in its 
extent as to be without parallel in history." (3) In essence, it was the age of the Enlighten-
ment that witnessed the creation of a self-conscious and revolutionary radicalism and a new 
vision of human potentialities, and the possibility of their liberation. 
Professor Peter Gay's monumental two volume study, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation 
(4) is a work of major importance, and it is a most regrettable fact that it has failed to receive 
much attention in libertarian circles. For the creation of a sophisticated historical understanding 
is a vitally important--but all too frequently neglected--part of libertarian analysis, and Gay's 
work constitutes an outstanding contribution to the development of such understanding. In fact, 
The Enlightenment is a most refreshing work of scholarship: in a period of increasingly 
myopic specialization Gay, while undoubtedly in full control of all his materials (a fact attested 
to by his earlier books and essays and by the extensive and dazzling bibliographic essays at the 
end of each volume of this work) does not fail to complete the task of scholarship, that of criti-
cism and synthesis in the cause of the grand theme. But what render's Gay's work all the more 
attractive to the contemporary libertarian is the author's own quite explicit sympathy with his 
subject, with what he describes as "the permanent value of the Enlightenment's humane and 
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liberal vision ... the permanent validity of its critical method." (5) Moreover, Gay's own 
conception of his intellectual task is a threefold one, "to account not merely for the philoso-
phes' ideas and for the interplay of these ideas but also to judge the adequacy or inadequacy of 
their perceptions," (6) leads him to take an unabashed evaluative and critical stance vis-a-vis 
his subject. It is, then, in subject, substance and approach that The Enlightenment possesses a 
direct relevance and importance so often lacking in more orthodox works of intellectual his-
tory.(7) 
I: A Rationalist Interpretation of History 
In tracing the genesis of the Enlightenment and its vision of the past, the first volume of Gay's 
study, entitled The Rise of Modern Paganism, essentially constitutes a powerful documenta-
tion of the "rationalist interpretation of history." For Gay, as for the philosophes, Greek 
civilization was a true revolution in the intellectual history of mankind, a "discovery of the 
mind," a period which "liberated men from the tyranny of myth and breathed the bracing air of 
reason." (8) It was not a revolution at one blow, of course, but rather "a long, laborious 
conquest of myth by reason" which took place, but it was a revolution nonetheless. Gay draws 
on the work of a number of scholars, including F. M. Cornford, Jane Harrison, Bruno Snell 
and Henri Frankfort in support of his thesis. But it is Ernst Cassirer' s distinction between two 
basic patterns of thought, between an essentially pathological "mythopoeic" mentality and 
rational intelligence, of which he makes the most fruitful use. (9) And it was undoubtedly to 
Greece that we are indebted for the revolutionary creation of a sustained critical intelligence 
which cut through the "web of myth" that had for so long constrained humanity. 
For the philosophes of the Enlightenment the decline of Graeco-Roman civilization and the 
rise of Christianity constituted a terrible tragedy: the Middle Ages were for them truly Dark 
Ages, when the power of reason was once more subject to superstition and overwhelming 
religious and political tyranny. The Enlightenment view of the Middle Ages has, of course, 
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been subject to massive criticism, and it is indeed necessary, as Gay points out, to recognize 
"the beauty, the learning, and the variety of the Christian millennium" (10), to observe that it 
was "not merely an abyss ... but a transmission belt." (11) In reality, the philosophes were 
themselves often constrained to make such qualifications. But, as Gay states, their polemics 
were very much to a purpose: "they treated the past ideologically because they were engaged 
in an ideological battle that knew no quarter. The Christian millennium ... was part of their 
political present." (12) Moreover, the philosophes were fundamentally correct in their view 
of the Middle Ages; it was a qualitatively different period. As Gay puts it: "behind a tissue of 
erroneous detail and prejudiced judgment stands a major historical truth, a truth that remains 
valid and becomes more obvious after its animus has been stripped away and its emotional 
terminology replaced by neutral language -- the Middle Ages were different in vital essence 
from the ages that preceded and followed them. And they were different, above all, because 
they introduced -- or rather, reinstated -- religious myth as the deepest motive power and final 
purpose of civilization." (13) 
Nevertheless, the seeds of a new society -- "seeds of reason" -- remained within the womb of 
the old. For Gay it is the four centuries between 1300 and 1700 that constitute the "prehistory 
of the Enlightenment", a period "when the critical mind resumed its interrupted conversation 
with classical antiquity and moved towards independence." (14) These were the years in 
which the unity of Christian civilization was increasingly undermined by forces of secularism 
and rationalism and, indeed, by its own spiritual malaise and lack of self-confidence. If not yet 
modern, it was an age no longer strictly mediaeval, an age aptly characterized by Gay as the 
"era of pagan Christianity" when the new forces and spirit were still subsumed under or con-
trolled by the old. The burgeoning of the Renaissance testified, however, to the vigour of the 
new spirit, to the new sense of man as "free, the master of his fortune, not chained to his place 
in a universal hierarchy but capable of all things." (15) But while the Renaissance possessed 
the same general qualities as the Enlightenment, manifesting most of the same intellectual 
themes and tensions, it resolved them in a different manner. Rather than a revolution, the 
Renaissance represented a victory for moderation and "compromise". As Gay puts it: "The 
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central intellectual problem of the Renaissance was to find ... a compromise formula ... that 
would enable men to live comfortably with classical forms and Christian convictions, trust in 
man and trust in God, vigorous secular energies and a tenacious ascetic ideal." (16) 
It was, then, to the Enlightenment that was left the task -- the honour -- of finally breaking out 
of the "holy circle" (as Gay terms it) and of completing what we might call "the revolution of 
reason." The "recovery of nerve" manifest in the Renaissance reached its culmination in the 
sense of life of the Enlightenment, in an ethos in which the possibility of massive social protest 
no longer wore a mantle of unrealistic utopianism. And this revolution in attitude, as Gay 
makes clear, was precisely the product and accompaniment of the growing predominance of 
reason, of critical intelligence, and its fruits in science and medicine. What Gay's work so 
effectively and valuably underlines is the inextricable linkage of the two basic values of the 
Enlightenment, between "the supremacy of philosophy and the autonomy of man." For the 
revolution of reason was simultaneously and of necessity the revolution of liberty. The auto-
nomy of the individual rests only upon the supremacy and exercise of a militant rationalism 
which blasts aside the pretensions of illegitimate authority and the mystique of the status quo. 
The revolutionary significance of an unbridled rationalism was indicated most vividly by 
Diderot's ideal of the philosopher who "tramples underfoot prejudices, tradition, antiquity, 
universal assent, authority, in a word, everything that overawes the mass of minds, who dares 
to think for himself, to go back to the clearest general principles, examine them, discuss them, 
admit nothing save on the testimony of his experience and his reasoning." (17) 
II: Liberty and Capitalism 
The political temper and tendency of the Enlightenment was, then, fundamentally libertarian. 
Its politics was essentially a politics of liberty -- a "politics of decency" as Gay sympathetically 
puts it -- which launched a growing attack upon a hierarchical class society, upon slavery and 
serfdom, upon clerical despotism and upon the barbarity of the criminal law, in favour of a 
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free and humane society open to talent and merit. As Gay states: 
"The men of the Enlightenment united on a vastly ambitious programme, 
a programme of secularism, humanity, cosmopolitanism, and freedom, 
above all, freedom in its many forms --freedom from arbitrary 
power, freedom of speech, freedom of trade, freedom to realise one's 
talents, freedom of aesthetic response, freedom, in a word, of moral 
man to make his own way in the world. "(18) 
Moreover, while hardly a radical libertarian, and frequently manifesting many of the orthodox 
myths and attitudes (he is, for example, quite capable of speaking about "the bourgeois spirit, 
which would merely rationalize the cowardice, the greed, and the philistinism typical of the 
trading mind"!) (19), Gay makes it thoroughly clear that economic freedom, the ideal of the 
free market and laissez-faire, was a vital and basic part of the Enlightenment's radicalism. He 
speaks of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations as a "cardinal document of the Enlighten-
ment" (20) and declares that, 
"(F)undamental values -- Enlightenment values --were involved in the 
issue of economic freedom, most notably man's right to determine his 
own fate, his right to be treated not as a ward of a supremely wise 
government but as an autonomous being." (21) 
In fact, Gay's -- alas too brief -- comments regarding the origins of capitalism are remarkably 
incisive and of some note in an historical area crying out for libertarian revision. Indeed, his 
remarks lend support to the thesis of Professor Rothbard in his essay "Left and Right: The 
Prospects for Liberty". They implicitly help refute the view (originated, as Rothbard pointed 
out, by the late 19th Century German anti-liberal historians) that the growth of the absolute 
monarchies and of mercantilism was a historically progressive stage necessary for the liber-
ation of the merchants and masses from local feudal restrictions. (22) Rather, Gay helps show 
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that the genesis of market capitalism was essentially an interstitial one, a development that 
flourished precisely where coercive authority was exercised less, whether that authority be of 
feudal lord and guild or royal absolutism and mercantilism. In Gay's words: 
"The dynamism that is the capitalist spirit was .,. the property of 
a minority and to an impressive extent of outsiders. In England, the 
industrial revolution was almost proverbially in the hands of Protestant 
Dissenters and Scots in search of their fortune. In France, 
financial and industrial innovations were largely the work of foreign 
Protestants -- Scots and Genevans -- and Huguenot families who had 
survived the great purges of the 1680s. Prussia benefited immensely 
from those purges: the Great Elector intelligently invited Huguenot 
refugees into his domains, and acquired able administrators and 
inventive craftsmen. The great port city of Hamburg, one of the 
many Free Cities in the German Empire, avoided the decay of most 
of the others by welcoming foreigners of all nationalities and 
giving them a share in civic and commercial affairs. The 
Hamburg Constitution of 1712, perhaps the least oligarchical 
urban charter of the age, reflected this liberal spirit and 
protected it. And in many European cities the Jews and Lombards 
did the financial business that the new spirit demanded 
and the old religion condemned." (23) 
III: The Reversal of the Enlightenment 
However, as incisive and valuable as Gay's study is, it unfortunately falls short of perfection in 
one very important respect. Perhaps it is due to the fact that the author is not himself a radical 
libertarian, but a relevant and central question regarding his subject is notable mainly by its 
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absence: i.e. what became of the Enlightenment's "humane and libertarian vision"? What 
happened to a seemingly overwhelming intellectual and political movement toward "natural 
liberty. "? That Gay fails to explore this issue is all the more strange since his own principal 
intellectual mentor, Ernst Cassirer, had himself voiced such questions: 
"How was it that all these great achievements (i.e., of the Enlightenment) 
were suddenly called into question -- that the nineteenth century 
began with attacking and openly defying all the philosophical and 
political ideals of the former generation? 
(What lay behind) the complete and rapid change of ideas that we 
meet in the first decades of the nineteenth century?" (24) 
The major part of the answer to such questions can be found, I believe, within the Enlighten-
ment itself. As Paul Hazard wrote regarding the "disaggregation" of the Enlightenment: 
"(W)ithin those symmetrical designs (i. e., of Enlightenment philosophy) 
. .. there were hidden certain inconsistencies, certain contradictory 
elements, which ultimately rendered them nugatory, at least in part 
... we shall see a doctrine brought to nought, not by any hostile 
intervention from without, but by the operation of some inherent defect 
from within. We shall see how flaws remained undetected within a system 
that was so seemingly faultless; we shall see how a victory, 
prematurely proclaimed, turned out to be no victory at all, and how, 
yet once again, a mighty effort to bring happiness to mankind was 
doomed to end in failure." (25) 
In other words, it was the very flaws and ambiguities within the Enlightenment's own philoso-
phy to which we can trace the causes its dissolution and the failure of its libertarian promise. 
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In all fairness to Professor Gay he does partially recognise this. He is quite well aware, of 
course, that "(t)he world has not turned out the way the philosophes wished and half expected 
it would." (26) And he does portray those ambiguities which were to prove so fatal -- but 
implicitly. What he fails to do, unfortunately, is to draw out explicitly the full significance, 
the political and ideological significance, of those philosophical ambiguities. 
What, then, were those fatal ambiguities to which we refer? Drawing especially from the 
second volume of Gay's work, The Science of Freedom, we can, I think, distinguish four 
major areas of concern: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
the status of reason and the reason-emotion relationship 
the nature of human psychology 
the status of "natural law" 
the significance and implications of science. 
IV: The Nature of Reason 
Although the Enlightenment was eventually to be subject to especially vehement attack for its 
allegedly "cold and heartless" rationalism it was, ironically, precisely the status of reason and 
its relationship to the emotions that constituted a serious ambiguity central to most Enlighten-
ment thinkers. For although committed to rationalism and to philosophy as "the organized 
habit of criticism", the Enlightenment also stressed a certain "philosophic modesty". In their 
reaction against the abstractions and dogmatisms of both mediaeval and 17th Century philoso-
phy and theology -- against what David Hume termed "an abstruse philosophy which seems to 
have hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error"(27) --
the philosophes were uncertain as to the nature and ultimate province of reason. As Gay 
states: "(T)he limits of rational inquiry into ultimate mysteries, the impotence of reason before 
the passions, were ... themes that haunted the Enlightenment." (28) Indeed, he is even able to 
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label this aspect of their thought as a "revolt against reason." Moreover, this uncertainty as to 
the power and province of reason combined with another fatal ambiguity. For the rehabilitation 
and celebration of man as a natural creature was a rehabilitation of the "whole" man, of the 
passions as well as of reason, of man as a sensual and emotional being. And to a certain 
degree this was all well and good; as Gay states, "the Enlightenment's rehabilitation of the 
passions was essential to its rehabilitation of man as a natural creature." (29) But the philoso-
phes were unable to successfully resolve the false dichotomy between reason and emotion, and 
in fact widened it by their vague and dangerous encomiums to the passions. The "emotional" 
nature of man, the limits -- both philosophical and psychological -- of individual reason, was a 
central message of Enlightenment thought. Hume's statement that "(r)eason is, and ought only 
to be, the slave of the passions ... " was merely one of its most famous manifestations. And 
thus the Enlightenment had left the path fatefully unobstructed for the progress of those myriad 
doctrines proclaiming the primacy, psychological, political and moral, of the "passions", for 
movements seeking the fulfilment of the alleged emotional needs of man, for countless irratio-
nalist theories and cults; in a word, for the statist collectivisms of both "left" and "right". 
V: Psychology and Reason 
A similar ambiguity in Enlightenment philosophy arose in the area of its dominant psychologi-
cal concepts, i.e. because of its Lockean "sensationalism" and "associationism." For although 
the motivation and predominant interpretation of the Lockean approach was undoubtedly liber-
tarian -- i.e., in its undermining of "original sin" and the mystique of the status quo, and estab-
lishment of the possibility of rational and radical social improvements (30) -- its potential 
implications were sinister indeed. The whole tendency of empirical psychology following 
Locke was the minimising, ultimately the complete denial, of the significance -- the very exis-
tence of "reflection", i.e. of reason. In modern terminology, its vision of man was essential-
ly deterministic and behaviouristic, and the implications of such a vision are, as its more radi-
cal and frank exponents were eventually to declare, to render "freedom and dignity" quite 
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meaningless. The logic of determinism and environmentalism is most definitely not the logic 
of liberty, but that of "social planning", "social control", "social engineering" and other such 
similar formulas for tyranny. 
VI: Natural Law and Natural Rights 
But possibly the most immediately striking ambiguity -- certainly the most immediately politic-
ally significant -- within Enlightenment thought was the tension between the tradition of natural 
law-natural rights philosophy and that of utilitarianism. And that tension was one resolved 
increasingly in favour of utilitarianism. As Gay puts it: "As the century went on, the philoso-
phes' attitude toward natural law became more and more sceptical, their relation to it more 
and more tenuous ... " (31). The significance of this change in attitude indeed held the most 
serious implications for the Enlightenment's "humane and libertarian vision", for the point is, 
as Elie Halevy made clear in his classic study of philosophic radicalism, that "(t)he philosophy 
of utility is not essentially a liberal philosophy -- not, in origin and in essence, a philosophy of 
liberty". (32) The real nature of utilitarianism was not immediately apparent during the En-
lightenment because its exponents and those of a natural rights based liberalism shared many of 
the same assumptions regarding man and society, assumptions largely libertarian in orientation 
and result. (33) But once those assumptions changed, then the logical direction of utilitarian-
ism could be seen clearly for what it was, and that was most definitely not a libertarian one. 
The example of Jeremy Bentham in this respect is particularly illuminating, and although he 
stands largely outside the main period of concern even Professor Gay is constrained to 
comment parenthetically upon him. For Bentham's obsessive fascination with his "Panopticon" 
model prison scheme, a vision of absolute "efficiency" and authoritarian control, illustrates 
very well the internal logic of the utilitarian position and its hold on the mind of a certain type 
of intellectual. Gay's dismissal of this authoritarian, manipulative element in Bentham's 
thought as an "eccentricity" (34) simply will not do. It should certainly be considered in the 
context of the other themes in his work, countervailing themes more libertarian and individual-
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ist in essence, but it remained nonetheless a very real and powerful element. (35) And Ben-
tham's significance in the context of this issue should not be underestimated; Gay is surely 
right in his description of him as "the arch-philosophe, who took eighteenth-century radical 
ideas into the nineteenth. " (36) 
The Enlightenment's ambiguity relating to natural law is rendered all the more striking, 
however, when we realise that it was David Hume who delivered the real, the philosophical 
and epistemological, deathblows to the doctrine. For Hume, in Gay's view, represented "the 
complete modern pagan", and almost archetypal embodiment of the Enlightenment ethos and 
dialectic: "in his intellectual pedigree, in his intentions, and in his very world view, Hume 
belongs with the philosophes, no matter how amiable his disposition, individual his argumenta-
tion, and unexpected his conclusions". (37) Yet Gay is also compelled to recognize that in its 
attack on "mere philosophic fictions" Hume's thought marks an epoch in the internal history of 
the Enlightenment." (38) If reason constituted the basis of the Enlightenment's radicalism and 
libertarianism, Hume's denial of necessity in causal relations, his denial of any rational basis to 
moral judgments, and his declaration of the impotence of reason before the passions, clearly 
represented a major challenge to that libertarianism. Whatever the complexity of motivation 
and intellectual orientation in Hume's case, a more penetrating assessment of his historical 
significance is surely that of Sheldon S. Wolin, who declared that "Hume was something more 
than the Enlightenment incarnate, for his significance is that he turned against the Enlighten-
ment its own weapons ... (whittling) down the claims of reason by the use of rational 
analysis." (39) 
At this point it should be stressed that Gay is correct in emphasising the "humane and liberal 
vision" as fundamental to the Enlightenment. The attempt by such scholars as J. L. Talmon 
and Louis Bredvold (40), to portray the philosophes simply as proto-totalitarians can only be 
supported by a highly selective and one-sided reading of their work. However, the point is 
that totalitarian potentialities were implicit in the Enlightenment, within the sort of philosophic 
ambiguities we have discussed. And Bredvold, in his The Brave New World of the Enlight-
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enment, is certainly correct in his view of the ominous implications of the abandonment of 
natural law. It is, then, precisely in such ambiguity -- as much as in its positive intellectual 
virtues -- that the significance of the Enlightenment lies. 
VII: Science and Scientism 
Not as immediately important as the abandonment of natural law and the rise of utilitarianism, 
but undoubtedly as ultimately significant, was a further ambiguity arising from the question of 
the status and implications of Science. As Gay notes, Science became in the enlightenment a 
"new mystique", with the figure of Newton being virtually deified (41). But in their quite 
understandable and thoroughly humanistic enthusiasm for the mastery over nature -- the liber-
ation -- promised, and increasingly achieved, by Science, the philosophes drew conclusions 
that resulted eventually in unhumanistic -- and inhumane -- developments. As Gay puts it: 
"The momentous manifestation of the scientific method -- one of the 
most significant, most heartening realities in the world of the 
Enlightenment -- promised a momentous consequence. If the scientific 
method was the sole reliable method for gaining knowledge in a 
wide variety of contexts, from the phenomena of the heavens to the 
phenomena of plant life, it seemed plausible and in fact likely that 
it could be profitably exported to other areas of intense human 
concern where knowledge was as primitive now, and disagreement as 
vehement, as it had been in physics a century before -- the study 
of man and society. " (42) 
But as he further states: 
"The Enlightenment I s entanglement with science is pervaded with ironies 
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· .. the philosophes' seizure of science was a far from untroubled 
affair ... (confronting them) with linguistic, ethical and metaphysical 
difficulties they had not anticipated, and for which most of them 
were ill-prepared. " (43) 
Unfortunately, however, Professor Gay hardly broaches the full irony, the real ambiguity, of 
the Enlightenment's vision of science, and why it held such ominous implications. This con-
sists of the fact that it was the methodology of the physical sciences that was to be applied to 
the study of man and society. Thus there was born that phenomenon we now refer to as 
"scientism", a development perhaps most thoroughly analysed by Friedrich Hayek in The 
Counter-Revolution of Science (44). In scientism we confront a profoundly unscientific, 
uncritical attempt to transfer the methodology of one scientific discipline to another, ignoring 
the crucial and distinctive attributes of their respective subjects -- in the case of the study of 
man, his rational consciousness. Thus, the dominance of scientism has produced "social sci-
ences" characterized by their militant denial of the validity of introspection, by reductionism 
and determinism, and by methodological collectivism, holism, and historicism. Of course, in 
the work of the most scientifically inclined of the philosophes -- d' Alembert, Turgot, La-
grange, and Condorcet -- the full implications of this development were hardly grasped or 
acted upon. As Hayek observes, they still embraced, both in theory and practice, not insignifi-
cant elements of the "abstract and theoretical method" and indeed remained "staunch indivi-
dualists." But nevertheless, as Hayek also concludes, "in some respects most of these men 
unwittingly started trains of thought which produced views on social matters very different 
from their own." (45) The ethos of science and rationality, of control over nature, was also 
transformed by other figures into a "scientific" vision of "humanity determining itself", and 
other rhetorical formulas which glossed over the fact that this could only mean in practice 
some men "determining" others. Thus, in the "social physics" of Saint-Simon and August 
Comte, and in the later classic sociology of Durkheim and Mannheim, scientism emerged fully 
in its true colours -- i.e., as a thoroughly anti-individualist, anti-libertarian, and authoritarian 
movement, a counter-revolution in every sense of the term. Once more, then, the Enlighten-
51 
ment's heritage was an ambiguous one. If Gay can pay tribute to its "humane and liberal vi-
sion", then such contemporary advocates of totalitarian social engineering as Ernest Becker 
(46) are, alas, equally well justified in tracing to the Enlightenment's search for a "science of 
man" the roots of their own nefarious and despotic vision. 
VIII: The Ambiguities of the Enlightenment 
It is, then, a failure to draw out the full significance -- the political and ideological significance 
-- of the ambiguities within Enlightenment philosophy that constitutes the major failing of the 
otherwise so masterly achievement of Peter Gay's The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. 
Not that he is entirely unaware of such ambiguities, or fails to deal with any of the political 
aspects of the Enlightenment, of course. He does state, for example, that "politics presented 
the Enlightenment with a dilemma of heroic proportions" (47). The issue of whether coercion 
and manipulation by a paternal and enlightened elite was justifiable for the attainment of En-
lightenment ends was, Gay indicates, a major issue, and one rendered all the more central by 
the generally environmentalist viewpoint of the philosophes (48). The anti-libertarian implica-
tions of such environmentalism were in fact seen, as Gay recounts, by Diderot, who criticised 
the ominously authoritarian direction in which Helvetius' extreme environmentalism had led 
him. (49) Yet such points cry out for elaboration, an elaboration they alas fail to receive. 
Consider the final chapter of the second volume, dealing with Rousseau. What an opportunity, 
in analysing this paradoxical figure, to sum up all the ambiguity of the Enlightenment and its 
political meaning. For Rousseau, as Gay does indeed state, while "not wholly in the Enlight-
enment .,. was of it". He was, in Gay's view, at one and the same time "a libertarian who 
could not get compulsion out of his mind" (51). He so blatantly manifests, too, that patholo-
gical psychological characteristic we so frequently find at the roots of statist-collectivist 
movements, that "urgent, sometimes frantic longing for community" (52). In all these things 
Rousseau gave an unmistakable indication as to the course of future history. And in his 
typically "dialectical" concept of "the general will", an attempt to offer a solution to "the 
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dilemma between freedom and reform that beset the [other philosophes] (53), the path of 
much future political thought and development could clearly be seen. Professor Gay rightly 
recognizes that Rousseau was thus more "modern" that his fellow philosophes and that his 
thought was distinguished by its "anticipation of future problems" (54). But that Rousseau's 
solutions "presented glimpses of a future not wholly palatable" (55) is surely an understate-
ment. In both motivation and thought Rousseau clearly stands, as Crane Brinton has stated, as 
"one of the prophets of modern collectivist society" (56). 
Although one recognizes that any study of so broad a scope as Professor Gay's is subject to 
obvious limitations of space, his failure to pursue such important and significant insights 
beyond a few token sentences or comments is striking -- all the more so in comparison with, 
say, his extremely detailed treatment of such a topic as the aesthetic thought of the Enlighten-
ment. 
In The Rise of Modern Paganism, the first volume of his study, Gay had seen a major part of 
his scholarly task as that of judging the "adequacy or inadequacy" of the Enlightenment's 
historical vision of itself -- i.e. of its significance and place in history. What I find so grev-
iously lacking (and, as a radical libertarian, so important) in The Science of Freedom, the 
second volume, is any similar evaluation of the Enlightenment's philosophic-political vision of 
itself, of the significance and status of its political liberalism and its "science of freedom." In 
fact, what becomes unmistakable after any serious study of the Classical Liberal tradition is 
just how ambiguous, how restricted, and how fatally flawed in its libertarianism it was. Its 
departures from individualist premises, in both normative and analytic respects, were far from 
infrequent. Thus, we find Adam Smith declaring, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, that 
"Man was made". to promote". the happiness of all" (57). As one Smith scholar has con-
cluded: "It was not to serve the selfish benefit of the individual that he should be given his 
head ... the belief that Smith was primarily an individualist ... is the very reverse of the truth. 
For him ... the interests of society were the end" (58). Similarly, his very view of the individ-
ual was as a highly "social" creature, moulded by his social relationships and extremely 
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vulnerable to the alleged horrors of isolation and loneliness. It was indeed an extremely 
"oversocialized conception of man" (to use the phrase of Dennis Wrong) to which Smith 
adhered (59), and, as Gladys Bryson has written, "in (the) discussions of Smith's ... which 
prefigure so much of modern social psychology, there sometimes seem to be no individuals at 
all, so organic is the relation of person to person conceived to be" (60). These characteristics 
were shared by the whole of the "Scottish School" of which Smith was a member -- by Hume, 
Adam Ferguson, Francis Hutchinson, John Millar, Dugald Stewart, the major thinkers who 
established not merely foundations of political liberalism but much of the basic conceptual 
framework of modern thought, the intellectual channels in which thought has run since their 
time. And for the Scottish School, as A. L. Macfie has written, "the ultimate unit is society, 
and moral obligations consist just in the individual's duty to society, where there is conflict 
with the claims of 'self-love"' (61). In the work of Adam Ferguson, for example -- which 
was, significantly, an influence upon Marx -- we find an often extreme hostility to individual-
ism and "selfishness", a view of the individual as overwhelmingly socially conditioned, and an 
early version of the wrongheaded and harmful "alienationist" thesis (62). 
The same sort of fatal ambiguities and flaws were also present in Classical Economics as a 
whole. Much of the "communitarian" and nationalistic outlook at the Mercantilists was to 
remain in the Classical approach. "It was," Professor Lionel Robbins points out in his impor-
tant study The Theory of Economic Policy in English Classical Political Economy, "the 
consumption of the national economy which they [the Classical Economists] regarded as the 
end of economic activity" (63). And regarding the concept of laissez-faire it should also be 
noted that none of the Classical Economists ever adopted it as a consistent policy prescription. 
At best it was only conceived of as a vague tendency within the boundaries of legitimate natio-
nal sovereignty. Any government intervention in the economy, any restriction of "naturalliber-
ty", was to be judged on its individual "merits", not against any standard of natural rights.(64) 
Moreover, serious technical ambiguities and failings drastically undercut the Classical analysis 
of the market. Smith's view of the division of labour (like Ferguson's) left the way clear, 
even encouraged, the later development of alienationist doctrines. More importantly, how-
54 
ever, the Classical labour theory of value provided the foundation for very different conclu-
sions which were to be drawn by Marx and other socialists -- and even led astray many indi-
vidualists in their view of profit, interest and rent. In all, then, as Lionel Robbins concluded, 
"The Classical analysis abounds in pessimistic vistas and revelations of clashes of interest" 
(65). 
One could elaborate at much further length, but the point should be clear (66). Liberalism, 
from Smith and the Scottish School, through Classical Economics, Bentham and the Utilitar-
ians, to Mill, Spencer and up to the present day has been completely undermined by its own 
fatal intellectual ambiguities and flaws. It failed to complete the Enlightenment's revolution of 
reason, to provide a complete and consistent vindication of human liberty. Instead, its conser-
vative and collectivist elements overwhelmed its liberal and individualist ones. As Sheldon S. 
Wolin has concluded in an important and penetrating re-assessment of the liberal tradition: 
"Liberalism has always been accused of seeking to dissolve the 
solidarities of social ties and relationships and to replace them 
by the unfettered, independent individual, the masterless man. 
In reality, the charge is almost without foundation and completely 
misses the liberal addiction towards social conformity." (67) 
Professor Gay's failure to deal with the ultimate political significance of the Enlightenment is 
in fact rendered all the less understandable by his recognition of the dual nature of its concern 
with "criticism and power," (68) in his statement that "(t)he science of freedom (i.e. Enlight-
enment scholarship) was intended as a practical science" (69). His conclusion of the second 
volume on a brief consideration of the American Revolution as "the (Enlightenment) pro-
gramme in practice," and an assessment of The Federalist as "a classic work of the Enlight-
enment" (70) is not only quite inadequate in the depth of its analysis but only serves to under-
line the fundamental ambiguity of the Enlightenment's politics. For while we can indeed 
perceive the strong influence of the "eighteenth century commonwealthman", of natural rights 
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libertarianism, in colonial and revolutionary thought, we can also find there, as William 
Appleman Williams has persuasively argued, strong elements of the mercantilist, nationalist, 
and conservative traditions (71). 
If, in the latter half of this examination of Peter Gay's The Enlightenment: An Interpretation 
I have struck a somewhat critical note, it should not be allowed to detract, however, from the 
profound admiration it nevertheless elicits in me. In an age in which the forces of unreason and 
irrationality are ever more rampant, in "counter culture" and "ivory tower" alike, Gay's work 
provides and eloquent and much needed reminder of -- and tribute to -- the revolutionary sig-
nificance of Reason in human history. To enter, via the two volumes of Gay's study, the intel-
lectual world of the Enlightenment is to enter the dazzling realm of the promise of rationalism. 
If the philosophes failed to fulfil that promise, their work nevertheless still provides us with 
both inspiration and instruction. Learning from both the achievements and the errors of the 
past we must, and can, ensure that this time a revolution of reason will not be betrayed, that 
every vestige, political and intellectual, of the "old order" will at last be deservedly swept into 
the dustbin of history. And to replace that "old order", which is alas still with us, for the 
contemporary radical libertarian the inspiring vision is that voiced so movingly by Condorcet, 
of "(t)he moment ... when the sun will shine only on free men on this earth, on men who will 
recognize no master but their reason. " 
NOTES 
1. In Left and Right: A Journal of Libertarian Thought, 1(1), Spring 1965. 
2. The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 2: The High Tide of Prophecy, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, London, 1945, p. 303. 
56 
3. European Thought in the Eighteenth Century, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex, 1965, p. 7. 
4. The Enlightenment: An Interpretation; Vol. 1: The Rise of Modern Paganism, 
Vol. 2: The Science of Freedom, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1967, 1970. 
5. The Science of Freedom, p. 567. 
6. The Rise of Modern Paganism, "Preface", p. xiii. 
7. Compare Gay's work with, for example, Preserved Smith's The Enlightenment, 
1687-1776 (Vol. 2 of A History of Modern Culture), Collier, New York, 1962, 
a quite worthy and exhaustive study on more conventional lines. 
8. The Rise of Modern Paganism, p. 72. 
9. Ibid., pp. 72-82, 89-94. One need not accept the rest of Cassirer's Kantian 
philosophy to recognize the penetration and value of his work on this topic 
(and others in the history of ideas). An accessible introduction to his views 
on the nature of myth can be found in Part 1, "What is Myth", of his The Myth of 
the State, Yale University Press, 1946. The similarities between Cassirer's concept 
of myth and the fallacies of conceptual realism and methodological holism are 
also noteworthy. 
10. The Rise of Modern Paganism, p. 209. 
11. Ibid., p. 225. 
12. Ibid., p. 211. 
57 
13. Ibid., p. 212. But if the philosophes were basically correct, then 
why should any rational person want to strip away their "emotional terminology" , 
the rightful expression of a righteous outrage? 
14. Ibid., p. 256. 
15. Ibid., p. 266. 
16. Ibid., p. 270 
17. Quoted in Ibid., p. 160. 
18. Ibid., p. 3 
19. The Science of Freedom, p. 48. 
20. Ibid., p. 368. 
21. Ibid., p. 367. 
22. As Rothbard states: "In actuality, this was not at all the case; the King and his 
nation-state served rather as a super-feudal overlord re-imposing and reinforcing 
feudalism just as it was being dissolved by the peaceful growth of the market 
economy. The King superimposed his own restrictions and monopoly privileges 
onto those of the feudal regime. The absolute monarchs were the Old Order writ 
large and made even more despotic than before. Capitalism, indeed, flourished earliest 
and most actively precisely in those areas where the central State was weak or 
non-existent: the Italian cities, the Hanseatic League, the confederation of 17th 
century Holland ... industry and the market (expanded) through the interstices 
58 
of the feudal order (e.g. industry in England developing in the countryside beyond 
the grip of the feudal State, and guild restrictions), "Left and Right: The Prospects 
for Liberty", op. cit., p. 5. 
23. The Science of Freedom, pp. 47-48. 
24. The Myth of the State, pp. 179,180. 
25. European Thought in the Eighteenth Century, p. 301. 
26. The Science of Freedom, p. 567. 
27. Quoted by Gay, The Rise of Modern Paganism, p. 138. 
28. The Science of Freedom, p. 188; and on this whole issue, pp. 187-201. 
29. Ibid, p. 192. 
30. On this point, see Kingsley Martin, French Liberal Thought in the 
Eighteenth Century: A Study of Political Ideas from Bayle to Condorcet, 
Harper Torchbook, New York, 1963, pp. 18, 122. 
31. The Science of Freedom, p. 459. 
32. Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, Faber & Gwyer, 
London, 1928, pp. 84, 144. 
33. See Kingsley Martin, op. cit., p. 8, on this point. 
59 
34. The Rise of Modern Paganism, p. 433. 
35. Gay is commenting specifically on Gertrude Himmelfarb' s essay, "The 
Haunted House of Jeremy Bentham", in her Victorian Minds, Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, London, 1968, where a powerful case is made for the thesis 
that Bentham's "Panopticon" scheme was "nothing less than the existential 
realization of Philosophic Radicalism." (p. 75). A similar interpretation 
of utilitarianism is also made by Halevy in The Growth of Philosophic 
Radicalism, passim, and especially pp. 82-85 on the Panopticon. 
Shirley R. Letwin, in The Pursuit of Certainty, Cambridge University 
Press, 1965, dismisses the Panopticon as a "momentary aberration" (p. 182), 
stresses the individualist and libertarian assumptions in Bentham's 
philosophy, and argues that "(t)he moral foundation of Bentham's system was 
not the principle of utility but his conviction that to deny to a normal 
adult the right to determine his own life was to treat him as a child 
and to derogate from his dignity as a rational being" (p. 138). However, 
even Letwin concedes that Bentham in his more austerely Utilitarian 
writings "(b)y ruthlessly ignoring the refractions of ideas and emotions 
. .. produced devices of a monstrous efficiency that left no room for humanity. 
In his ardour for reform, Bentham prepared the way for what he feared" (p .188). 
And what he feared, Letwin argues, was a coercive and altruistic State paternalism. 
36. The Rise of Modern Paganism, p. 432. 
37. Ibid., pp. 401, 403. 
38. The Science of Freedom, p. 403 and passim. 
39. Sheldon S. Wolin, "Hume and Conservatism," American Political Science 
60 
Review, XLVIII(4), Dec. 1954. 
40. J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, Secker & Warburg, 
London, 1952; Louis Bredvold, The Brave New World of the Enlightenment, 
University of Michigan Press, 1961. 
41. The Science of Freedom, pp. 126-133. 
42. Ibid., p. 164. 
43. Ibid., pp. 126, 128. 
44. The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason, The 
Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1955. And see also Murray N. Rothbard, "The 
Mantle of Science", in H. Schoeck & J. W. Wiggins, eds., Scientism 
and Values, D. Van Nostrand, Princeton, New Jersey, 1960, for a brief 
but equally incisive treatment. 
45. Hayek,ibid.,p.107. 
46. The Structure of Evil: An Essay on the Unification of the Science of Man, 
George Braziller, New York, 1968. A particularly incisive assessment of 
scientism has been made by Yves R. Simon, in his The Philosophy of 
Democratic Government, University of Chicago Press, 1951: "A new lust for 
domination over men, shaped after the pattern of domination over nature, 
had developed in technique-minded men ... (its) highly emotional humanitarianism 
... did not blind everybody to the fact that a new imperialism, a new lust 
for absolute power, was finding expression." (p. 44). 
61 
47. The Science of Freedom, p. 497. 
48. Ibid., p. 48 and passim. 
49. Ibid., pp. 514-516. Interestingly enough, Helvetius was the most 
anti-individualist, anti-market and utilitarian of all the philosophes --
a fact one does not learn from Gay. See Kingsley Martin, French Liberal 
Thought in the Eighteenth Century, op. cit., pp. 178, 181-186. 
50. The Science of Freedom, p. 529. 
51. Ibid., p. 530. 
52. Ibid., p. 532. 
53. Ibid.,p.530. 
54. Ibid., p. 552 
55. Ibid., p. 530. 
56. Crane Brinton, The Shaping of the Modern Mind, New American Library, 
New York, 1953, p. 135. 
57. Quoted, p. 219, in T. D. Campbell, Adam Smith's Science of Morals, 
George Allen & Unwin, London, 1971. 
58. A. L. Macfie, The Individual in Society: Papers on Adam Smith, Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1971. 
62 
59. See, on this topic, Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision, Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1961, pp. 344-345. 
60. Gladys Bryson, Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century, 
Princeton University Press, 1945, p. 160. 
61. Macfie, op. cit., p. 49. 
62. In fact praised by Marx. See Duncan Forbes, "Introduction", p. xxxi, to Adam 
Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, Edinburgh University 
Press, 1966, on this point, and also David Kettler, The Social and Political 
Thought of Adam Ferguson, Ohio State University Press, 1965, "Introduction". 
On the oversocialized conception of man in Ferguson, see Kettler, pp. 193-197, 
and William C. Lehman, Adam Ferguson and the Beginnings of Modern Sociology, 
Columbia University Press, 1930, pp. 69-73. 
63. The Theory of Economic Policy in English Classical Political Economy, 
London, Macmillan, 1965, p. 11, my emphasis. Smith's general "moderation", 
his nationalism, and his conservatism are also stressed in William Clyde 
Dunn's "Adam Smith and Edmund Burke: Complementary Contemporaries", Southern 
Economic Journal, Vol. VII, No.3, January 1941, which demonstrates the wide 
intellectual agreement of the two respective founders of Classical Economics and 
Classical Conservatism. And, of course, as Liberalism became synonymous with 
Utilitarianism it became progressively less concerned with individualism, 
libertarianism and justice. Robbins in fact makes a very firm distinction 
between the "two distinct philosophical origins" of Liberalism, i.e. between 
natural law and utilitarianism, and stresses that, while sharing certain 
individualist sentiments, it was utilitarian to the core. This was true 
63 
even for Adam Smith, who was influenced by the Stoic concept of natural law 
and frequently used the rhetoric of "sacred rights" and "natural liberty. " 
64. As Lionel Robbins shows, all the major Classical Economists were quite vehement 
in their denunciation of laissez-faire as an abstract standard. The 
acceptance of the principle and legitimacy of state intervention by the 
Classicists, whatever their disagreements regarding the degree of such intervention 
that was desirable at any moment in time, leads Professor Robbins to stress, 
from Adam Smith to 1. M. Keynes, "the essential continuity of thought in the 
tradition of economic liberalism concerning the positive nature of the 
co-operation between the State and the individual", The Theory of Economic Policy, 
op. cit., p. 38. And for the significance of this fact for Robbins himself, 
see Chris R. Tame, "A Note on Lionel Robbins", Wertfrei: A Review of Praxeologi 
cal Science, No.2, Spring 1974. 
66. Robbins, op. cit., p. 26. On Adam Smith specifically, see Robert L. Heilbroner, 
"The Paradox of Progress: Decline and Decay in 'The Wealth of Nations''', Journal 
of the History of Ideas, XXXIV(2), April/June, 1973. On Ricardo's fatal 
errors concerning the conflict of interests within the market, see Ludwig von 
Mises, The Free and Prosperous Commonwealth, D. Van Nostrand, Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1960, and Leonard P. Liggio, "Mises and History", Libertarian Forum, 
VI(1), January 1974. 
66. I have discussed these issues further in two as yet unpublished papers, both 
entitled "Why Did Classical Liberalism Fail?", at The Adam Smith Club 
(Institute of Economic Affairs, London), May 1977 and the Second World Convention 
of the Libertarian International, Royal Holloway College, Egham, August 1984. 
67. Wolin, Politics and Vision, op. cit., p. 343. Of course, Wolin tends 
64 
to overstate his case, ignoring the other intellectual themes present in the 
thought of those he analyses (and, for that matter, in the choice of those 
figures, and the exclusion of others, he takes as representing the 
liberal tradition). Nevertheless, he does demonstrate an important truth, that 
concerning the frequent pessimism, conservatism, and collectivism that featured 
-- and eventually predominated -- within the mainstream of liberalism. 
68. Gay, The Rise of Modern Paganism, "Preface," p. xiii. 
69. Gay, The Science of Freedom, p. 555. It might be objected that Gay has 
anticipated such criticisms in his comments in the "Preface" to the second volume. 
He states therein that he has deliberately avoided "one large area of evaluation, " 
i.e., of "the possible relevance of the Enlightenment to our time" -- the 
reason being "to avoid value judgments" and to restrict himself to "an act of 
definition, not evaluation" (ibid. p. xi). But it is surely apparent, 
from both this essay and Gay's own work, that such a separation cannot 
be viably made. The questions we ask in any historical analysis, in any 
attempt at an historical definition (especially so in the history of ideas) 
are a product of our conception (whether it is made explicit or not) of 
the abstract nature of ideas and values and by our own values themselves. Gay's 
failure to come to terms adequately with the ultimate and political significance 
of the Enlightenment is thus not simply a matter of failing to tag on some 
concluding comments regarding its "possible relevance ... to our time. " It is a 
failure to deal with its most vital and central defining characteristics, its 
inherent and abstract intellectual, philosophic and moral nature. The Enlightenment's 
relevance to our time lies precisely in the answers (and their implications) 
to the most "scholarly" questions regarding its defining qualities -- was its 
scheme of values internally consistent or not, did its philosophy contain fatal 
features that undermined much of its original intention, was its perception of 
65 
its own significance an accurate one ... ? It is such questions we have begun to attempt 
to answer in this essay. 
70. Gay, The Science of Freedom, p. 563. 
71. See Williams, The Contours of American History, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 
1966, especially the introduction, "British Mercantilism as the Political Economy 
of English Backwardness," and pp. 77-125 of the first section, "The Age of 
Mercantilism, 1740--1828." 
72. We have not commented in this essay on the felicities of style and literary 
construction of Gay's work, on its lucidity and almost symphonic construction 
which integrates with such apparent ease and in so sparkling and rational a manner 
so vast a degree of learning. This characteristic is indeed fitting from an author 
whose latest work is on Style in History, in which he stresses the 
intellectual significance of style, the unity of style and philosophic outlook, 
in the work of the historian. 
*** 
Originally Published in: The Journal of Libertarian Studies (Pergamon Press, New York), 
1(3), Summer 1977, pp. 217-227. Reprinted as Libertarian Heritage No.7, Libertarian Al-
liance, London, 1992. ISBN: 1-85637-112-3. (8069 words) 
Textual Note: A number of minor grammatical and stylistic corrections have been made and 
sub-headings have been added. 
66 
3: THE CRITICAL LIBERALISM OF J. M. ROBERTSON 
Contents: 
I: Introduction 
II: Class Conflict and the Economic Interpretation of History 
III: Historical Sociology 
IV: The Application of Class Analysis 
V: Liberalism and Sociology 
VI: Robertson as a Political Thinker: Socialist, Neo-Liberal, 
or 'Guarded Individualist'? 
VII: Economics 
VIII: Elements of Philosophy 
(i) Natural Rights and the Nature of Emotion 
(ii) Individualism Versus Collectivism 
(iii) Robertson's Concept of Reason 
IX: Robertson's Liberalism: A Critical Assessment 
Notes 
Appendix: A Selective Bibliography of the Writings of J. M. Robertson 
*** 
I: Introduction 
The old adage that history is always written by the victor is as true for the history of ideas as 
for the more dramatic record of conflict in political and military affairs. 
67 
In the history of both political thought and social theory J. M. Robertson was on the losing 
side. The ideas he expounded and the movements of which he was a part, or even led, are 
those which during this century have been pushed from the forefront of political and intellect-
uallife. Why, then, should I - and hopefully the reader - be concerned with the act of recla-
mation which this essay is attempting? The answer is twofold. Firstly, there is such a thing as 
objective history, and whether or not one has any sympathy with Robertson or his outlook, his 
consignment to an Orwellian "memory hole" can only distort our understanding of the histori-
cal record. As Comad Kaczkowski states in his unpublished doctoral dissertation, Robertson 
was "an outstanding and representative figure of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centur-
ies" (l). An understanding of his role in both intellectual matters and political life can only 
help illuminate the history of the period. Secondly, some of us might consider it premature, as 
well as less than just, to consign both Robertson and the liberal movement of which he was an 
important part to the ideological dustbin of history. Admittedly, intellectual and political cur-
rents, in both "left-'" and 'right-wing' guises, which we can label broadly as statist, collectiv-
ist, anti-individualistic, authoritarian, and irrationalist, have been the predominant "paradigm" 
in economic, political and social thought for most of the twentieth century (2). But the past 
twenty years have seen a steady renaissance of radical, rationalist and individualistic liberalism 
(3). For those of us, like myself, in sympathy with this liberal revival, the rediscovery of Ro-
bertson not merely aids the propagation of the liberal perspective, but can assist in a more 
viable reformulation of it. In other words, we can hopefully profit from a grasp of both the 
strengths and weaknesses, the valid and the invalid, the successes and failures of the thought of 
a great exponent of liberalism. 
For those not in sympathy with Robertson's political position, however, an understanding of it 
will at least give a clearer grasp of its ideological character, and that of its present -day liberal 
adherents. 
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II: Class Conflict and the Economic Interpretation of History 
Part of Robertson's significance and greatness lies in the wealth of his intellectual concerns. A 
multi-lingualist of immense learning, he applied his mind to, and wrote extensively on, a multi-
tude of subjects. In all areas his work was characterised by both breadth and depth of know-
ledge, clarity of expression, and intellectual insight, on which Professor Stanislav Andreski has 
positively commented (4). However, it is primarily the political significance of Robertson with 
which I am concerned. As Kaczkowski declares, he was "a well-known radical-liberal theor-
etician and politician, he played an active role in British politics for over twenty years and was 
a recognised authority on economic questions, in particular free trade" (5). My focus will not 
be so much on his role in party politics but on his significance as a thinker, as one of the last 
great representatives of a major tradition of liberal thought. 
The roots of one tradition of liberalism in class analysis, in a broad sociological perspective 
and in an economic interpretation of history have, until relatively recently, been forgotten. At 
best, liberal class analysts and historians have been consigned by Marxists to footnotes as 
vague and alleged "precursors" of Marxist sociology and historical materialism (6). However, 
in Britain this liberal sociological outlook was co-extensive with the development of liberal 
economics. Adam Smith's economics, for example, was very much part of a broader "socio-
logical" concern with, as he put it, "the general principle of law and government and of the 
different revolutions they have undergone in different periods of society" (7). The Wealth of 
Nations embodied much of Smith's historical sociology and his analysis of class factors in 
economic and political life. This approach was in fact shared, to a greater or lesser degree, by 
the whole "Scottish School" or "Scottish Enlightenment". Smith never completed his proposed 
broader study although the rediscovery of a longer version of his Lectures on Jurisprudence 
gives further evidence of his philosophy of history). But his colleague John Millar, in his 
major work The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks (8), delineated systematically a liberal 
analysis of class formation and conflict and of historical development. 
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The major stream of British liberalism chose, however, to refine the tools of classical econo-
mic analysis, rather than develop its historical and sociological insights. The last of the major 
classicists to maintain a class and historical analysis as a broader political economy I wedded to 
liberal values was James E. Thorold Rogers (9). But he left no disciples and, insofar as he 
was remembered, it was as a founding father of empirical economic history. Henry Thomas 
Buckle was really the only nineteenth century historian to attempt a detailed liberal philosophy 
of history. But in spite of a brief period of popular acclaim, he too exerted little influence and 
left no disciples. 
Robertson was, then, the last great exponent in Britain of liberal class and historical analysis. 
He was consciously indebted to the Scottish School (1), to Charles Comte (11) and to Buckle, 
to whom he devoted a major critical study (12) and whose History he edited in a fine annota-
ted version (13). Of Rogers he said that he "enlarged in a suggestive fashion" on the economic 
interpretation of history, but that his "application of the principle does not carry us far" (14) -
an incorrect assessment in my view. 
III: Historical Sociology 
What, then, was the nature of the liberal class and historical analysis championed by Robert-
son? His concern in his historical work as in all his scholarship was to apply "scientific thor-
oughness" in "the statement of historic causation", to discover "general laws" and to establish 
"determining conditions, the economic above all" in a "true science of social evolution" (15). 
His interpretation was not, however, the dogmatic assertion of aprioristic axioms, for he stres-
sed the importance of the "study of the concrete process" (16). His "economic interpretation" 
was largely a view of the "economic motive" in human behaviour, not an ascription of irresist-
ible influence to particular social institutions or so-called "modes of production". In this sense 
"sociological truth" is ultimately "rooted in psychology and biology" (17). "The main primary 
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factors in politics or corporate life" are thus "all-pervading biological forces, or tendencies of 
attraction and repulsion" between individuals (18). He insisted on the one hand that economic 
motives be recognised as affecting social action in general, and on the other that "varying 
forms of social machinery react variously on intellectual life" (19). He explicitly rejected any 
view of inevitability in historical events or any mono-causal approach to them, "so many and 
so complex are the forces and conditions of progress in civilisation" (20). Thus "functions that 
were originally determined by external conditions came in time to be initial causes - the teeth 
and claws so to speak, fixing the way of life for the body politic" (21). 
His view of class conflict is clear. "Home politics", he declared, "is the sum of the strifes and 
compromises of classes, interests, factions, sects, theorists, in all countries and in all ages" 
(22). The history of the world is as much one of class co-operation as well as conflict, and of 
classes conceived broadly in terms of all sorts of interest groups and ideologies, not merely as 
some automatic reflex of the "mode of production". Neither did he adhere to the utopian delu-
sion of the so-called "scientific socialist" that this conflict would ever end: "the clash of oppos-
ing tendencies is perpetual, Ubiquitous, inevitable" (23), although modes of conflict might well 
change (i.e., the "blind" conflict of war might well be replaced with more civilised intellectual 
conflict). History was, in Robertson's view, thus an "endless process of compromise among 
social forces" (24) to which "movements of true public spirit" contribute as well as more venal 
clashes of "class needs and interests" (25). He was not driven to crude collectivism which 
negated the role of individuals as compared to "classes" - "men of genius have counted for 
something in all stages of upward human evolution" (26). 
We might have been spared much tedious historical exegesis if Robertson's balanced view of 
motivations had prevailed over countless Marxist-inspired attempts to demonstrate the "econo-
mic basis" of every social phenomenon. Thus, he explicitly commented on the fruitless at-
tempts to discuss the "class politics" of religious conflict in the late Tudor period - fruitless 
since "in reality class politics was for the most part superseded by sect politics' (27). In other 
words, religious disagreements, "destructive passions", could lead to real conflict just as much 
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as clashes of "real" economic or political interest. Economic determinism, then, "used as a 
sole interpretive principle ... may lead to all manner of errors". The correct historical method 
is clearly to "recognise and trace the reactions of all the factors" (28). It was this balanced and 
sensible approach to historical causation that he saw embodied in "the method and basis of 
Buckle" above all others. 
In view of the short shrift given to liberal class theoreticians and historians by Marxist scho-
lars, one cannot but take ironic satisfaction in Robertson's similar treatment of Marxist histori-
cal materialism - in his parenthetical observation that "several members of the Marxian school 
have dealt very acutely and instructively with the element of economic causation in ancient and 
modern life" (29). For Robertson, Marxism represented little more than a partisan expropria-
tion of a liberal doctrine, "arbitrarily applied by Marx to civilisation in the light of a class 
gospel and a doctrinaire purpose" (30). Moreover, Marx's approach was vitiated by putting a 
"catastrophic and finally static theory of social destiny under a pseudo-evolutionary form" 
(31). Its persistence as a political ideology, a quasi-religious hope, was to Robertson "in itself 
an extremely interesting sociological phenomenon" (32). Elsewhere he declared that in Das 
Kapital there was "a sociological teaching of permanent importance, and that is the principle 
which has been stated by [Marx's] followers as 'Economic determinism"'. But he emphasised 
again that this was not original to Marx, merely "newly applied". The perspective originated in 
the Scottish writers and in Charles Comte, and Buckle was, "as it were, resuscitating a buried 
movement and reviving a forgotten interest". If this point was understood, he declared, scho-
lars would be "less dithyrambic over the service done to sociology by Marx". What Marx had 
added to the approach was to wed it to absurd economic doctrines, like "surplus value", and to 
"formal fallacies of the most grotesque description" (33). 
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IV: The Application of Class Analysis 
Robertson's studies were not dictated by simple scholarly interest. He sought a usable past. 
"Either we are thus to learn from history", he declared, "or all history is as a novel without a 
purpose" (34). His principal application of class analysis in contemporary politics lay in his 
defence of Free Trade against the rising forces of Protectionism. Free Trade was not simply 
science itself, "the unshakable inference of a hundred years of economic experience verifying 
the economic science on which the great experiment was founded", but its abridgement was a 
classic case of the acquisition of special privilege by a distinct class interest. Thus he declared: 
"Tariffs are engineered by grafters, and grafters will never, of their own accord, 
let go their hold. Tariffs fail to secure prosperity; and so the industries which 
have been trained to rely upon them, as crutches, demand to have bigger and 
stronger crutches to rely upon ... In all countries there is a multitude of men 
who have absolutely no scruple about enriching themselves at the expense 
of their fellow countrymen in general ... The simple principle is, 'Get what you can, 
by any monopoly that you can impose. Make your neighbour pay. If you think you 
can make the foreigner pay, do so, of course, with all your heart' ... [Tariffism] 
is the policy of plundering your fellow-citizens to fill your own pockets". (36). 
He noted that liberal democracies had not remained immune from the forces of class pressure 
and mutual predation: 
"It must be recognised that in the way of collective tyranny the modern 
democracies have abundantly proved that they are 'sisters under the skins' 
with the autocracies and aristocracies of the past, and are as zealous to 
play the game of beggar-my neighbour as were the trade guilds and monopolies 
of the Middle Ages". (37) 
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V: Liberalism and Sociology 
Other aspects of Robertson's sociology were equally wedded to his liberal concerns. In his 
"The Sociology of Race", a discussion of the "eloquent fiasco" (38) of Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain's Foundations of the Nineteenth Century (the classic statement of racism), he 
effectively disposed of both its historical idiocies and its absurdities of reasoning. In The 
Germans he refuted the "Teutonic Gospel of Race" with a wealth of historical and ethnologi-
cal evidence "which once for all reduce[s] to absurdity the theory of the hereditary possession 
by any race or race-mixture of qualities which ensure their progress or 'success'" under any 
conditions" (39). In The Saxon and the Celt (40) he made a similar critique of the "Anglo-
Saxon" version of racial superiority, which cast the Celtic peoples in the inferior role. And he 
made adverse comments on racialist explanations in his book on Buckle (41). 
In matters of foreign affairs Robertson shared the "isolationist", anti-interventionist orientation 
which characterised much of the classical liberal tradition. He thus denounced "thoughtless 
demands for intervention in the affairs of foreign nations, impossible proposals to redress the 
wrongs suffered by foreigners at the hands of their own people" (42). Kaczkowski comments 
that Robertson's position stemmed less from the laissez-faire classical liberal tradition than 
from his moral thesis that the basis of all human relations was "reciprocity" (43). However, it 
was precisely the ideal of reciprocity, the harmony of human interests, that the classical lib-
erals saw as embodied in free trade and which in their view necessitated a new order of inter-
national peace (45). Robertson himself declared that "a sane Political Economy had done more 
for the promotion of peace than all the moral exhortation in other literature" (46). 
Robertson was a major influence (along with such anti-war liberals as Herbert Spencer, 
Gustave de Molinari and Jacques Novicow) on the last great figure in the liberal anti-war tradi-
tion, Norman Angell. Angell's essay "War as the Failure of Reason" was published along with 
an essay by Robertson in a volume entitled Essays Towards Peace (49). I would emphasise 
that Robertson was not a dogmatic pacifist and never allowed his desire for peace to lead him 
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into ignoring aggressive intentions when they arose. Thus his opposition to increased naval 
estimates ceased the moment Germany's aims became obvious, and he analysed and denounced 
the "civicidal madness" of the theory and practice of German "Caesarism" (50). Although a 
founder member (and President) with Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner of the Rationalist Peace 
Society in 1910, they both supported the First World War, while allowing that Britain, "in 
common with other great Powers, may have been guilty of faults of omission and 
commission". In a statement signed by them, and issued in the name of the Committee of the 
RPS in 1916, Robertson and Bonner rejected absolutist pacifism, declared that "moral appeal" 
was quite useless against the "ruthless barbarian", and held that there were two classes of war 
which, "lamentable as they must be, might yet be quite justifiable", namely "wars of defence 
and wars of independence" (51). 
Robertson's position on imperialism was marked by a similar balance. Imperialism might be a 
bad ideal, but the British Empire was in existence and a sudden withdrawal might also have 
undesirable consequences (52). He considered imperialism detrimental for various reasons. 
Massive imperial concentrations of power lead, by clear psychological laws, to a spiral of 
enmity and to the creation of "zealous enemies" (53), who perceive the concentration of 
power as a threat to which they respond by embarking on a similar course of imperial expan-
sion. Imperialism, in his view, also encouraged both the "nominally defunct principle of a 
monopoly market" (54) and "primitive racial egoism", destroying the "instinct of domestic 
sympathy" (55). 
In his most detailed critique of imperialism, Patriotism and Empire, Robertson sought to find 
its class roots, the specific interests that profit from it. I find his analysis less than successful, 
for it is never clear whether he believed that industry, financial interests, the business class as 
a whole (or as distinct groups) profited from imperialism, or whether it was merely specific 
sections of these groups that did so (56). 
Ironically, Robertson's failure to produce a really satisfactory account of imperialism can be 
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seen as the result of not following his own methodological precepts. Such an account would 
need to integrate a sensitive perception of the role and nature of classes and interest groups 
(without falling into fallacious reifications) with an understanding of the role of both mistaken 
ideas and atavistic psychological motives. 
But if Robertson did not always live up to his own philosophy, he did at least make its princi-
ples clear. This philosophy lies firmly in the liberal tradition of methodological individualism 
that warned against raising concepts and categories into supposedly real entities, and against 
perceiving reality in mere allegory. "Beware of allegorical sociology", he declared in a criti-
que of Schaffle, the German academic sociologist who expended "enormous effort" on elabora-
ting "the dream of a 'social organism''', a "kind of actual Leviathan" into a scientific demon-
stration (57). 
VI: Robertson as a Political Thinker: Socialist, Neo-Liberal or 'Guarded Individualist'? 
Characterising the nature of Robertson's liberalism has not always appeared easy, however. 
Martin Page has described him as "one of the unsung prophets of the British Welfare State" 
(58) and one of his oldest friends, J. P. Gilmour, termed him a "philosophical Socialist" (59). 
However, his other close friend, John A. Hobson, opined that "Robertson stood upon the 
whole by laissez-faire liberalism" (60). And Kaczkowski similarly describes him as a strict 
Bright-Cobden Liberal when it came to economics and free-trade ... the last Liberal of the 
rationalist-radical tradition" (61). 
Some of Robertson's statements do indeed suggest that he was a socialist. He once seemed to 
refer to himself as a "scientific socialist" although his wording is somewhat ambiguous (62). 
Elsewhere he declares "an ultimate Socialism" to be "the highest ideal" (63). Moreover, his 
work is full of critical remarks on laissez-faire and on free-market capitalism. "Mere Free 
Trade and laissez-faire", he declared, "have not produced and cannot conceivably produce a 
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really sound society. They have yielded us a large and blindly multiplying proletariat, subject 
to deplorable fluctuations of employment and comfort ... " (64). He attacked what he described 
as "a deadening competitive industrialism", its "ugliness, apathy, and degradation" (66) and 
"the social rapine of self-seeking trade" (67) He concluded: "Decidedly, our needed social 
solutions are not being reached on the lines oflaissez-faire" (68). 
Similarly, he seemed to accept the socialist view that a boom and bust cycle was inherent in a 
free market, saying that "the periodic miseries [arose] out of industrial anarchy' (69) and that 
there was something irrational about a "blind industrial competition" (70). He thus declared 
that he had "no fixed prejudice against legislation as such" (71) and advocated such measures 
as "socialisation of public monopoly profits as those of railways, banks, gas-works, water-
works" (72). He also spoke in favour of state old-age pensions and taxation of "unearned 
wealth" (73). Throughout his book on Buckle he criticised that writer's laissez-faire position. 
Robertson's "socialism" thus seems to resemble that of those socialist and neo-liberal thinkers 
who argued that a rational and scientific society is one in which "society" scientifically chose 
to regulate "itself". In reality this view is actually a form of "scientism", a fallacious view of 
the nature of science and a a profoundly unscientific understanding of the nature of social 
processes (74). Some of Robertson's most "scientistic" statements can be found in his generally 
approving discussion (75) of the American sociologist Lester Ward, himself a classic expoun-
der of the scientistic approach. In his 1891 essay "Outlines of Social Reconstruction", Robert-
son saw "a greater measure of equality in material well-being" as attainable through "the 
corporate action of the citizens through their political machinery" (76). Such interventionism 
represented in his view a "collectively conscious society, a society which has realised evolution 
and is constructing a universal sociology" (77). 
Consistent with all this is Robertson's very critical evaluation (78) of the radical libertarian 
writer Auberon Herbert who, as the leading American anarchist Benjamin Tucker declared, 
was "a true anarchist in everything but name" (79). Hopefully Martin Page's in-progress bio-
graphy of Robertson will illuminate his relations with the radical liberals and individualists of 
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the period. He certainly held one of them, Joseph Hiam Levy (not to be confused with the 
socialist writer Hyman Levy), in high regard (80) and, while editor of The National Refor-
mer, featured Levy's essays in it frequently, as Bradlaugh had done before him (81) Other 
individualist contributions which Robertson published in this journal included an essay on 
"Freedom and Marriage" by Wordsworth Donisthorpe (82), which had been rejected by The 
Liberty Annual, the publication of the Liberty and Property Defense League. Donisthorpe's 
was, along with Herbert and Levy, one of the leading radical individualist thinkers of the 
period, although like his fellows, now generally written out of intellectual history and main-
stream views of the history of liberalism (83). Whilst Editor of The Free Review Robertson 
published essays by many of these diverse individualist and anarchist writers (84). 
Nevertheless, in spite of all the above, Robertson, throughout virtually all his writings, dis-
tances himself from socialism proper. Moreover, for every anti-capitalist remark, there are at 
least as many hostile evaluations of socialism. He castigated reformers who "interfere with 
reasonable freedom in their gropings after improvement" and who "openly flout the eternal 
yearning of men for freedom". While praising the honesty of both socialists and individualists, 
he stated that they represented "extremes of error". '" A plague 0' both your houses! '" was his 
final judgment (85). 
Robertson also repeatedly described the great classical liberal Herbert Spencer as his "intel-
lectual father" (86) and as "one of the great minds of the modern world" (87). He considered 
Spencer's polemic against the sins of legislators to be "powerful and often unanswerable", and 
agreed that "a great deal of modern philanthropic legislation has missed its mark". Spencer, he 
said, "remains one of the most effective monitors against hasty legislative action" (88). He also 
praised John Stuart Mill for the eloquence and wisdom of his support for "a doctrine that is 
ever being venomously assailed and too often being sullied", namely "the doctrine that the 
good of mankind is a dream if it is not to be secured by preserving for all men the possible 
maximum of liberty of action and of freedom of thought" (89). Again, Robertson's hostile 
comments about laissez-faire can be balanced by favourable ones about its "fundamental truth" 
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(90). Society, he said, had "gained much from its application" (91), and while "quite done with 
as a pretext for leaving uncured deadly social evils which admit of curative treatment by State 
action", laissez-faire "is not done with as a principle of rational limitation of State interfer-
ence", and as a "wholesome caveat against hasty scheming" (92). 
Robertson distanced himself from socialism in his earliest writings, but his hostility to it does 
seem to become more pronounced and more systematic in his later works. Thus in Fiscal 
Fraud and Folly, a passionate critique of protectionism, he lumps together in an ideological 
rogues' gallery "political adventurers, opportunists, grafters, socialists, and sciolists in gen-
eral" (93). He doubted the feasibility of centrally planning an entire society and attacked trade 
union leaders who thought they "know in advance all about the real treatment of the vast com-
plexity of industry and international trade, and this by [their] inner light as ... good Trade 
Unionist[s]" (94). In this context he went on to criticise certain trade unionists for "unlimited 
interference with international, to say nothing of domestic trade". Socialist theorists like G. D. 
H. Cole were lambasted for relying on mere "well-worn doctrinary formula" instead of offer-
ing detailed expositions of how a socialist society would operate. He added: 
"Socialism, staking the whole frame of society on an a priori theory of an 
inexhaustible public spirit, is revealed in its foremost exponents, as so 
lacking in true public spirit, as distinct from class spirit, that they have 
never scientifically thought out the very problem they handle, finding and 
offering only prophecies in support of their proclivity ... If you ask 
for the deeds of Socialism, you have them in Soviet Russia. Look on that 
picture, and then look back on the record of Free Trade". (95) 
He also observed sardonically that he was "unaware" that the Labour Party "possessed or 
accepted any economist", and stated that he had "never detected in Mr. Cole's polemic an 
economic as distinguished from a sectarian ethical ideal" (96). 
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The example of Soviet Russia seems to bode large in Robertson's shift of emphasis. The social-
ist school had "tried its hand", in Russia and the "terrific object-lesson" correctly accounted, in 
his view, for the "large body of solid scepticism among the workers as to Communist pro-
mises" (97). 
One of Robertson's last political works was the dour and memorable The Decadence of 1929. 
Written under the pseudonym "L. Macaulay" as an imaginary account, by a future historian of 
1949, of the "decay of England", it rings even truer now than when he penned it. It is a vision 
of the "commercial suicide of the United Kingdom" and a settling of scores with all those who 
had contributed to the collapse. Who, then, were the guilty men? There were the businessmen, 
those who had abandoned free trade for the legalised theft of tariffs, "the traders who, once 
honestly proud of their honest and helpful if commonplace commerce, of their service in light-
ening the burden of life for the mass of mankind, were now grown still prouder of their ac-
quired function of licensed pickpockets". There were also the socialists advocating wholesale 
nationalisation but who lacked intellectual honesty. Refusing to accept the evidence of individ-
ual failures of their schemes, they had always pleaded that socialism could and would succeed 
when applied to a whole nation. But, Robertson declared, "socialism had been so applied in 
Russia", with "miserable social and industrial failure" as the result (98). Marxian socialism 
was a "doctrinaire dream, scientifically on all fours with all the previous and contemporary 
Utopianisms ... demonstrably a spurious equation, in which the really vital factors were falsi-
fied". The "unthinking" adherents of Marxism, in his view, "knew neither economics nor 
history" (99). But it was such doctrinaires who, in Robertson's opinion, were the "aggressive 
driving force" in "most labour constituencies". Believing "all the encomiums of a non-existent 
prosperity" in the Soviet Union, its adherents disrupted the meetings of their liberal opponents. 
Moreover, such intolerance was not restricted merely to the ranks of the Marxists. Socialists 
generally were "scheming for a society in which not only would there be no machinery what-
ever for the publication of criticism, since all would be bound to do their share of productive 
labour for the State alone, but criticism of the new social system itself would be absolutely 
prohibited". George Bernard Shaw's "genial" comment that "when once Socialism was estab-
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lished, anyone who questioned the system would be sent to an insane asylum" was utterly 
representative of the prevailing authoritarianism of the Left. When liberals of a previous 
generation had pointed out that "socialism inevitably excluded the public criticism of its own 
validity, and involved a state monopoly of all printing and publication, the Socialists loudly 
denied the statement". But now, Robertson declared, "they avowed that under Socialism all 
critics of the system would at least be incarcerated" (100). In general, socialism offered mere 
"visionary issues" and an "appeal to ignorance, thoughtlessness, to gUllibility". It relied on the 
"principle of inflaming and exploiting the ignorant" and, fundamentally, "on the great motive 
of envy" - in both class and personal respects. It was simply, in his view, the mirror-image of 
the predatory class politics of the Conservative Party and the business interests (101). Intellec-
tually, socialism was merely "panacea mongering". Its exponents assumed that: 
"While the ostensibly simple Golden Rule is incapable of strict individual fulfilment, 
a mathematical calculation of universal and unanimous right action for an entire 
nation can be imposed and successfully maintained. Men incapable of thoroughgoing 
morality could all be persuaded to fulfil a new commandment of completely 
right conduct under State Socialism. All that is needed, they proclaimed, is 
that the ideal way of life should be expounded. Then, even if everybody is not 
at first convinced, the converts can at least coerce the rest. Under coercion, 
the system will work to perfection." (102) 
He held that, economically, socialism was utterly naive. "Confidently proposing to supersede 
the whole machinery of individual enterprise by which economic life had been built up", it 
ignored the roots of innovation. Thus socialists "took for granted that inventions of every kind 
would continue to abound, though nobody needed to secure or improve his own income by 
inventing anything, since there was already enough wealth for all, if only it were properly 
distributed' (103). "To comprehend the vast complexity of free commerce was beyond the 
power even of the Socialist intelligentsia in face of the Russian collapse." Their thoughts were 
little more than "draughts of philanthropic sentiment with grains of second-hand economic 
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theory", while the proletariat seemed convinced that trade-union secretaries could manage all 
industry and commerce, with fifty per cent. profits for all." (104) 
The decline of Britain as outlined in The Decadence was fundamentally the result of intellect-
ual failure. An intelligent public spirit was simply absent, and could not be appealed to against 
the prevalence of "sinister interests" and economic ignorance. As Robertson declared: 
"A self-governing industrial State, dependent on the right judgment of its voters 
for the choice of right policies, can subsist only in virtue of adequate 
knowledge and judgment on the part of the majority of its electors. Nations 
which make economic decisions without knowledge of economic law must 
pay the economic penalty". (105) 
Ultimately, the fall of Britain and the British Empire stemmed from the same "central fact" 
underlying that of the Roman Empire: "Men did not understand the total causation of their 
social system" (106). Industrial Britain had "let its heritage fall from its hands" and declined 
"from the status of a first-rate to that of a third-rate power" (107). 
In his final years Robertson strenuously opposed attempts to incorporate the freethought and 
rationalist movement into some broader so-called "progressive movement" - an incorporation 
sought by a number of socialists and Marxists in a typical piece of "popular front" infiltration 
and manipulation. Robertson held that rationalists could honestly disagree over political posi-
tions, and that the growth of rationalism was encouraged more by the "rationalizing habit" of 
debate between them than by a political partisanship which would merely destroy or tear apart 
the established rationalist organisations (l08). He had always opposed such "mergers" on tacti-
cal grounds, but his later opposition seemed much more marked by opposition to Marxism and 
socialism, per se. Communism was, in his view, "working irrationalism in the name of Rea-
son" (109). In 1933 he penned his most notable refutation of the so-called "scientific Human-
ists" (i.e. Marxists), in an essay entitled "Contaminated Ideals". He roundly condemned as 
82 
fallacious Marxist historical materialism and "surplus value" theory, and "the deep-seated 
human bias to tyranny" which was manifest in Marx's "scheme of revolutionary brute force, 
slaughter, and class hatred in place of fraternity". The "dogmatic and coercive purpose ... 
inherent in the post-Owen Socialist ideal" was clear long ago, he declared, and in this connec-
tion he recalled the refusal of socialists in a debate with Bradlaugh to forswear censorship of 
non-socialist views. Both in their theory and in their practice in Soviet Russia, socialists, "after 
benefiting by the right of free speech, propose to abolish that right as soon as they triumph". 
He concluded: "In sum, then, the ideal of logical persuasion without a shadow of coercion, 
which is part and parcel of the rationalist ideal, is simply incompatible with the ostensible 
Socialist ideal." The "pretentious aggression" and "pseudo-science" of the Marxists were 
threatening "all ideals of free progress in systems which trample liberty under foot, and, dis-
missing persuasion, eviscerate the mental life even as we see today" (110). It did not escape 
him that Mussolini had "mentally evolved as a Socialist" (110). 
Robertson's critique of socialism was not restricted to its Marxist or egalitarian forms. In his 
essay on "Utopia" he offered a biting critique of H. G. Wells' authoritarian Fabian socialism 
as well as of romantic utopias in general. Such literary absurdities represented a flight from the 
"depressing side of life" into a situation where all human dilemmas and problems dissolved 
into a picture harmony of perfection. Man, he argued, is not "an animal of whom it is predic-
able that every member of the species must and will one day live a mental life in terms of the 
ideals of Mr. Wells, or yours or mine". "Endless variation in congenital endowment, from the 
highest to the lowest", is ineradicable in the species (112). Robertson detected romantic uto-
pianism in all forms of socialism. Socialists were, in his view, "zealots of the impossible" and 
"manufacturers of mere catchwords rather than of practicable policies" (113). They were 
possessed by a "consummate incompetence to face the practical problem" (114). Like Brad-
laugh, he was saddened to find socialist doctrine "appealing to and applauded by, not the clear-
headed and self-controlled workers, but the neurotic, the noisy, the passionate, the riotous" 
(115). 
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Robertson also objected strongly to the socialist celebration of class struggle. A class analysis 
of historical development did not, for him, imply an acceptance of class conflict as a phenome-
non conducive to social progress or to the creation of either a more efficient or a more just 
society. In his view it was the "supreme duty of Liberalism", its "special mission and function" 
to "guard earnestly and actively against the recurring risk of class cleavage and class conflict" 
and to refuse to "pander to class hate either among the rich or among the poor" (116). The 
weakness of socialism lay not merely in the massive gap between its rhetorical claims and 
promises and its proposals for implementing its goals, but in the even greater discrepancy 
between its promises to create a "new Moral World" and its blatant "exploitation of malice" 
and "ingrained habit of hostility and virulence" (117). Those who champion the cause of labour 
against an ill-defined "bourgeoisie" ignored, in his view, its productive activities. They had 
succeeded only in erecting "labour" as a "concept and principle of disunion - a league of the 
hand-workers against all who are not of them, and an ideal of 'social revolution' in which they 
shall set their feet on the others' necks" (118). 
A representative example of Robertson's shift to a more hostile evaluation of socialism can be 
found in his change of mind about the relationship between socialism and war. In early essays 
he declared that it was "hardly conceivable that, if France and Germany were socialised, the 
war spirit would remain as before" (119) and that one of the great merits of the socialist 
movement "is that it is really destroying the spirit of national enmity, as between the workers 
of the different nations" (120). By 1916 things looked a little different, and he noted then "the 
virtual surrender to German militarism made even by Socialists who profess to repudiate mili-
tarist ambitions" (121). He also observed the racialist tendencies of German socialist scholars 
such as Woltmann and Reimer, and declared: 
"The thesis that men exist for the State and not the State for men, the 
maxim of obedience, the fixed habit of thinking in terms of nationality 
and not of humanity - all this seems to have been rather accentuated than 
modified by the Socialist agitation, which had seemed to put Internationalism 
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as its first postulate ... And latterly we find the Socialists themselves 
in large part permeated by the racial and national ideal, and, when not 
adopting it, visibly constrained to bow before it. " 
He concluded: 
"It would be rash to say that without Socialism Prussianism might have refrained 
from precipitating war, but Socialism has been part of the inspiration of 
Armageddon" (122) 
However, even in 1916, he still "recognize[d] in the Socialist ideal the highest ethical and the 
highest economic conception of social life. " (123) 
Robertson was quite clearly not a radical libertarian along the lines of his contemporaries 
Auberon Herbert, J. H. Levy, and Wordsworth Donisthorpe, or of such modern advocates as 
Ayn Rand, David Friedman, Murray Rothbard and Robert Nozick. But neither did most of the 
so-called laissez-faire liberals adhere to such a vigorous libertarianism (124). Nevertheless, 
simply to term him a neo-liberal along the lines of Hobson or Hobhouse seems to me not quite 
accurate either. He had a far greater commitment to individual liberty as both goal and method 
than in the case of most of the neo-liberals (125). This is reflected in his The Meaning of 
Liberalism, something of a definitive statement of his political philosophy, where he charac-
terised liberalism as fundamentally "a movement of liberation' (126). And although he clearly 
moved from a greater to a less sanguine view of socialism and state interventionism, his 
thought remained largely coherent and consistent in its basic outlook. The preface to his 1892 
book The Fallacy of Saving (127) included a long quotation from the neo-liberal Thomas 
Whittaker advocating that moderate intervention be considered on its merits, case by case. And 
in 1928 he contributed a Foreword to Whittaker's own treatise The Liberal State, which is a 
detailed exposition of this approach. He endorsed Whittaker's critique of authoritarian state 
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socialism, of "the drill-sergeants of the Fabian Society", and distinguished between liberal and 
illiberal elements in socialistic theory. Whittaker's approach, like Robertson's, was a moder-
ate, basically individualist one, with "democratic" and "informed" state actions seen as some-
times necessary to achieve liberal and individualistic ends (128). It is surely significant that by 
1933 Robertson was referring to his position as one of a "guarded individualism" (129). A 
little earlier he had characterised it as endorsing: 
"[T]he maximum of liberty compatible with the law of reciprocity and the 
elaboration of that law with constant regard to the potential lawlessness 
of the spirit of liberty". (130). 
VII: Economics 
Robertson may claim to be considered as an economic as well as a sociological and political 
thinker. The bulk of his work in this field is a defence of international free trade, the principle 
upon which, he declared in 1928, "Liberalism must stake its very existence" (131). His other 
contributions, however, bear the same ambiguities we have noted in his political thought. 
Thus, in one of his earliest works, The Eight Hours Question (1893), he offered a cogent 
critique of the campaign for the state enforcement of an eight-hour working day and pointed to 
"the very real social dangers of an all-round interference with the hours of labour". Rejecting 
"crude Marxian economics" and the "happy-go-lucky inclination" for state interference, he 
offered the following assessment of the desirable division between free competition and state 
regulation: 
"The instinct of freedom, if often astray, must necessarily be often right. 
Many people are now proceeding from a perception that laissez-faire has 
involved misery to an uncalculating determination to abolish laissez-faire 
86 
anyhow. They begin to delight in restriction for restriction's sake, thinking 
they establish human solidarity by every act of the kind. 'Fabian' writers 
are found claiming that all individual faculties are the property of society. 
But that is precisely the doctrine of the most fanatical of the Iacobins 
of the French Revolution, whose blind coercive action weakened social solidarity 
instead of increasing it. The evil is that humanitarians so often refuse 
to think out the real effects of their interferences." (133) 
If this work represents the liberal pole of Robertson's economic thought, The Fallacy of 
Saving of 1892 shows him as a critic of classical economics, of what he called "the great error 
of the laissez-faire school ... that unlimited saving can support unlimited industry". His views 
on this matter can certainly be termed proto-Keynesian (135). But while he argued them more 
coherently than do other exponents of underconsumptionism and "funny money", they suffer, 
in my view, from the same fallacies as all such writings, including those of Keynes himself 
(136). 
The tension between liberalism and interventionism was not resolved in the work of Robertson 
which comes closest to systematic economics, namely his The Economics of Progress of 
1918. Here he restated his opposition to class struggle and his support for free trade and a 
mixed economy liberalism, where elements of nationalisation and "national management" 
would help eliminate "waste" (137). He also rejected the theories of the libertarian free bank-
ing advocates A. Egmont Hake and O. E. Wesslau (the authors of Free Trade in Capital and 
other works) (138). Of greatest relevance to socialism is his emphasis on the importance of 
production, for socialists of his time and ours act as if economic affairs are merely a matter of 
readjusting distribution of some static but adequate supply of resources. Robertson declared: 
"Only through an increase of real production by economy of labour power of all 
kinds can labour be really advantaged '" There is no solution for labour on 
the lines of merely increasing the share without increasing the output. More 
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and more clearly does it appear that Mill was in error in stipulating for 
improved distribution without increase of production". (139) 
A common tactic of anti-liberal scholars at least since the nineteenth century has been to chal-
lenge the validity of economic science by reference to the findings of anthropology and ethno-
logy. The alleged existence of so-called non-commercial or non-economic societies and beha-
viour refutes, it is claimed, the universality of economic laws (140). In one of his last essays 
Robertson criticised anthropological investigations of "primitive economics" for being 
"needlessly anxious to dispute over general conceptions of economic action and causation" and 
for their common "desire to discredit all 'old' methods in political economy". "Economists", 
he countered, "have long known well enough that in both primitive and mediaeval life there 
were social and political and religious forces which created a situation largely different from 
the modern. It was the modern problem that they were concerned to study" (141). 
VIII: Elements of Philosophy 
(i) Natural Rights and the Nature of Emotion 
While certainly contributing to the explication of many of the techniques of reason (as in his 
Letters on Reasoning), Robertson did not attempt to explore wider epistemological or meta-
physical issues or to construct a scientific ethical system. Nevertheless, in a variety of areas he 
made a number of extremely suggestive and penetrating observations. Many of these are 
remarkably prescient of the approaches of liberal rationalist philosophers of today. For in-
stance, he perceived that the source of - or need for - any sensible moral code must be a utili-
tarian one. But he did not fall into the fallacies of either crude collectivist or amoralist forms 
of utilitarianism. The "sense of final utility is always the final standard" (143) but our "utility' 
can be graded or categorised hierarchically according to our natures. We owe it to ourselves to 
pursue 'the best and the highest'" (144). 
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Of interest in this connection is Robertson's standpoint concerning natural rights. While such 
concepts were being rejected by the mainstream of philosophy and the academic world in 
general, his admittedly parenthetical digressions resembled the Aristotelian natural rights 
approach championed by most liberal philosophers today. The term, he said, has "a real con-
tent" and "a real use" in indicating the nature of reciprocity (145). As he explicated: 
"Morality clearly rests equally on primary self-regarding instinct and 
on secondary sympathetic instinct ... The very sense of right rises in physical 
instinct, as we can see in the habits of animals; and this is the scientific 
justification of the term 'natural right', which covers all social arrangements 
that can be permanently harmonised with the first biological instinct 
and its social correlative, and marks off as invalid and deserving of abolition 
all other so-called rights set up by the legislation of either the majority 
or the minority". (146) 
Rights are simply the generalisation of our own individual "self-preservation and self-asser-
tion'" to all identical entities; "duty" is simply "reciprocity" in observing these others' rights 
(147). The elaboration of an ethical egoism on Aristotelian, natural rights/natural law lines by 
such contemporary liberal rationalists as Ayn Rand, Tibor Machan, Eric Mack, Murray 
Rothbard and others incorporates these insights (148). 
Robertson also presented an interpretation of emotion presaging the more detailed expositions 
of a number of (largely libertarian) contemporary philosophers and psychologists. He thus 
declared that "not only are ideas and emotions not antagonistic aspects of consciousness, but 
they are positively inconceivable apart". Normal emotion, in his view, "belongs to an idea". 
"Affect the perception, the idea, alter or modify or supersede that, and the emotion will take 
care of itself as surely as your shadow." He thus rejected the traditional assertion of anti-
rationalists, conservative or collectivist, that reason is "cold" or "heartless", and human life of 
necessity irrational because of its emotional constituents. "The upward path for men lies by the 
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way of knowledge and reason - a path from which emotion is in nowise shut out, but in which 
it is ever more finely touched to finer issues" (150). It is a "motor force" which can be direc-
ted wisely or foolishly (150). 
(ii) Individualism Versus Collectivism 
Robertson's commitment to reason, to individual autonomy and to self-sovereignty dictated his 
attitude not merely to political collectivism and tyranny but to other anti-individualist forces. 
He rejected Fascism and nationalism not merely because of their factual claims, but also 
because of their moral character, their "reduction of the living individual to the status an atom 
in the non-moral state" and their implication that "men exist for the State and not the State for 
men" (151). The submission of the individual to "the collective pride and lust-to-power of the 
tribe", to the horrors of war and blind nationalism, were "due fruits of the persistence on the 
mediaeval path of 'vigorous government'" (152). 
Similar reasoning underlies Robertson's rejection of sexual collectivism. "The spirit of indi-
vidual self-assertion", he said, "is the stuff of spiritual equality" and is as desirable for women 
as for men. Walt Whitman's maxim of "Resist much, obey little" was his stated ideal. The 
relations of dominance and subservience existing between the sexes were blatantly at variance 
with "the indefeasible rights of personality as such" and are an inheritance from a time charac-
terised by the "cruel clash of brute force, and ... mindless tyranny of naked strength" (153). 
Needless to say, he rejected claims (curiously reborn in the chauvinism and sexism of the 
contemporary socialist "feminist" movement) that women have a "mission" to "elevate" and 
"purify" politics. There was, he said: 
"no 'mission' held in common by women any more than by men. Women 
oppose each other as men oppose each other. Nor is there any reason 
to look to them for any special show of political wisdom. When they 
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talk politics now they show much the same habits of mind as men; 
they fall into the same fallacies; they show the same sympathies, 
good and bad; the same philanthropy, the same snobberies, the 
same superstitions; the same insufficiency of logic and 
science. How should it be otherwise?". (154) 
(iii) Robertson's Concept of Reason 
Joseph McCabe called Robertson "the most considerable figure in British rationalism after the 
death of Bradlaugh ... the recognized leader of the rationalist movement" (155). While I am 
not concerned here with Robertson's specific critique of Christianity and of religion generally, 
it is important to understand how he viewed reason, and to appreciate his conviction that the 
rule of reasoning in every aspect of life and behaviour, individual and social, was beneficent. 
Robertson lies in the radical rationalist and individualist tradition associated with the Levellers, 
the eighteenth-century Commonwealthmen, Paine, various natural rights/natural law philoso-
phers, the fin de siecle individualists and, of course, modern libertarians such as Rand and 
Rothbard. 
In the view of those committed to this tradition, including Robertson himself, the practice and 
exercise of reason liberate the individual from the constraints and injustices of society, politics 
and religion, all of which noticeably rely on anti-rational elements. As he put it: 
"[R]ationalism, on the side of thought, must forever mean liberty, 
equality, fraternity, 'the giving and receiving of reasons' , 
the complete reciprocity of judgment". (156). 
Liberalism, it followed, was "a war of reason" and its adherents formed "a party of principle 
that shall know why it acts, and foresee its way" (157). He opposed all religions because they 
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rendered a "fictitious account of the world, and of human life" and hence "confuse men's ideas 
of right and wrong, and of wisdom and unwisdom". He explained: 
"Every error on a great scale is so much hindrance to human happiness ... 
False beliefs on the great problems of thought are bound to spoil men's 
handling of the great problems of action ... I cannot conceive that the 
progress towards a better life for all mankind ... can ever be made 
to any great extent while men hold unreasonable and self-contradictory 
opinions about the government of the universe." (158) 
Certain eminent thinkers might, he thought, be able to function adequately while adhering to 
rational thought in their specialist sphere and to nonsense in another; but he felt that, for the 
majority, "irrational opinions are just so much deadweight, so much rubbish in the wheels of 
the thinking machine, wasting its power and throwing it out of gear" (159). For him, rational-
ism constituted a moral duty to oneself - the ideal process of "making each day a conscious 
new beginning in the higher life". Progress and happiness in individual and social life are rela-
ted dialectically: there is no social progress and improvement without individual progress and 
improvement, and vice versa-and such improvement is always an improvement of rationality: 
"When we see that there is no other salvation for man than that which 
he can compass by his own thought, we shall surely rise to the 
height of that great argument, and seek in a new way to make a new 
world by being perpetually new men." (160) 
Robertson's concept of reason has been attacked by Kaczkowski as "singularly unphilosophi-
cal" and "somewhat untraditional in approach" (161). Robertson in fact sums reason up as 
"only second thought against first thought: more precisely it is a careful plexus of our modes 
of knowledge and inference ... not a different function from primary thinking or believing". In 
other words: 
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"When ... in speaking of our mental processes, we lay special store by 
Reason, and claim to make that the guide of life, we are but proposing or 
claiming to live, in serious things, by our best thought, our checked and 
tested thought, as distinguished in degree or quality from our untested or 
ill-tested intuitions, prejudices or proclivities. This holds alike as 
to our ethics, our aesthetics, our science, our politics, and our philosophy. 
Our Reason, then, is just the generalisation of 'the best we can do' in the 
mental life, after taking all the mental pains we can. " (162) 
far from being unphilosophical this approach seems to me to be both perceptive and prescient 
of that of Sir Karl Popper (167). Indeed, Popper's view of science as proceeding by a process 
of "conjectures and refutations", based on insight and inspiration, is also presaged by Robert-
son's view of the role of unsupported ideas as tools of reasoning and discovery (164). 
IX: Robertson's Liberalism: A Critical Assessment 
I have tried to show that Robertson was a productive and important thinker. That his political 
philosophy seems a "curious combination of the old and the new liberalism", as Kaczkowski 
puts it (165), is understandable in the light of the prevailing ignorance of the radical rationalist 
tradition in classical liberalism. His attempt to treat all subjects with objectivity and rational 
scrutiny, free from apriorism, dogmatism or fanaticism produced a body of thought that at first 
glance is not easy to classify. Nevertheless, as I have attempted to show, he adhered to tradi-
tional liberal individualist values and concerns, and his thought, unlike that of some so-called 
neo-liberals, remained quite distinct from socialism. 
I have already indicated that my own interest in Robertson is not merely antiquarian. His 
radical rationalist and liberal approach is undergoing a revival. The issues he discussed are 
still, after all, the disputed political and economic questions of our time. What then can we 
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learn from him? 
While I would concur with Professor Stanislav Andreski's estimate of the favourable balance 
of "correctness" in his work, it does seem to me that there were frequent errors both in his 
reasoning and - as Andreski himself admits (165) - in his factual evidence. The correction of 
those errors and a more accurate knowledge of social and economic facts appears to me, 
however, to lead one inevitably to an appreciation of the libertarian and individualist strands in 
his thought, and to a rejection of the interventionist and socialist ones. Let us study the details. 
For example, it is hard to reconcile Robertson's repeated attacks on capitalist endeavour with 
his implicitly individualist comments on natural rights and individual assertion. Moreover, 
production, trade and competition in the market place - i.e. in the absence of coercive force 
and special privilege - is hardly "rapine" or blind egoism. As he himself put it at one point, the 
ideal of industry is, after all, "the honest rendering of service for service" (167). It is difficult 
to grasp the meaning of his view that socialism represented some higher "reciprocity" than that 
of the free market. Indeed, it is frequently impossible to see, in the light of his observations on 
the reality of socialist experiments and the views of actual socialists, what socialism meant at 
all - other than a phrase denoting a desirable state of affairs (and who doesn't desire such a 
state!). One suspects too that in spite of his attempt to conceive of morality in rational terms, 
he was still dominated by the intellectual residue of traditional religious altruism and anti-indi-
vidualism, with its rejection of individual self-assertion and self-interest (165). 
Other ethical incoherencies are present. If one does not accept (as Robertson indeed did not) 
the labour theory of value, it is hard to see why "unearned increments" of any sort of property 
- land, capital or personal skills - should be subject to government confiscation, or why some 
sorts of labour (i.e. factory workers) should be favoured by state action above others (i.e. 
entrepreneurs) (169). 
Robertson himself stressed "how important the factual error is" that "knowledge is the soil in 
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which judgment waxes, and ... every process of reasoning tends to be deepened and refined as 
it is based on a widened knowledge of the sum of things" (170). Among his own serious fact-
ual errors are his confident assertions about the superiority of state postal services and telegra-
phy, refuted by evidence available even at the time. Subsequent experience of these and other 
nationalised industries throughout the world has only reinforced this evidence (171). Robert-
son's naive belief that there was little danger that state employees could constitute a powerful 
interest group and combine against the public interest (172) needs little comment in an age of 
mass action, strikes and violence by myriad groups of state employees. 
It also seems to me that Robertson did not observe the lessons of his own class analysis. He 
ignored the extent to which the problems and conditions of his time were the result of coercive 
class legislation, the many interventions both historical and contemporary, from which the 
market order was still struggling to free itself but for which it was ironically being blamed 
(173). 
Moreover, in the light of both his contemporary and historical observations, one is amazed at 
Robertson's failure to realise that an extension of political machinery into social and economic 
life could only increase conflict and disruption, as different interest groups would struggle for 
control and for the benefits of interventionism. As he himself wrote after some direct Parlia-
mentary observation of real life, "every operation of State finance in peace is a battle-ground 
of interests, all represented in the legislature" (174. His own earlier account, in The Evolution 
of States, of the extension of state power in the Roman Empire really should have warned 
him. He wrote there: "As the scope of the State increased from age to age, the patrician class 
found ready to its hand means of enrichment which yielded more return with much less trouble 
than was involved in commerce" (175). 
Perhaps the major fallacy in Robertson's work is what has subsequently been described by 
Friedrich Hayek as 'scientism', the belief that scientific progress means an extension of an 
allegedly 'scientific control' to society as a whole - "the controlled and rational progressive 
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action of the whole community", as Robertson put it (176). Apart from the fact that such regu-
lation in reality means the regulation of some people by others - something which Robertson's 
own methodological individualism should have alerted him to - it ignores the real nature of 
social existence. For in a market society a 'spontaneous order' emerges from uncoerced indi-
vidual action. The spontaneous order of (relatively) free market societies has repeatedly shown 
itself to be more productive and harmonious than any type of imposed order (177). Robertson 
occasionally deplored what he called "waste". But this - when it is not merely a derogatory 
misnomer for consumer decisions which do not meet with someone else's approval - is merely 
the price of the process of adjustments that enable the free market to be so incredibly produc-
tive (178). 
Scientism, then, is a profoundly unscientific doctrine, ignoring the true nature of the entities 
and processes for which it attempts to prescribe (179). There is no way that a scientific plan-
ner can make "exact calculations" - a phrase Robertson uses in his The Meaning of Liberal-
ism - for the economy as a whole. This was pointed out by his contemporary, W. H. Mallock, 
although only worked out systematically by the "Austrian School" economists of the later 
twentieth century in the so-called "economic calculation" critique of socialism. The sort of 
information necessary for any would-be planner is simply not accessible to anyone individual. 
The knowledge required is tacit knowledge, implicit in the multitude of decisions and evalua-
tions of all individuals. Rational economic calculation is hence impossible under central 
economic planning (180). 
As a great exponent of radical rationalism and liberalism, and as a significant sociologist, 
Robertson deserves to be rescued from an unjustified obscurity. That his thought was not 
without its ambiguities and errors is to say merely that he was as other men. And, as he put it 
himself, the only "safeguard against the risks of reasoning is just - more reasoning" (181). I 
find it hard to imagine that Robertson, were he alive, would not have fulfilled the intellectual 
duty he proclaimed, that of "perpetually revising and widening [one's] thought and ... know-
ledge, so forever reaching towards fresh enlightenment" (182). I like to think that he would 
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have joined those of us who today champion a more vigorous and systematic rationalist and 
radical libertarianism, shorn of any fatal residues of statism. 
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4: THE NEW ENLIGHTENMENT: THE REVIVAL OF LIBERTARIAN IDEAS 
"A new enlightenment will come", Hans Kohn, 1920 * 
*** 
Contents: 
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Notes 
*** 
Since the end of World War II there has emerged in almost every academic discipline or realm 
of thought a growing tide of opinion which we might categorise for the moment under the label 
- suggested by Edward Pearce - of the 'non-left'. Whether in economics or political philoso-
phy, ethics or aesthetics, sociology or psychology, and even in artistic endeavour, there have 
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arisen powerful challenges to the intellectual hegemony long held by collectivist, statist and 
anti-capitalist thinking. 
I: Left and Right: The Unhelpful Dichotomy 
I used Edward Pearce's phrase hesitantly, since the language of "left" and "right" is profound-
ly unhelpful. Not only have the terms reversed their meaning (pro-free market, liberal ideas 
were, when the categorisation was first employed in the post-Revolutionary French Assembly 
placed on the "left"); this language also conceals a massive and fraudulent conceptual package 
deal. Thus, a group of collectivist and anti-individualist doctrines - national socialism, fascist 
corporatism, racial collectivism, and anti-semitism - are lumped together as "rightwing" with 
their polar opposites - liberalism, individualism, and capitalism. This has indeed proved a most 
useful weapon for Marxist and socialist opponents of liberalism, who seem well aware of the 
dictum attributed to Lenin that "once you have labelled something you don't have to argue with 
it". Liberalism and liberals are constantly being smeared as somehow "reactionary", and linked 
with unpleasant and inhumane doctrines. 
Indeed, every few years the term "the New Right" also gets dusted off and applied to some 
school of thought that socialist writers or journalists have suddenly deigned to notice. In my 
lifetime I have thus seen it applied to: 
*advocates of real Burkean conservatism like the American Russell 
Kirk 
*the half-liberal, half-authoritarian conservatism of William F. 
Buckley 
*the religious fundamentalism and social authoritarianism of the 
"Moral Majority" in America 
*the free-market economics of Milton Friedman and the Institute of 
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Economic Affairs 
*the National Socialism of the National Front in Britain 
*the ex-Marxist French New Philosophers 
*the rabidly anti-immigrant Front National of 1. M. Le Pen in France 
*the Europe-wide, quasi-Nietzschean, anti-capitalist organisation GRECE 
*contemporary classical liberalism, libertarianism and anarcho-capitalism 
*the writings of "sociobiologists" (theorists of evolutionary biology 
and psychology - many of whom are social democratic statists) 
*various researchers into genetics or intelligence - many of whom are 
socialists 
*advocates of racism 
*those disillusioned former American welfare statists (inaccurately) 
termed "neo-conservatives", like Irving Kristol 
*the High Toryism of Roger Scruton and other Salisbury Review writers. 
It should be amply clear why the whole language of left and right should be disposed of in toto 
(1). 
II: The New Enlightenment 
A far more informative label for the post-war liberal revival would be "the new liberalism" or 
the now widely used neologism "libertarianism". A phrase I find particularly suggestive, 
however, is "The New Enlightenment". Liberalism was born in the Enlightenment of the 18th 
century. The concepts of individual liberty, individualism, the free market, and rationalism 
crystallised in the intellectual systems of Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment and the 
natural-rights political philosophy of John Locke. The myriad views I shall discuss in this 
essay resemble nothing so much as a new statement of the ideals and aspirations of the original 
Enlightenment (2). 
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III: The Fall and Rise of Liberalism 
The concept of the New Enlightenment is also particularly fruitful in drawing attention to the 
question of why classical liberalism declined, why it was deposed by Marxism and various 
forms of socialism in the 20th century, and why the hopes and promises of the original En-
lightenment were not fulfilled. The answer, as I argued in my essay "The Revolution of Rea-
son" (3), lay within the very ambiguities of Enlightenment liberalism itself, its inconsistencies 
and inner contradictions. Moreover, the contemporary revival of liberalism can very much be 
seen as the belated attempt to resolve those ambiguities and to restate systematic liberalism 
without any of its fateful errors - in the words of Michael Polanyi, "to restate the great work of 
the Enlightenment without danger of the traps that have so disastrously ensnared its progress in 
the present century" (4). 
IV: Science and Freedom 
Perhaps one of the most fatal ambiguities of classical liberalism lay in its concept of science. It 
justly celebrated the achievements of science, the liberation to be found in man's mastery over 
nature. But unfortunately the ethos of science became transformed into the ethos of "scient-
ism", in reality a profoundly unscientific attempt to transfer the methodology of one scientific 
discipline to another, ignoring the crucial and distinctive attributes of their respective subjects. 
In the study of man and society, rational consciousness and free will hence became ruled out 
virtually a priori. The liberal ideal of the autonomous individual was subverted in various 
ways by the predominance of social sciences that ruled out of court the validity of introspec-
tion, and that were characterised by a militant reductionism and determinism, by methodologi-
cal collectivism and holism, and by historicism. This vision of science was embodied not 
merely in Marxism's claim to be "scientific socialism", a science of society, but the idea that 
science endorsed or implied the concept of a "scientifically controlled" and "rationally plan-
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ned" society (5). 
One of the major roots of the New Enlightenment and the new liberalism has thus been a sus-
tained critique of scientism by Michael Polanyi and Karl Popper. Polanyi, a noted physical 
scientist before he turned his attention to the philosophy of science and to the humane sciences, 
explored in a number of seminal works "an alternative ideal of knowledge, quite generally". 
His task of "conceptual reform" rejected not merely the "scourge of physicalism" in psycho-
logy and the life sciences - the idea that human beings are irrevocably determined by internal 
or external forces - but a reassessment of the very "conception of knowing" and its reconstruc-
tion upon the basis of "knowing as an active comprehension of the things known" and "the 
personal participation of the knower in all acts understanding"'. His philosophy constituted not 
merely an answer to the materialistic, determinist and scepticist positions which had resulted in 
the "moral inversions" of nihilism and totalitarian doctrines (whether National Socialist or 
Marxist international socialist). He also drew out the mistaken conception of science that 
undergirded the concepts of the alleged scientific planning of society and economy, by his view 
of "tacit knowledge" - knowledge that cannot be formally written down or can only be expres-
sed in the terms of action. (6) It was this epistemological approach which thus led to Polanyi' s 
critique of various forms of alleged planning, whether the democratic variety of Britain (a 
muddle) or that of the Soviet Union (tyranny). I use the word "alleged" since, as he demonstra-
ted in his seminal studies of what actually occurs in the Soviet system - The Contempt of 
Freedom and The Logic of Liberty - such planning is a myth, an impossibility. The sort of 
knowledge necessary to make such planning possible is outside the reach of the would-be 
planners (7). 
A similar, but arguably even more impressive and systematic, philosophy was produced by 
another refugee to Britain, Sir Karl Popper. Again, the failings of much of the mainstream of 
European philosophic and scientific thought provided the stimulus, in the words of John Gray 
in his essay "The Liberalism of Karl Popper", to "a defence of liberalism ... which gains 
much of its power from the fact that ... it is embedded in a comprehensive philosophical 
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perspective on the nature of human knowledge, rationality and freedom of thought and action" 
(8). Revolutionary ideologies like Marxism and fascism/national socialism were based, in 
Popper's view, on pre-scientific and irrational modes of thought (although disguised by the 
mantle of science) that he designated as holism and historicism. His case against holistic 
"social engineering" stems directly from his case against holistic methodology in social sci-
ence. Just as holistic methodology ignores the inevitable selectivity of observation and attempts 
the logically impossible task of studying social wholes, holistic social engineering attempts to 
centralise knowledge. This attempt is not only epistemologically impossible, but also inherently 
coercive and systematically self-defeating, since it walls itself off from real information and the 
corrective process of criticism. Popper's "falsificationist" and "error elimination" approach 
sees knowledge as an evolutionary process. It is a view remarkably analogous to the function-
ing of the free market process, especially as outlined by Friedrich Hayek and other "Austrian 
School" economists (9). 
V: The Autonomous Individual 
Since, as the Marxist philosopher Ellen M. Wood has put it in her The Mind and Politics, "a 
conscious or unconscious conception of human nature underlies every choice of social or poli-
tical values" (10), it is not surprising that the success of particular political doctrines has been 
intimately associated with the success of related ideas in psychology and social theory. Both 
Polanyi and Popper rejected the deterministic or reductionist view of man, the idea that man's 
behaviour is overwhelmingly dictated by forces beyond his control, whether biological, racial, 
psychological, social, historical or economic. Their colleague Arthur Koestler similarly carried 
on a sustained critique of determinism within psychology and the life sciences and a vindica-
tion of human creativity and free will. (11) 
At the same time there also arose a further broad movement in reaction against what Koestler 
called the "ratomorphic" image of man. Under the banner of "humanistic psychology" there 
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arose a myriad school of thinkers and therapists who rejected determinism. The most distin-
guished figure in this movement was undoubtedly Abraham Maslow, who outlined a new 
"psychology of being" that did not deny our introspective experience of free will. His approach 
also built upon the psychology of the healthy individual, the "self actualising" person as an 
ethical ideal. This approach also temper ran through many other analytic and therapeutic 
schools of thought, too numerous to mention here. Although all arguably possess their fair 
share of weaknesses and errors, they all embodied a sound common liberatory and voluntarist 
image of man (12). 
Although many of the humanistic psychologists and therapists had no political orientation, or 
even an anti-liberal one, many were well aware, as Maslow put it, that their "new world view" 
implicitly contained "a new image of society and of all its institutions". Maslow moved from 
an early socialism to, by the time of his death, an almost completely libertarian position. His 
disciple and biographer, Frank G. Goble, was an outright libertarian, while a growing number 
of explicit libertarians have also added their weight to the ranks of humanistic psychology and 
have integrated and extended its insights into the broader framework of libertarianism. Here 
one would cite the work of New York University's Dr Thomas Szasz. or Dr Nathaniel Bran-
den, and Dr Peter R. Breggin. (13) 
VI: The Anomalies of Statism 
Why did these counter-collectivist and counter-statist intellectual revivals not occur until after 
World War II? If liberalism, as I have argued above, declined essentially because of its own 
inherent weaknesses, why didn't liberals recognise and correct them earlier? 
Of course, Liberalism did not entirely disappear before the War. Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von 
Mises, Lionel Robbins, Wilhelm Roepke, Frank H. Knight and other economists wrote the 
bulk of their major work in the pre-war period. But they gained mass followings and substan-
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tial influence only after it. The reason, in my view, is largely that any intellectual system needs 
some sort of fair intellectual crack of the whip, so to speak, before its strengths and weaknes-
ses can be fully assessed. Before we can properly refute any view, it must be boldly conjec-
tured - to use Popper's terminology. 
Here we might find Professor Thomas Kuhn's concept of the paradigm particularly useful. 
Kuhn, a distinguished historian and philosopher of science (also influenced by Popper), argued 
in his influential Structure of Scientific Revolutions that science does not progress in the way 
most people assume. All scientific work takes place within what he called a "paradigm", a 
fundamental conceptual world view. Scientific research is a working out, application or exten-
sion of the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm. Since any scientific paradigm is more or 
less related to objective reality, "anomalies" will occur, "violations of expectations", facts that 
cannot satisfactorily be explained by the accepted paradigm. Eventually a new paradigm, aris-
ing out of the anomalies of its predecessor will become accepted (usually by a new generation 
of scholars, rather than the existing one) (14). 
Collectivism and statism, in their many and varied forms, have had their fair crack of the whip 
- usually more than metaphorically. National Socialism, the fascist corporate state, racial col-
lectivism, communist central planning, Conservative interventionism, Keynesianism, the mixed 
economy, the welfare state - every conceivable form of collectivism has been intellectually 
elaborated (often to a tedious degree) and put into practice. And the results, according to 
which variety has been adopted, have been mass exterminations, repression, famine, poverty, 
inflation and economic decline. In other words, collectivist theories have been given plenty of 
time to be put to the tests of reason, while collectivist practices have generated more and more 
actually existing "anomalies", effects which are simply not explicable in terms of their own 
conceptual theories. 
It is particularly notable that the so-called American "Chicago School" developed its vindica-
tion of neoclassical economics from a background of highly detailed empirical studies of 
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government intervention. As one leading Chicagoan, Yale Brozen, the author of many such 
studies, put it in his aptly titled 1965 essay, "The Revival of Classical Liberalism": 
"Now that we have lived so long with government intervention in 
our economy, a few professional economists have begun to examine 
the results of that intervention. Some findings from these 
examinations are beginning to appear and affect, at least, 
the attitudes of an increasing number of scholars. If any resurgence 
of liberalism is occurring, this is the primary place it is apparent 
to me." (15) 
Chicago scholars and their intellectual comrades at the Institute of Economic Affairs in Britain 
have thus built up a massive library of evidence on the effects of minimum wages and rent 
controls, the nature and effects of regulatory agencies, prices and wages control and virtually 
every form of intervention and regulation. In Milton Friedman's theoretical and historical 
analyses of the supply of money and its attempted regulation - by both Keynesians and pre 
Keynesians - we have an impressive vindication of the quantity theory of money ("monetarism" 
as it is frequently, and unhelpfully, called) (16). Black libertarian economists and sociologists 
like Thomas Sowell and Walter Williams have demolished the statist analysis of ethnic minori-
ties and its disastrous policy prescriptions (17). The so-called "public choice" or "economics of 
politics" school, which grew out of the Chicago School, has taken the war into the enemy 
camp. Its analysis of the real nature and workings of the governmental, political and bureau-
cratic process further demonstrates the failings of the political process just as its forebears 
demonstrate the mythical nature of the much touted "market failure" (18). 
It is probably this rootedness in empirical research which explains why it has been the Chicago 
School rather than the "Austrian School" which has received the most attention. The Austrian 
School, especially as manifest in such figures as the late Ludwig von Mises, Israel Kirzner and 
Murray Rothbard, possesses a methodological approach at such variance with the predominant 
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philosophical paradigm that it has really only started to gain a wider audience after the 'crisis 
period' of statism has become so apparent. The Austrian School is being increasingly consid-
ered as individuals seek a radical alternative to the established macroeconomic and positivist 
paradigm (19). 
VII: The Crisis Period of Statism 
That we are now deeply in the crisis period of statism is apparent from the fact that the expo-
sers of its anomalies by no means come to their work with a prior commitment to libertarian 
values. Thus Professor Martin Anderson, who wrote a devastating and influential critique of 
America's urban renewal programme, started that study as a "liberal" (in the American sense 
that is, an interventionist). It was precisely that objective study that generated his opposition, 
turned him into a libertarian and a career as one of the Republican Party's most influential 
policy experts (20). 
A whole school of similarly sceptical intellectuals emerged. Many of them had been involved 
in the creation or administration of statist policies, recognised their failure and subsequently 
called for a re-orientation in social policy toward the market mechanism. They have been 
confusingly and inaccurately called the "neo-conservatives". Writers like Irving Kristol, 
Nathan Glazer, Daniel P. Moynihan, (the Assistant Secretary of Labour under Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson), Norman Podhoretz, and others frequently associated with the journals 
Commentary and The Public Interest are among the most notable figures in this group (21). 
If the "neoconservatives" rebelled against aspects of statism from the very centre of the statist 
paradigm and policy elite, the "New Left" in America of the 1960s also largely arose as a 
reaction against statism and what it termed "corporate liberalism" (the technocratic, paternalist 
corporate state). The failure of the New Left to resolve its own internal contradictions, how-
ever, led to its dissolution, to a decline in some cases simply back into old style Marxism, into 
total disillusionment, or indeed to an incorporation into free market libertarianism (22). 
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VIII: Ayn Rand and the New Libertarian Paradigm 
One of the major figures of the New Enlightenment was the Russian-born Jewish American 
novelist and philosopher, Ayn Rand. In some respects she stands in relation to the rest of the 
New Enlightenment as Locke did to the original Enlightenment. In both her philosophic novels 
and in a large number of non-fiction essays she attempted to create a broad philosophic system 
following a consistent path from metaphysics, through epistemology to ethics and politics, and 
not forgetting aesthetics. In essence her approach was neo-Aristotelian (but attempting to 
correct the errors she perceived in its earlier forms). What made such an impact was her bold 
moral defence of capitalism. Rejecting the consequentialist, utilitarian or Christian approaches 
manifested by writers like Hayek, Henry Hazlit or Paul Johnson, she defended what she saw as 
a scientific morality, an ethical egoism - the "virtue of selfishness" as she termed it in the title 
of one book. Individuals have a right to exist for their own sake, the pursuit of their own 
happiness, and not for the sake of any alleged social good, or some fictitious collective or 
entity, whether the people, the nation, the race, the fatherland, or God. 
Although initially Ayn Rand's approach was treated with scorn or contemptuous silence in 
academic circles, all her works were bestsellers and had an enormous impact among young 
people. Indeed, they have probably had numerically the biggest impact in converting young 
people to libertarian ideas. And there are now a substantial number of young professional 
academic philosophers, like Tibor Machan, Eric Mack, David Kelley, Douglas Den Uyl, 
Douglas Rasmussen and Leonard Peikoff, explaining and developing her approach. Even 
Robert Nozick, whose Anarchy, State and Utopia has so far proved to be the libertarian work 
which has received the most academic attention, while rejecting the basis of the Randian moral 
argument had to devote a serious critical analysis to it in his discussion "On the Randian 
Argument" (25). Her work has also provided inspiration for a growing body of artistic expres-
sion, in the mainstream novel, in science fiction, in poetry and drama, in the visual arts, In 
both classical and rock music. 
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Rand I s thought has been probably the principal instigator and inspiration of the contemporary 
libertarian" movement, together with another very similar variant of neo-Aristotelian Natural 
Law/Natural Rights philosophy developed by Murray Rothbard (originally an early disciple of 
hers). The more radical exponents of her Objectivist philosophy, together with Rothbard and 
his followers and a number of other schools of libertarianism, reject her "minimal 
statismllimited government" views (the traditional classical liberal position) in favour of "anar-
cho-capitalism" or "free market anarchism". This view holds that the monopolisation of 
defensive and restitutive force by the state is both an infringement of individual liberty and 
economically unnecessary - that the market can provide agencies of defence, justice and law 
enforcement. A growing body of research in economic theory, history, jurisprudence, anthro-
pology and sociology is being produced to support this market anarchist approach. (26) 
IX: "Bliss It Was" ... Some Personal Reflections 
I have attempted to sketch some of the principal forces at work in the revival of libertarian 
ideas. My own experience is very much a micro version of the macro intellectual forces out-
lined. My own personal background was what is called "working class", and I note with inter-
est that many of my political colleagues share this socioeconomic origin. Our personal exper-
ience of socialism and the welfare state undoubtedly enabled us to see through their bogus 
claims - and the ethos of social determinism. 
It is difficult to convey the excitement I and many of my friends experienced as we discovered 
the diverse streams of libertarian thought which emerged in our lifetime. In his influential 
textbook, Economics, Paul Samuelson quoted Wordworth I s famous lines about the French 
Revolution: 
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Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive 
But to be young was very heaven. 
For Samuelson these lines summed up his excitement in discovering Keynesian ideas. But 
Keynes' fallacious and feeble dilettantism pales into insignificance besides the synthesis emer-
ging from the post-war New Enlightenment. Here were the clear explanations for the world we 
experienced, its successes and its many tragic failures and problems. Moreover, these were not 
barren unfalsifiable dogmatisms but a continuing "research programme", in which a plenitude 
of different discoveries were unmistakenly pointing in the same direction and to the same 
conclusions. In a phrase, we were observing the emergence of a libertarian paradigm clearly 
destined to replace the statist paradigm. 
X: The Recovery of Nerve 
But this does not, perhaps, tell the full story. Why does not everyone perceive the same truth? 
There are undoubtedly some interesting psychological factors at work here (and some libertar-
ians, like Andre Spies, are exploring this issue). A further aspect of interest is undoubtedly the 
influence of "popular culture", which, while despised by the statist intelligentsia, constitutes 
the real cultural alternative or "underground" of the 20th century. 
The cultural mainstream for this century has been as much dominated by anti-libertarian ideas 
as the politico-economic mainstream. It has been characterised by the ethos of an "Age of 
Defeat"', as Cohn Wilson has put it in one perceptive book of that title, of "the unheroic hy-
pothesis" or the "discussion of triviality" (27). Doctrines of naturalism or realism echo collec-
tivism's social determinism. The traditional novel of manners evokes mainly boredom. Liter-
ary and stylistic experimentation seem devoted to little but "disillusionment, cynicism, disgust 
and gnawing envy" or in "making delicate picture puzzles out of the buttends of life", as the 
American literary critic Henry Murray has put it. A large part of literary and cultural enter-
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prise has also been characterised, in the words of John Weightman in "The Concept of the 
Avant Garde", by "the flight from reason ... [a] disgust ... with the idea of science", evoca-
tions of perceptual and epistemological chaos, and embodiments of crackpot philosophies and 
cults (28). 
In many of the young libertarians I meet as founder and Director the Libertarian Alliance and 
Secretary of the Adam Smith Club I have found an enormous alienation from the products of 
establishment or mainstream or "high" culture (whatever we chose to call it), or, to be more 
accurate, from its 20th century manifestations. As Ayn Rand put it in her essay "The New 
Enemies of the Untouchables": "When a culture is dominated by an irrational philosophy, a 
major symptom of its decadence is the inversion of all values" (29). Rational moral values, a 
life-affirming sense of life, a voluntaristic image of man, have been preserved, however, in 
what Rand calls the "bootleg" forms of romanticism, in the adventure, detective, thriller and 
science-fiction genres. It is no accident that the Frankfurt School Marxist Max Horkheimer 
contemptuously referred to the "rhetoric of individuality" within popular culture. It is no mere 
rhetoric!. There are no social determinist apologies for crime in the "Dirty Harry" films, only 
a love of justice and empathy with the victim, rather than the perpetrator. Individual integrity, 
honour, justice: these are the core values in so much popular culture, from the Italian westerns 
to kung-fu films. It is in science fiction, however, that we find those specific values that Pro-
fessor Peter Gay, in his definitive work The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, attributed to 
the original Enlightenment - "the recovery of nerve" in humanity's potential and destiny, "the 
celebration of industry" and of science and technology. 
It is notable that for countless libertarians - including myself - it has been popular culture, and 
especially science-fiction, that have influenced and emotionally sustained us. Leading science-
fiction authors like Robert Heinlein, Poul Anderson, Jerry Pournelle, Larry Niven, and F. 
Poul Wilson, amongst many others, consistently dramatise themes relating to the issues of 
rationalism versus superstition, progress versus reaction, freedom and individualism versus 
socialism and authoritarianism (30). 
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It is also significant that socialism, having literally failed to deliver the goods, is increasingly 
abandoning the mantle of science. Its predominant tone is now one of doom-mongering, of 
hysterical prophecies of environmental disaster and the "limits to growth", of rabid technopho-
bia and opposition to progress and science. Indeed, some socialists like Robert Heilbroner 
explicitly call for a return to a neo-feudal, no-growth system in which a superstitious populace 
are manipulated - for their own good and that of "nature", of course - by a new priestly class 
of ecologists (31). The original Enlightenment identified itself "with sound method, progress, 
success, the future" I, declared Professor Gay (32). The inspiration many libertarians find in 
science-fiction and their enthusiastic commitment to the vision and role of science thus makes 
the title name "The New Enlightenment" even more apposite. 
XI: The Future 
What are the prospects for this New Enlightenment? There is no inevitability in history. And 
while scientific paradigms generally move in the direction of increasing credibility and truth, 
the broader socio-political community is somewhat different from the scientific community. 
The scientific community has characteristics which provide an impetus to the discovery of the 
truth. The socio-political community, unfortunately, has characteristics which, to say the least, 
are not especially amenable to change. Special interest groups, the "tax eaters" who use the 
political means of state power to exploit their fellows, are going to be less than objective in 
examining either the justice or the consequences of their mode of existence, as John Burton has 
shown so illuminatingly in his recent essay "The Instability of the Middle Way" (33). 
Nevertheless, there is a power to truth. We have a powerful emergent libertarian synthesis -
the beginnings of a "science of liberty" as Murray Rothbard calls it - that explains the anoma-
lies of statism and offers a research programme of enormous promise. But it is entirely on us 
as individuals, on our dedication and commitment to political and intellectual struggle, that the 
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prospects for ideological victory depend. 
* 
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Originally Published in: Arthur Seldon, ed., The 'New Right' Enlightenment, Economic 
and Literary Books, Sevenoaks, Kent, 1985, pp. 237-250, 252-261. ISBN: 0-948115-01-7. 
(8700 words) 
Textual Note: In the published version of this paper my footnotes were removed and rendered 
as a bibliographical appendix entitled "What To Read". I have restored them to their original 
form as footnotes. I have also corrected some typographical and grammatical errors. 
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I: Introduction: Economics, Political Economy and the Philosophy of History 
While the 200th anniversary, in 1976, of the publication of The Wealth of Nations celebrated 
the writer who is justly famed as one of the greatest economists - the founder, in his magnum 
opus, of the discipline we now call "economics" - it will undoubtedly seem paradoxical to 
argue, as this essay will do, that Adam Smith's relevance for our time is not primarily as an 
economist. 
In so doing, I hasten to add, I am not denigrating his achievement in this sphere, his creation 
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in the systematic form of the basic "tool box" (the concepts, methods, lines of approach) of 
positive economic analysis, the "apparatus of mind, [the] technique of thinking" which, as 
Keynes so notably pointed out, truly distinguishes economics as a science (1). But Smith was 
not, of course, only an economist; he contributed to belles lettres, wrote a "speculative" 
history of astronomy, and, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, composed a pioneering work 
in what we would today call social psychology. In keeping with this breadth of interest Smith's 
economics was as far removed in essence as in time from the hyper-refinements of abstract 
technique and mathematical formulations which characterise contemporary economics. 
Moreover, the rediscovery of a longer version of his Lectures on Jurisprudence has recently 
underlined Smith's fundamental concern with a philosophical, or more accurately (albeit 
anachronistically) sociological perspective on human society and its historical development, 
and his expressed intention (in The Theory of Moral Sentiments) to provide "an account of 
the general principles of law and government and the different revolutions they have undergone 
in different periods of society" (2). 
II: Mercantilism and Neo-Mercantilism 
Much of Smith's philosophy of history in fact emerged in The Wealth of Nations, especially 
in his famous delineation of the "four stages" theory of economic, social and political deve-
lopment in which the mode of subsistence played a predominantly determining role in the 
development of class structure and the form of government. It was an approach which has 
quite justly been termed an "economic interpretation of history", although attempts to charac-
terise it as merely a proto-Marxist philosophy are ultimately unsuccessful (3). However, in the 
light of this broad historical and social perspective it is hardly surprising to find Smith's 
economics resolutely a "political economy", a wide-ranging analysis that took in the whole 
fabric of social life, its patterns of power, privilege and class in both their contemporary and 
historical settings. 
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The rootedness of Smith's political economy in an analysis of the character and historical 
development of the "present establishment" of Europe (4) is rendered particularly important 
and significant, however, by one of the great ironies of history: that 200 years after the publi-
cation of The Wealth of Nations, the "present establishment" of Europe once more bears - as 
we shall attempt to demonstrate in this essay - the most startling resemblance to that of Smith's 
time, to the "commercial or mercantile system". This observation is hardly original, of 
course. Following Keynes' favourable reassessment of Mercantilist theory in The General 
Theory (5) and the renewed obsession of all nations with securing a surplus on the balance of 
payments, many economists have labelled the commercial policy of the past few decades as, in 
the title of one work by Joan Robinson, The New Mercantilism (6). 
But it is important to realise that classic mercantilism was far more than simply a policy of 
obtaining a favourable balance of payments based upon the simple-minded formulas of "bul-
lionism", the confusion of precious metals with real wealth (i.e. productive material capital). 
It involved an increasingly complex policy of state regulation (in intention, if not always in 
successful practice) of the whole economic system - the encouragement and control of trade 
and labour associations, and the attainment of "full employment". In the name of the "national 
interest" competing and conflicting economic groups and functions were to be "harmonised" 
and co-ordinated; chaotic and hazardous competition would be replaced by "orderly" and 
"fair" development which would be in the interest of the whole community. As Professor 
Lipson wrote in the extremely thorough two volumes on the Age of Mercantilism in his 
Economic History of England: 
"[W]hat is distinctive of mercantilism is the more systematic application of 
a protectionist system in all spheres of the national economy in order to 
develop native productive sources of every kind ... " (7) 
That the study of mercantilism and the recognition of its contemporary parallells might prove 
of singular utility in understanding the dynamics and nature of our own social and economic 
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system had indeed been stressed by the major historians of mercantilism. Professor Lipson, 
after completing his economic histories of both the mercantilist and modern periods and noting 
the "striking similarities" (8) between them, made an interesting attempt to assess, in the work 
of this title, A Planned Economy or Free Enterprise: The Lessons of History (9). Like-
wise, Heckscher, in his monumental and classic work on mercantilism stressed the "innumer-
able similarities" and, while somewhat more cautiously than Lipson observing that "mercantil-
ism cannot be resurrected in its entirety any more than any other historical phenomenon", was 
equally sure however that its study would "contribute in various ways either positively or 
negatively, whether as a foundation or as an historical parallel, to a more profound insight into 
the problems of political economy both in the present and in the future" (10). 
III: The Wretched Spirit of Monopoly 
What, then, is the significance for us today of Smith's critical analysis of mercantilism? The 
core of that critique was not simply an abstract economic analysis of the obstacles that mercan-
tilism had erected to the functioning of a competitive market system, but rather a truly radical 
exposure of, and attack on, the very driving motivation inherent in mercantilism was quite 
simply that of the "wretched spirit of monopoly" (11) manifest principally, and most vigorous-
ly, by the merchants and manufacturers. While "national prejudice and animosity" (12) 
undoubtedly added fuel to the call for, and successful attainment of, mercantilist legislation, 
Smith had no hesitation in declaring it to be "prompted always by the private interest of partic-
ular traders" (13) nor in repeatedly excoriating the "impertinent jealousies of merchants and 
manufacturers", and their "mean rapacity, the monopolising spirit" (14). Thus he wrote: 
"The principles which I have been examining took their origin from 
private interest and the spirit of monopoly ... That it was the spirit 
of monopoly which originally invented and propagated [the 
mercantilist] doctrine cannot be doubted, and they who first taught 
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it were by no means such fools as they who believe it." (15) 
Smith's impassioned critique of mercantilism is so valuable precisely because its unblinkered 
and realistic exposure of the true character of what Professor Lipson called "Britain's first 
planned economy" can help us transcend one of the most orthodox, and disastrously misleading 
intellectual cliches in contemporary political economic discourse. This cliche, or myth, has 
both its "left-" and "right-wing" variants. In the former, the growth of government interven-
tion in the economy is seen as being generated by the need to restrain the rapacities of business 
enterprise and hence as almost invariably serving the interest of the masses. In the latter it is 
seen as simply the product of socialist or communist influence and its fellow travellers, which 
will ultimately end in the erection of a monolithic state socialist tyranny. 
If Smith's analysis had been kept in mind such simplistic mythology would surely never have 
taken root, let alone existed for so long. For only now have some historians and economists -
and these almost wholly in America - begun to examine the true record of the growth of state 
interventionism. Initially, and significantly, it was the so-called "New Left" historians who, 
disillusioned by the fact that the various forms of state control and regulation had apparently 
failed to produce a more egalitarian, just or free society, took a fresh, and close, look at what 
had really occurred. And what they in fact discovered was that, facing market conditions 
which (contrary to the traditional view) were increasingly more competitive and "insecure", 
and with their eyes clearly set upon the privileges and profits that might be secured by the 
employment of state intervention, business interests both large and small had sought, encour-
aged, and utilised socialist ideas, movements and measures (16). A burgeoning stream of 
"revisionist" studies in economic and political history, emanating from scholars of all political 
colours and none, has largely confirmed the validity of this analysis (17). In economic theory, 
however, it has been those economists most directly in the Smithian, empirical, tradition, 
members of the so-called Chicago School like George 1. Stigler (18) and, even more ambi-
tiously, the "new institutional economics" of Buchanan and Tullock and their associates, who 
have analysed realistically the workings of "public choice" and the "political market". 
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IV: Neo-Mercantilism and Corporatism 
However, in Britain only a handful of heterogeneous figures from journalism, economics and 
sociology, namely Samuel Brittan, Peter Jay, Patrick Hutber, Robert Moss, R. E. Pahl and 
Jack Winkler, have begun to transcend the orthodox images of both "left" and "right" to 
comprehend that the economic and political system presently emerging in the country cannot be 
understood in terms of either the ideals of social democracy or the harsh model of Soviet sty Ie 
state socialism (19). Instead, they have characterised it as the "corporate state". In the words 
of its most thorough analysts, Pahl and Winkler, it is: 
"[A] comprehensive economic system under which the state 
intensively channels predominantly privately-owned business 
towards four goals ... Order, Unity, Nationalism and Success". (20) 
And although Pahl and Winkler seem to conceive of this emergent corporatism as a "new form 
of political-economic organisation" (21) it should be clear that it would be hard to find any-
thing more reminiscent of classic mercantilism: the pattern of the regulation and harmonising 
of various economic and functional interests to attain full employment and national prosperity. 
And what of the reality beneath the rhetoric of national unity and common interest? Once 
more, the "exclusive corporation spirit", the "wretched spirit of monopoly" which Smith had 
exposed (22) seems only too apparent. As Pahl and Winkler conclude from their research 
among a selected number of companies: 
"Business leaders will hardly object to this kind of interventionism. 
Indeed, it is precisely what those in larger companies want -
a protected environment while they get on with their job. What 
the directors of large companies do not want is laissez-faire 
competition. What they do want is capitalism without competition, 
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a combination of state support and private control. What they will 
accept is corporatism." (23) 
Indeed, many firms, they discovered, were quite frank regarding their goals of price fixing and 
cartelisation and in their recognition of the "opportunity" inherent in state economic planning. 
One firm, they recounted, "willingly acted as an unofficial planning department for the gov-
ernment in drawing up longer-term investment and development plans for its industry, because 
it saw this as a way of manipulating policy decisions in the direction it favoured." (24) 
V: The Contemporary Corporate State 
Since Pahl and Winkler wrote, the evidence adducible for the thesis that we are rapidly enter-
ing a period of "neo-mercantilism", a "corporate state", piles ever higher. The Confederation 
of British Industry engages in ceaseless consultations and agreements with the government of 
the day, and even the auspices of the bete noire of the businessmen, Anthony Wedgwood Benn 
(the alleged incarnation of "left wing" militancy), deterred few from participating in his recent 
National Energy Conference and demonstrating, as one report put it, their keenness "to secure 
stability rather than pursue competition" (25). The "lame ducks" of industry, like British Ley-
land, Chrysler, and Alfred Herbert dig ever deeper into the public purse, while the front-ranks 
of "free enterprise", like Babcock and Wilcox, Clarke and Chapman, Head Wrightson, 
G.E.C., and Reyrolle Parsons enter talks on "planning agreements"? - and their share of the 
growing fund (£550 million increased to £1 ,600 million) to aid industry under Section 8 of the 
Industry Act. And, as British industry becomes increasingly less willing and able to face the 
rigours of international competition, the cry against "unfair" competition and "dumping"? 
grows in volume. 
Smith would have been well acquainted with the sophistry of "interested falsehood" manifest in 
the plea for protection against cheaper imports voiced by the chairman of one of the largest 
178 
textile manufacturers: "We are not looking for the taxpayers' money", he stated as he was in 
fact doing so. "All we are seeking is effective controls of imports. (26). The "impertinent 
jealousies of merchants and manufacturers" are hardly confined to the upper ranks of business, 
however. They are none the less apparent in the attempts of the taxi drivers to suppress their 
mini-cab competitors, in those of the private security and investigation firms which seek 
government regulation to "protect" the public by effectively banning entry into these profes-
sions, or in those of the small shopkeepers' union which sought the banning of mail order 
catalogues, trading stamps, supermarket "gimmicks" (glamour, soft lights, sweet music and 
attractive layout!) and bulk purchasing and storage in order to destroy their larger competitors. 
The emerging corporate state is, of course, hardly identical in every feature with its classical 
mercantilist predecessors: a less reified concept of national prosperity and more humane con-
cern for the actual material welfare of the great mass of the working population would be 
undeniable (although even this was not entirely absent from the mercantilist writings) (27). 
However, Smith would surely not have been surprised overmuch by the most significant dif-
ference between his time and ours - the immense growth in power and importance of organised 
labour. Smith had, of course, always been deeply concerned with the welfare of the largest 
proportion of the population and deeply critical of the "tacit combination" of employers to keep 
wages at their lowest. He was quite clear in his assertion that "whenever the legislature at-
tempts to regulate the differences between masters and their workers, its counsellors are 
always the masters" (28) and indeed even declared that "when the regulation ... is in favour of 
the workmen it is always just and equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise when in favour of 
the masters." (29) But Smith had been equally well aware of the monopolistic role of the 
guilds, the restrictive practices of "(t)he trades, the crafts, the mysteries" (30) with their 
unnecessarily long apprenticeships and restrictions on entry, and equally critical of their 
"manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and those who might be 
disposed to employ him" (31). 
Contemporary self-righteous accusations of "union-bashing", living off the moral capital of 
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past injustices and legal disabilities, would not have deterred Smith, I am sure, from recognis-
ing their manifestations and exercise of the "exclusive corporation spirit" in a period when the 
balance of economic power, legal status and legislative influence are very different. (32) 
Moreover, the Marxist and Socialist doctrines of class unity and common interest among "the 
workers" would seem less a statement of social science than of normative political philosophy 
in the face of "impertinent jealousies" no less vigorous among those who sell their labour than 
those who sell any other product (33). The ceaseless disputes regarding lines of demarcation 
and wage differentials do not seem to be in decline and when, as of writing, a fierce dispute 
still rages between such unions as the National Union of Railwaymen, the Transport Workers' 
Union and the Shop Distributive and Allied Trades Union, seeking to protect the livelihood of 
their members against what they have called the "expansionism" of the dockers' attempts to 
extend the "dock work" classification to ever more unrelated and distant sites. 
VI: Demystification and Political Economy 
Radical sociologists of the so-called "left" have frequently spoken of the role of their analysis 
as one of "demystifying" political and economic life, the necessary exposure of its true nature 
prior to reform or reconstruction in the interest of the mass of the people. It is our contention 
here that Smith's perspective is as relevant for our contemporary neo-mercantilism as it was 
for the mercantilism of his era. Smith's work indeed stands in direct contradiction to the 
audaciously bizarre accusation of one self-described "ultra-Keynesian" defender of neo-mer-
cantilism, John Knapp, that the "classic" and "neo-classic" tradition cannot provide a true 
"political economy", a realistic and relevant analysis of the "social, political and other factors" 
involved in political-economic systems in either historical or contemporary periods (34). 
Unfortunately for Knapp and especially for his plea for a "relaxed and tolerant attitude" to the 
practitioners and theorists of the modern mercantilism, Smith's timely significance is precisely 
his achievement of such a political economy and its exposure of the dynamic of mercantilism 
as one of power, privilege and monopoly. 
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VII: The Role of Value in Analysis 
Certainly no one would abandon the heritage of wertfreiheit in economics and the social 
sciences, the positive analysis by - in the words of Kenneth Boulding - "escaping from the 
swaddling clothes of moral judgment ... tak[ing] off into the vast universe of 'is' [and] escap-
ing from the treacherous launching pad of 'ought' (35). Yet as Boulding recognised, the ethi-
cal and normative dimensions of economics is ultimately inescapable, and, as even the most 
austere Austrian School exponents of "aprioristic" methodology and the "pure logic of choice" 
have argued, a political economy is essential to an understanding of the social fabric as a 
whole (36). Writing in 1869, Professor James E. Thorold Rogers, an eminent but now forgot-
ten disciple of Smith, wrote that "Smith's political economy was a war against privilege and 
monopoly, as all honest political economy is, whether it be privilege on the part of the land-
lords or masters, peasants or workmen" (37). In a era of Eastern state socialism which hides a 
bureaucratic-military-technocratic "new class" behind a mask of "proletarian" and egalitarian 
rhetoric of national interest and social democracy, it is the task of demystification, wedded to 
"the liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice" (38) that seems most urgently relevant - and so 
radical - today. For those of us who consider ourselves radicals, Smith would indeed seem to 
offer a better guide than Marx, and the market mechanism appears increasingly vindicated as a 
progressive and humane social form. Smith's "obvious and simple system of natural liberty" 
(39)is not (as indeed it was not in The Wealth of Nations itself) quite as simple as the phrase 
might suggest. Smith certainly never assumed any spontaneous identity of interests in the 
absence of government restrictions, and part of the unifying theme of his great work was preci-
sely the way in which some institutions would channel human self-interest in a socially benefi-
cial way and others (such as, but not solely, mercantilism) would not (40). The exact charac-
ter of the institutional framework best suited to this age (Smith was always aware of the chan-
ging historical context) is outside the scope of this essay, and Smith can hardly be blamed for 
not providing a map when he certainly did provide a compass. 
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VIII: Conclusion: The Market Versus the Present Establishments 
In The Political Economy of the New Left (41) Professor Assar Lindbeck has argued that 
many of the "new radicals" in the "New Left", disenchanted with the bureaucratic and coercive 
structures of both East and West, had ultimately to face a choice between two mutually exclu-
sive social options, between the market economy and the command economy. Many of those 
whose motivation was truly one of "equality, liberty and justice" have indeed made such a 
choice and, like ex-SDS activist and Harvard philosophy professor, Robert Nozick, have opted 
for the market as a utopian ideal (42). It would indeed be a further irony of history if, 200 
years after the publication of The Wealth of Nations, we were not only faced with the emer-
gence of "present establishments" that so closely resembled those of Smith's time but also with 
the possible emergence of a new radicalism which would attack that system in the same mar-
ket-oriented and liberal terms as Smith. 
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The last decade has clearly witnessed the shattering of the sociological consensus. We seem 
far removed from the time when, in 1954, Ely Chinoy could declare that "the days of compet-
ing schools, each employing a distinct conceptual apparatus, are almost gone" (1) or even from 
Donald MacRae's statement, in 1968, that an intellectual "lull", a sociological "unity" had 
been achieved, and only "a long period of logical refinement, and cleaning-up operations 
awaits us" (2). Instead, what has occurred has been the explosive emergence of a myriad 
competing claimants to the mantle of revolution or "paradigm change" in sociology. Phenome-
nology, ethnomethodology, symbolic-interactionism, critical theory, "new", "reflexive", 
"radical", and "humanistic" sociologies have all laid claim to the honour of being the agent of 
transformation. Yet, while noting their common elements, a commitment to "liberation", to 
"self-determination" and to various views of individual autonomy against "social forces", it is 
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necessary to observe, as one self-proclaimed "humanistic sociologist" has indeed done, that: 
"it is not clear at all ... how the various 'elements', or, better, 
manifestations [of the " great first-order fissure" in contemporary 
sociology] cohere or are even compatible: the 'radicalism' and 
struggle-o,rientation-even-unto-violence-if-need-be of some, with 
the dignity-preservation- for-all at almost any cost to others; 
the roles of prophet, soldier, healer, light-bringer ... leader, 
planner, liberator, and - can it be? - controller." (3) 
To what extent does the smoke of a somewhat self-satisfied bandying of new jargon and labels 
conceal the absence of any real fire of change? To what extent does allegedly revolutionary 
disputation with the orthodox tradition actually share with that tradition a cumulative back-
ground of ideas and numerous fundamental assumptions? - as Ernest Becker has queried with 
reference to similar conflicts in the past (4). How far has real change occurred? 
I: Dennis Wrong's "Skeptical Sociology" 
Dennis Wrong's Skeptical Sociology (Heinemann, London, 1977; subsequent bracketed page 
numbers refer to this work) is no mere late-corner to the ranks of contenders for the 'revolu-
tionary' honours. Wrong has been a distinguished and long-standing (if insufficiently known 
in Britain) contributor to the growing stream of criticism of the structural-functional ortho-
doxy. This book thus gathers together most of his major published essays, dating from 1959, 
along with a number of previously unpublished items. Ranging in character from scholarly 
polemics to serious contributions on major issues in sociological theory and general discussions 
of divers topics in politics and political theory. They present us with a timely illustration of 
the general direction of the 'new' and 'humanist' streams of thought, and numerous (' refle-
xive'!) reflections on the actual diversity of such intellectual currents. In examining the char-
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acter of Wrong's own work, his observations on contemporary sociology, and the questions he 
both raises and fails to raise, we can go some way in assessing the true status of the 'new 
sociologies' . 
II: Human Nature and Individual Autonomy 
In perhaps the most valuable section of the book, the "Prologue" and Part One on "Human 
Nature and the Perspective of Sociology", Wrong provides a much needed criticism of some 
fashionable trends. An established critic of the positivism and "scientism" of structural func-
tionalism, he explains his reasons for no longer calling his own view "humanistic" - not the 
least of which is its "self-congratulatory aura" (p. 2) and its use as a "virtual synonym for an 
engage sociology aligned politically with the Left" (p. 2)" Although indeed (in American 
terms) a "liberal" and "a man of the left", Wrong does not hesitate to proffer some biting criti-
cism of the so-called "Critical Theory" of the Frankfurt School and its followers. Not a few 
will welcome his declaration that the "critical theorists" possess no monopoly on the "reflex-
ive" perspective, the critique of positivism, a critical perspective on the status quo, or on 
adherence to a "utopian' vision". That critical theory's criticism seems remarkably parochial 
and one-sided, focused principally on the West and ignoring the conditions in socialist and 
Marxist states whose existence (whatever the status of their claims to such titles) poses certain 
analytical problems, is a point all too infrequently raised. Wrong's comments on "the increas-
ingly shadowy contours of 'socialism' as an ideal", its use as a "god-term" (p. 9), and likewise 
his sad observation that Marxism is now "surely the most trendy tendency in the sociological 
academy" (p. 51) will provide a courageous and refreshing exercise in intellectual scepticism 
and independence for those who have read the voluminous "radical" writings and experienced 
their growing concrete influence. 
The core of Wrong's work, however, and indeed his most well-known contribution to the 
critique of structural-functionalism, is "The Over-Socialized Conception of Man in Modern 
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Sociology". This essay, his "Postscript" to it, and its companion piece, "Human Nature and 
the Perspective of Sociology", constitutes perhaps the most telling and well-reasoned criticism 
of the holistic and deterministic outlook of conventional sociology. The latter's "model of 
human nature, sometimes clearly stated, more often implicit in accepted concepts" (p.35) is 
one of man as overwhelmingly an "acceptance seeker", a passive internaliser of external social 
norms. Wrong does not, of course, deny the social nature of man, the existence of the "vexa-
tious fact of society" (to use Dahrendorf's phrase) but objects rather to the generalizing of a 
"particular selective emphasis", and the subsequent "extremely one-sided view of human 
nature" (p. 41), while ignoring or minimizing the "obvious and massive fact" (p. 62) of human 
choice and autonomy. 
Much of this critique, the appreciation of a far greater degree of human autonomy than was 
ever recognized by even the most "balanced" of the older sociologists, is now, with the growth 
of varied "humanistic" trends in sociology, anthropology, and psychology, quite widely accep-
ted (5) - although Wrong's view of it as largely "absorbed into the conventional wisdom of the 
discipline" (p. 47) surely goes too far and begs a great many questions. What is particularly 
noteworthy at this moment, however, is Wrong's recognition of the extent to which many of 
the "new" sociologies still share much of the traditional, deterministic image of man. Thus, 
symbolic interactionism, in spite of its stress on the role-making aspects of human interaction 
and its perceptive "readings" of the realities of social intercourse, draws heavily on the work 
of George Herbert Mead and Harry Stack Sullivan, both of whom present a concept of the self 
characterized by a distinct "lack of any motivational energies of its own" (p.66), as a "social 
self", the product of "the reflected appraisals of others" (Sullivan) and the internalizing of the 
"generalized other" (Mead) (6). As Wrong puts it: 
"Symbolic interactionists are not guilty ... of suggesting 
that men are conformist automatons ... Nevertheless [they] still 
see resistance to social demands and expectations as essentially a 
by-product, though an inevitable one, of socialization. The 
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essence of man is 'the presentation of self in everyday life' , 
even though it is recognized that the social world is discontinuous 
and permits some individuality and some resistance to social 
control to flourish in the interstices between rules and 
institutions. Instead of [as in structural-functionalism] successful 
'tension management' imposed by the imperative of the social 
system, 'impression management' under the dominance of the self, 
a theatrical impresario cannily sizing up his audience, becomes 
the compelling social reality. Both views, though in different ways, 
present an oversocialized conception of man." (p. 67) 
Similarly, much of the work of "radical" and anti-functionalist "conflict theorists" adopts either 
vague concepts of the dynamics of "objective conditions" and conflicting "interests" (which 
actually need further psychological explication) and Marxist reifications of class and history, or 
other views equally as holistic and deterministic as those of the functionalists. "Their denial 
that society is a self-equilibrating system in the structural-functionalist sense", Wrong writes, 
"merely leads them to stress socialization in subgroups within total societies that are at odds 
with one another, as opposed to being united by an overarching, shared value system" (p. 60). 
The most notable example of the latter, of course, is that of Gerth and Mills who, in Charac-
ter and Social Structure, "subscribed to conceptions of socialization that scarcely differed 
from those of Parsons and his fellow functionalists" (p. 48). (7) 
On the subject of C. Wright Mills, Wrong in fact includes a full essay, an appraisal of "C. 
Wright Mills and the Sociological Imagination", which contains a number of critical observa-
tions on the hero and inspiration of much "radical' sociology", regarding whom a certain 
degree of "demystification" is certainly long overdue. While justly praising The Sociological 
Imagination, Wrong points to "the striking discrepancy between Mills' own work and [his] 
admirable conception of what sociology ought to be ... " (p. 28). Thus, much of Mills' work is 
actually characterized by its lack of an historical and comparative perspective, an absence of a 
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truly rigorous reasoning to follow up imaginative insights and suggestions (most notably in his 
work on the power elite, where it was left to others to really clinch the case against "plural-
ism"), and the "grand theory" orientation of Character And Social Structure. It is a pity that 
Wrong does not include here his equally important and biting political observations, made in 
Partisan Review, regarding the statist and authoritarian inclinations of Mills (8). 
III: Freudian Fallacies 
Unfortunately, however, much of Wrong's own alternative (fonception of human psychology is 
drawn from Freudianism, emphasising the "somatic, animal roots of our emotional lives" (p. 
54). Here Wrong is open to the same sort of criticism he has made of Gerth and Mills, that he 
is subjecting Man to simply another form of determinism. He is not only apparently unaware 
of the devastating criticisms of Freudianism available (9), and the extent of its predominantly 
deterministic nature (10), but neglects the large body of "humanist" or "third force" psycho-
logy. The writings of the latter movement provide detailed and well-reasoned concepts of 
human nature ("social, but not entirely socialized"), and of the limits of socialization (11). 
Wrong's knowledge of the burgeoning humanistic movement in psychol~gy seems, alas, con-
fined to some of the more anti-rational group psychotherapies distinguished (as he rightly 
points out) by anti-individualistic celebrations of group-induced emotion and of public self-
exposure (p. 2). (12) 
IV: The Sociological Bias 
In the last two essays of this section, "The Idea of Community: A Critique" and "Identity: 
Problem and Catchword", Wrong makes a number of valid criticisms of two widely used 
concepts and of the prospects of measures aimed at the restoration of "community" and secure 
"identity". Unfortunately, he fails to get to grips with the issue of their true scientific status 
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and its significance for sociology. Herein we thus find a further example of the limits of the 
critique of traditional sociology. Although well aware of Nisbet's famous work on the conser-
vative-collectivist origins of sociology (13), and citing Leon Bramson's less well-known, but 
important, The Political Context of Sociology (14), Wrong does not subject these two central 
concepts to a truly critical analysis - indeed, he even seems to share, to a degree, their holistic-
collectivist assumptions regarding the alleged need for rootedness, stability, and socially 
guaranteed identity. Yet such sociological concepts and theories rest, as Bramson pointed out, 
"not on empirical research alone, but on a specifically anti-liberal [i.e. anti-individualist] philo-
sophical approach to modern society". They are "derived from a number of assumptions 
concerning modern society few of them proven or even provable by scientific methods ... they 
do not involve questions of fact, but rather, questions of fact structured by and saturated with 
values. They resemble philosophical rather than scientific propositions" (15). Bramson illu-
strated his thesis by reference to "mass society and culture" theory. A great deal of contempor-
ary work in urban sociology has similarly demonstrated the inadequacy of what have proved to 
be essentially normative and holistic concepts in this area. 
V: Power, Conflict and Change 
The essays in Part Two provide generally penetrating contributions to the criticism of structur-
al-functionalism for its neglect of power, group conflict, and historical change - very well 
trodden ground by now, of course, if less so when originally published. Wrong's essentially 
Weberian analysis provides a sound explication of concepts (especially in "Social Inequality 
Without Social Stratification", re-affirming with welcome clarity a number of distinctions that 
are (as he says) widely, if not always clearly, recognized in theory while often ignored in 
research practice, and underlining the continued relevance of these concepts and distinctions to 
the understanding of contemporary social trends. Unfortunately, however, while Wrong is 
himself well aware of the danger in "retracing familiar ground", of "perpetuating the larger 
failure of so much contemporary sociological theory to overcome its purely definitional charac-
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ter, its tendency to produce a distinctive nomenclature rather than significant propositions 
about social reality" (p. 121), and stresses "that conceptual analysis should lead directly into 
the elucidation of social processes and historical trends with which we are directly familiar" (p. 
121), his own work still pays virtually no attention to the real structure and dynamics of power 
and privilege in contemporary America (16). It is a serious reproach to sociology that virtually 
every major empirical contribution to our knowledge of the realities of power has come from 
outside the sociological profession, whether from "New Left" historians and writers, "right 
wing" conspiratorialists, or radical libertarian economists and theorists (17). 
The final section of the book is - as the author admits - a somewhat more heterogeneous collec-
tion of essays united only superficially in their concern with varied issues of "Power and Poli-
tics", they range from relatively theoretical discussions, through a criticism of Robert Heilbro-
ner (one of America's leading contemporary socio-economic Cassandras), to a celebratory 
introduction to Weber and an explication of "Ends and Means in Politics". It also contains 
perhaps the weakest essay (although one of Wrong's self-proclaimed favourites) on "The 
Rhythm of Democratic Politics", in which he delineates the thesis that "democratic societies ... 
experience a cyclical alteration of periods dominated by protest from the Left and retrenchment 
by the Right" (p. 226). Wrong, however, offers no real analysis of, or justification for, these 
misleading, vague and emotive terms which, as his own essay actually demonstrates, beg so 
many questions and function as semantic weapons by which an ideology can lay claim to virtue 
and label its rival opprobriously. It is again a cause for reproach that neither sociology nor 
political science has produced systematic and convincing analyses of this common categoriza-
tion. Once more it has been left to journalists, academics in other disciplines, or activists, who 
feel such loaded stereotypes do no justice to their own beliefs, to engage in such tasks (18). 
That this essay originally appeared in a volume, The New Conservatives: A Critique from 
the Left (19), intended as a counterblast to the works of a group of writers also frequently 
termed revisionist "liberals" - men of undoubtedly scholarly objectivity whose analysis and 
policy prescriptions were distinguished by a growing disillusionment with the failure of tradi-
tional so-called "leftist" (that is, state interventionist or socialist) policies - surely indicates how 
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value-laden such categorization and terminology can be. 
VI: Monica Morris' "Creative Sociology" 
Monica B. Morris' An Excursion Into Creative Sociology (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977; 
subsequent bracketed page numbers refer to this work) provides an interesting contrast to 
Wrong's work, while serving to underline many of the points I have made so far. An admitted-
ly partisan work, it is designed to serve as a relatively comprehensible introduction to the 
range of phenomenological, ethnomethodological, and interactionist perspectives she designates 
as "creative sociology". Their common character, in her view, is that: 
"[A]ll have an image of human beings as creating reality in 
interaction with others. They all call into question the 
deterministic notion that the 'solid structures' of society act 
as forces on the individual, deciding his fate. They all use 
methods of study that are different from the natural-science 
methods of positivistic sociology." (p. 42) 
However, that an introduction, a "simplification" and demystification, even, of such streams of 
thought should prove necessary constitutes more than a little reproach to their proponents. As 
she points out, they "present their programmatic statements in language so obscure that many 
readers become quickly confused, frustrated and discouraged. Terminology is introduced that 
is far from self-explanatory, sentences are tortuous, much chaff surrounds the wheat of 
wisdom that awaits those patient enough to sift through the terrible wordiness" (p. viii). In-
deed! Moreover, much of the jargon is quite indefensible (do we really need to call objectiv-
ity, open-mindedness or absence of presuppositions, "performing the epoche", "bracketing", or 
"reduction"?), masks either repetition, prolixity, and assertion (rather than validation), or 
simplicity, banality, and truism (20) which is anything but "profoundly complex" (p. viii). 
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In fact, Morris performs her self-appointed task remarkably well. She delineates the principal 
achievements of the "creative" sociologies, their analysis of "the amazingly ordinary phenome-
non of daily life" (p. ix), the structure and tactics of ordinary language and discourse, with 
facility. Her account of her own research into the justifications by newspaper editors of the 
nature of their treatment of the Women's Liberation Movement (pp. 108-114) is particularly 
incisive and interesting, as is her description of the work of Fishman, West and Zimmerman, 
and Cicourel and Kitsuse on the role of expectation and linguistic conflict in ordinary life. 
Yet, while noting the differences among the various "creative" sociologies, Morris is too 
expository and insufficiently analytical. To what extent does "creative sociology" depart from 
the core assumptions of the traditional paradigm? Her account of Mead shows no recognition 
of the deterministic orientation of his work, although she does note that Berger and Luck-
mann's work "appears to smack considerably more of social determinism than do other 
phenomenological approaches" (p. 59) and cites Jack Douglas's comments that "in the grafting 
of structural ideas onto situational analyses, Berger and Luckmann have largely denied the 
necessary freedom of individuals implicit in the whole idea of situated meaning and have rein-
stated the 'objectified' absolutist tyranny of the structuralists" (p. 166). The question she fails 
to ask is, to what extent the "creative sociologies" have either disposed of the "deterministic 
notion" or adequately and systematically dealt with the exact limits of socialization and social 
constraints. Her failure in this respect is that of "creative sociology" as a whole. Peter Be-
rger's Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective (21) for example, presents no more 
(probably less) of a systematic discussion of the role and limits of socialization and the status 
of homo sociologicus than did Ralf Dahrendorf in his famous essay "Homo Sociologicus" and 
its postscript, "Sociology and Human Nature" (22). 
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VII: Change and Pseudo-Change 
Both Wrong and Morris leave us, then, if not with any direct answer to our initial question -
how far has real change occurred in contemporary sociology? - at least with a clearer picture 
of the points at issue and of their significance. If the new trends in sociology represent manife-
stations of a "view of man as having a measure of autonomy, choice and self-determination" 
(23), what is the extent of that choice and at what point does it constitute a quantum jump 
from the traditional sociological view? To what extent, moreover, does sociology qua science 
necessarily focus on the "socialization" process, or depend upon homo sociologicus as either 
an allegedly true representation of human nature or a self-conscious construct, a heuristic tool? 
And to what extent do the "humanistic" propositions either constitute or need to be developed 
into, a new "paradigm"? Wrong at least indicates implicitly his attitude when he declares that 
he has "no intention of creating a new movement or tendency within sociology". In his view 
"sceptical sociologists may wryly recognize a kinship with one another under various dis-
guises, but it would be self-defeating for them to organize as a group or even to adopt a 
common label. In the end, there can be no such thing as a sceptical sociology, only sceptical 
sociologists" (p. 14). 
For those, however, whose skepticism goes further, who adhere to a much broader rejection of 
the holistic and determinist concepts and values inherited by sociology from classical conser-
vatism (and reinforced by the more collectivist varieties of socialism), a different task lies 
ahead. In perhaps the most forthright and successful attempt so far to outline a voluntaristic or 
individualistic sociology, that of Dick Atkinson (24), we find a clear recognition that many of 
the "critics and dissenters, the advocates of an alternative, radical sociology [are] in fact ... 
part of the orthodox consensus", and that this is a measure of the crisis facing sociology and 
students of sociology (25). If a thoroughly new sociological paradigm is to emerge, a socio-
logy that is a "science of liberty", methodologically, psychologically, and normatively indivi-
dualistic, then a great deal more radical thought and change will have to take place. 
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Heinemann, London, 1968, p. viii. 
3. John R. Seeley, "Humanizing the Superconscious: A Foreword to 'Humanistic Society' 
and a Prelude to a Humane Society" in John F. Glass and John R. Staude, 
eds., Humanistic Society: Today's Challenge to Sociology, Goodyear 
Publishing, Pacific Palisades, California, 1972, p. xvi. 
4. Ernest Becker, The Structure of Evil: An Essay on the Unification of the Science 
of Man, George Braziller, New York, 1968, p. 403, Note 1. 
5. For useful summaries of, and introductions to, such trends, see Fred W. Voget, 
"Man and Culture: An Essay in Changing Anthropological Interpretations", American 
Anthropologist, (26)6, December 1960 and Mary Ellen Goodman, The Individual 
and Culture, The Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois, 1967. 
6. A similar recognition of the rather grim and deterministic image of man in 
ethnomethodology can be found in John F. Glass, "The Humanistic Challenge to 
Sociology" in Glass and Staude, op. cit., p.4. 
7. Another criticism of Gerth and Mill's holism and determinism can be found in the 
important but neglected essay by Benjamin Schwartz, "The Socio-Historic Approach", 
World Politics, VIII(1), October 1955, especially pp. 141-43. Schwartz points out 
that in their work the person is "nothing more than a combination of internalized social 
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model [i.e. Freudianism] commonly thought of as a purposive one, leaves Man a 
passive victim of the interplay between constitution and environment no less than do the 
non-purposive stimulus-response models. Man, as such, has nothing to do with the 
outcome. He does nothing; things happen to him" (p. 6). 
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7: MAN, CONCEPTS AND SOCIETY 
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Concepts and Class 
Against Social Determinism 
Conditioning or Contexts? 
*** 
Professor I. C. Jarvie's Concepts and Society (1) is a rare and pleasing phenomenon in 
contemporary academic sociology: it is an exposition of the doctrine of methodological indivi-
dualism, one of the major foundations of both liberal sociology and the "Austrian School" of 
Economics and its "praxeological" approach (2). Its author has thus produced a work which, 
thematically at least, stands alongside the - alas, small - group of volumes in this tradition: F. 
A. Hayek's The Counter-Revolution of Science, and Ludwig von Mises' Theory and His-
tory, Epistemological Problems of Economics, and The Ultimate Foundation of Economic 
Science. It is indeed refreshing to find Jarvie calling for the injection of "a powerful charge of 
mentalism ... into the methodology of the social sciences" (3). As he points out, "determinis-
tic" approaches (i.e., behaviourism, functionalism etc.) founder precisely in being unable to 
satisfactorily explain social change - at least, not without resorting to quasi-mystical concepts 
of inherent "forces", a point Jarvie might also have added. Against the dominant deterministic 
tradition then, Jarvie champions the views that "ideas affect the way people act, and hence the 
world is" and that "The struggle of privately held beliefs to realise themselves in the world 
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through the actions of their believers ... (is) ... a fundamental force behind social change" (4). 
Given the scarcity of work in the methodological individualist tradition, and given the basic 
soundness of Jarvie's own position, it is doubly disappointing that qualitatively his work must 
be judged as falling far short of that of Hayek and von Mises. The book also suffers from a 
somewhat disjointed and unintegrated character, a character explained by the fact that it is 
actually a compilation of previously published essays and additional material (although Hayek, 
it should be remembered, avoided any disjointedness in his own similarly composed book). 
The six chapters, largely equal in length, which constitute Concepts and Society, vary consid-
erably in value and specific comments on each one are in order. 
I: Situational Logic 
In the first chapter, "The Logic of the Situation", Jarvie expounds Karl Popper's concept of 
"situational logic" , which is defined as "explanation of human behaviour as attempts to achieve 
goals or aims with limited means" (5) - an interesting praxeological formulation which was 
indeed suggested to Popper by his reading in economic theory (6). However, it is to my mind 
Jarvie's heavy reliance and emphasis on Popper's work, in contrast to his neglect of von Mises 
(who is mentioned only once and in passing) that explains some of the work's weakness. This 
is not to say that there is anything positively or fundamentally erroneous in this aspect of 
Popper's approach or terminology or Jarvie's exposition of it, but rather that it is somewhat 
gratuitous, adding nothing really substantial to what Hayek or von Mises have already written. 
Jarvie's discussion in this first chapter seems to me needlessly abstract and prolonged, simply 
elaborating - over-elaborating! - rather than fruitfully applying or validating, the basic cate-
gory. 
This latter point also applies, in my view, to the second chapter, "Understanding and Explain-
ing in the Social Sciences", which is devoted to a discussion and refutation of the relativism of 
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Professor Peter Winch. While largely valid, Jarvie's discussion seems once more needlessly 
extended and less than fully successfully integrated with the rest of the book and its thesis. 
II: Concepts and Class 
The next two essays, "Between Adult and Child: Notes on the Teenage Problem" and "The 
Idea of Social Class" are, however, more apposite, being in fact "case studies" chosen to 
"exemplify the idea that how society is conceived to be by its members considerably influ-
ences how it is" (7). The former, on the teenage problem, is of less consequence, being 
mainly some rather "commonsensical" reflections focussing on the teenager's lack of any 
generally accepted "social role" and on the tensions involved between his economic, emotion-
al, and social circumstances. Of far more importance is the latter essay on social class, which 
represents a substantial contribution to this major issue. Noting the startling degree of dis-
agreement among scholars as to what social class actually consists of, Jarvie in fact attacks the 
predominant "naturalistic" definitions. Indeed, what Jarvie argues is that in a free market 
society (a vital point) "The classification of people into a system of readily and objectively 
identifiable social groups is false; it does not correspond to the facts about the people it classi-
fies ... " (8). 
Unfortunately, some of the major politico-economic premises fundamental to his position are 
not made fully explicit. But the point is nevertheless clear: "social class" in the present (semi-
market) society is different in essence from social class in a non-market or feudal society. In 
the latter there was, and is, "a fairly clearly (that is, legally) defined system operating in pretty 
unambiguous ways ... (a) hierarchy of social classes ... characterised by certain non-conflict-
ing indicators" (9). A society in which the market and the cash nexus predominate is, in 
contrast, one which makes available all goods and services to the great mass of the people and 
hence destroys social class barriers and immobility. Yet, in our present society the language 
and belief in "the class system" does still persist. Why? Jarvie answers that "what sustains the 
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reality of the system of social class is that real people believe in it and act on these beliefs" 
(10). In other words: 
"[T]hat people have theories (i.e., beliefs) of class, and that 
they act as if these theories were true, adequately explains the 
'class' phenomena. So I am not denying the reality of those snobberies 
and discriminatory practices which operate in our society. That people 
believe in, and act on, their theories of class adequately accounts 
for these things. One might put the point this way: the concept 
of social class, like most sociological concepts, is dispositional. 
It describes people's dispositions to believe in and act in certain 
typical ways; as a belief held in common and acted upon it is a social 
myth or tradition; a social class is a quasi-group of people whose 
links are that they think they have similar interest, and 
who share common beliefs about the system of social class, their 
own position in that system, and similar dispositions as to the 
behaviour appropriate to their position in that system". (11) 
The social class divisions of modern society are thus conceptual in nature: 
"[P]eople are divided from themselves: their theories or beliefs, 
their myths, are what so tragically separate them. And these theories, 
because they are acted on, themselves create and sustain imagined 
divisions". (12) 
Given the continued importance of the collectivist attack on capitalism as a an alleged "class 
society" Jarvie's methodological individualist thesis is thus of more than mere scholarly inter-
est. It is rendered even more important, in my view, by the unfortunate tendency of some 
libertarians to reify the market, to see it in a manner independent of the human behaviour and 
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beliefs of which it is in actuality the result. Hopefully, Jarvie's account of class might also 
serve as a stimulus to some to consider the whole question of the "social framework of the free 
market", a question so unfortunately neglected at present (with the notable exception of Wil-
helm Roepke) (13). 
III: Against Social Determinism 
But if society and social classes are fundamentally conceptual in nature, and given that our 
concepts can be both mistaken and inappropriate - perhaps disastrous - what can we say about 
their sources? The prevailing and rigid deterministic answers are, as we have already noted 
with Jarvie, unsatisfactory. Jarvie's final two chapters, "The Sociology of Knowledge Recon-
sidered" and "Concepts and Society" are thus attempts to reach a new understanding of the 
"social context", to answer the questions "How does (the) constructed, intersubjective world 
come to be? How is it sustained?" (14). 
In the former essay Jarvie, while rightly rejecting the vulgar, traditional form of the sociology 
of knowledge as "naive and unconvincing", comments at length on the recent "revised and 
improved" re-development of it by Berger and Luckman in The Social Construction of Real-
ity (1966), a work he describes as "useful and illuminating". In fact, it is by no means incon-
sistent with methodological individualism to recognise that, as Jarvie puts it, "Once they have 
existed over time, institutions become something over and above their component individuals: 
an objective, external, coercive fact. The existence of an institution as such is a primary 
social control" (15). Jarvie goes to some pains - and rightly so, given the common misunder-
standings regarding it - to elucidate the position of methodological individualism vis a vis the 
social context. 
"A methodological individualist ... while stressing that society 
and social entities are made up of individual people, their actions 
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and relation ships; that only individuals have aims and interests; 
that individual actions are to explained as attempts to realize aims, 
given the circumstances; and that the circumstances are changeable as 
a result of individuals' actions; need not deny the equal reality 
of social circumstances ... 
Methodological individualism is not a reductionism that would eliminate 
all hut individuals from sociological explanations". (16) 
f' Among the cardinal realities facing the individual, then, are his 
social surroundings, especially institutions. These are as 
concrete and as real as his physical surroundings, and must play 
a part in his discussions and activities". (17) 
That such a reiteration should prove necessary is indicative of the extent to which methodolo-
gical individualism has been misunderstood or deliberately distorted in the process of critical 
attack - i:md perhaps also of the neglect of its most consistent exponent, Ludwig von Mises. 
Surely von Mises' own clear and concise formulations should long ago have left no room for 
misunderstanding? As he wrote in Human Action: 
"It is uncontested that in the sphere of human action social entities 
have real existence. Nobody ventures to deny that nations, states, 
municipalities, parties, religious communities, are real factors 
determining the course of human events. Methodological 
individualism, far from contesting the significance of such collective 
wholes, considers it as one of its main tasks to describe and to 
analyze their becoming and their disappearing, their changing 
stlt •. ~::Ures, and their operation. And it chooses the only method 
fitted to solve this problem satisfactorily." (18) 
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In fact, a good case can be made that von Mises over-estimated the role of the social context 
and its determining function in human action! (19) 
IV: Conditioning or Contexts? 
Unfortunately, however, one is forced to say that Jarvie does not in fact satisfactorily answer 
the questions he himself sets, that he fails to illuminate the relationship between the individual 
and the social context. Whether one finds Berger and Luckman's study useful (and I do not) it 
is important to note that these authors are - in the tradition of James Mark Baldwin and George 
Herbert Meade - committed to a view of individual consciousness as overwhelmingly socially 
conditioned, that "the self is a reflected entity", a passive "social product", or reflective 
emanation of "significant others". And, indeed, any examination of the soziale frage tradition 
in sociology and social psychology reveals a strong and ingrained normative hostility to self-
interest, the profit motive, and the "chaotic" market, and an equally strong commitment to 
altruism, "social control", planning, and "order" (20). However, while the very real forces of 
social conditioning, the "manifest effectiveness of social entities", are not denied by Jarvie (nor 
by praxeologists or libertarians in general), the vital questions of the nature, extent, and limita-
tions of that conditioning - of why some men are "common men" and others "innovators" as 
von Mises once phrased it (21) - remain unanswered, even in outline, by Jarvie. In fact, Jarvie 
tends merely to talk around, rather than come to grips with, the basic issues. In the final 
essay he simply returns to a discussion of Popper's view of "the location of social reality in the 
third world, a world the features of which are constantly changing as they interact with physi-
cal states through the mediation of mental states" (22). Yet this concept of the "third world" -
at least as expounded by Jarvie - simply re-states, in metaphorical terms, the problem at hand! 
Jarvie ends with the same vision with which he started, but without having either completely 
validated it, or demonstrated what it adds to our concrete knowledge. 
That this is so is all the more regrettable, since in the last two decades or so a small but grow-
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ing body of extremely valuable scholarship relevant to his theme has emerged - from writers 
like Clyde Kluckhorn, Gordon W. Allport, Gardner Murphy, Dorothy Lee, H. G. Barnett, 
Mary Ellen Goodman, and Abraham Maslow (23). While not denying the constructive and 
moulding role of society and culture, these writers provide both a far more accurate insight 
into their operation and of the factors of individual transcendence, autonomy, and resistance to 
socialisation. An integration and synthesis of this "revisionist" and "humanistic" vein of 
thought would have served Jarvie well and represented a useful contribution to sociology (24). 
I suspect however that American students may well find the brief appendix to Jarvie's work, 
"The Methodological Individualism Debate", one of its most valuable features - for they may 
be unaware that such a debate has taken place! Although apparently largely ignored in Ameri-
can academic circles, there occurred in Britain during the 1950' s a serious discussion of the 
merits of methodological individualism, primarily stimulated by the work of Hayek and Pop-
per. The debate took place in such journals as the British Journal of Sociology, British 
Journal of the Philosophy of Science, Journal of Philosophy etc., and involved such scho-
lars as Jarvie himself, Ernest Gellner, 1. W. N. Watkins, 1. O. Wisdom, Joseph Agassi, L. 1. 
Goldstein and Stephen Lukes. Jarvie summarises chronologically the major contributions and 
arguments in the debate, and although (as his summary alone reveals) much of the hostile criti-
cism was rendered gratuitous due to its misunderstandings, students of the debate will undoubt-
edly find many of the contributions greatly stimulating and will be well rewarded by following 
up the references supplied. 
If Concepts and Society does not constitute a classic contribution to methodological indivi-
dualism in the manner of Hayek or von Mises it nevertheless does remain an important work -
if only because of the paucity of scholarship in this tradition. Those concerned with the 
methodological foundations of both economics and the social sciences in general will certainly 
find Professor Jarvie's work stimulating. 
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1. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1972, in its "International Library of Sociology" 
Series. 
2. The late Ludwig von Mises conceived of economics as being part of a broader 
science of human action, a science termed "praxeology". See Ludwig von 
Mises Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, William Hodge, London 1949, 
especially pp. 1-142. On the relationship of Mises' praxeology to earlier 
economic methodologies see Israel M. Kirzner The Economic Point of View 
(1960), Sheed and Ward, Kansas City, 1976, especially pp. 146-185. 
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12. Ibid., p. 126. Of course, we are not dismissing the very real class, 
or caste, divisions based upon the relationship of individuals and 
groups to the State. Such divisions are justly dealt with by 
libertarian class analysis, with its fundamental categories of the 
"economic means" and the "political means" to wealth. Cf. Murray N. 
Rothbard, "The Anatomy of the State", Rampart Journal (Rampart 
College, Larkspur, Colorado), 1(2), Summer 1965, and "Left and Right: 
The Prospects for Liberty", Left and Right, 1(1), Spring 1965, 
and Albert J. Nock, Our Enemy, The State, Caxton Printers, Caldwell, 
Idaho, 1950. 
13. See Roepke, A Humane Economy: The Social Framework of the Free 
Market, Regnery, Chicago, 1960. 
14. Concepts and Society, p .131. 
15. Ibid., p.140. 
16. Ibid., pp.156, 157. 
17. Ibid., p.xiii. 
18. Human Action, Regnery, Chicago, 1966, Third Edition, p.42. 
19. Cf. his statement: "Inheritance and environment direct a man's actions. 
They suggest to him both the ends and the means. He lives not 
simply as man in abstractio; he lives as a son of his family, his 
race, his people, and his age; as a citizen of his country; as a 
member of a definite social group ... He does not himself create his 
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ideas and standards of value; he borrows them from other people. His 
ideology is what his environment enjoins upon him. Only very few men 
have the gift of thinking new and original ideas and of changing the 
traditional body of creeds and doctrines". Human Action, p.46. 
20. For a particularly graphic modern example see Ernest Becker, The 
Structure of Evil: An Essay on the Unification of the Science of Man, 
George Braziller, New York, 1963. 
21. Von Mises, Theory and History, Jonathan Cape, London, 1958, pp.190-191. 
22. Concepts and Society, p .163. 
23. For an introduction to this school of thought, and for further 
bibliographical details, see Mary Ellen Goodman's valuable study 
The Individual and Culture, The Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois, 1967. 
24. In this respect Jarvie's definition of the social sciences as "not 
out to explain why people do things, to understand or explain in that 
sense. Primarily they are concerned to explain typical, repeatable, 
and unintended phenomena ... " (op cit, p.43) is surely open to 
debate as excessively restrictive. Is not the whole direction of the 
book toward the why of human behaviour? In fact, the 
question of the status of psychology in relation to the social 
sciences is dealt with inadequately in my view both in Jarvie and the 
other literature of methodological individualism. Jarvie would 
probably rest his case upon Popper's analysis in "The Autonomy of 
Sociology", Chapter 14 of The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1945. Popper likewise argues that 
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"the main task of the social sciences ... is (that) of analysing the 
unintended repercussions of intentional human actions" (p. 95). 
However, I consider that Popper not only erects a quite unnecessarily 
radical dichotomy between what he terms "psychologism" and 
"institutionalism", but that his whole concept of "Sociology" is 
unsatisfactory. 
*** 
Originally Published in: Wertfrei (Journal of the Society for Praxeology, Washington, DC), 
No.2, Spring 1974. Also reprinted under the same title as Sociological Notes No.1, Libertar-
ian Alliance, London, 1987. ISBN: 0-948317-30-2. (3,472 words) 
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Such is the devastating rebuttal by contemporary economists of 1. K. Galbraith, that to add to 
it would almost seem superfluous (1). Even those of his professional peers who share his poli-
tical orientation maintain a discreet silence regarding the merits or demerits of Galbraith IS 
contribution to economic science. 
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But, alas, in this age a lack of intellectual clothes does not seem to deter anyone from acclaim 
or influence, and Galbraith surely constitutes the barest academic "Emperor" of our time. 
While others expound socialism within economics with at least some semblance of dignity and 
adherence to the standards of their profession, Galbraith aims at, and influences, the lump en-
intelligentsia, the "new class" purveyors, popularizers and consumers of ideas, and, of course, 
those sociologists for whom a real social science, economics, remains a closed book. 
Given the failure of past criticism of Galbraith to have had much impact upon his influence and 
reputation, it might seem arrogant or quixotic to add to it. But the repeated refutation of error, 
as tedious and unending as it might often seem, is a scholarly duty, and the only path to the 
eventual defeat of such error. It becomes a more urgent duty when that error is pregnant with 
deleterious consequences for the lives and liberties of the great mass of ordinary people. 
I: The Age of Uncertainty 
Among Galbraith's works The Age of Uncertainty was distinctive in two respects; it appeared 
both as a book and as a lavishly produced thirteen-part television series; and it aimed to be "a 
history of economic ideas and their consequences" (2), a mixture of intellectual and economic 
history. A certain degree of superficiality or simplification might be excused because of its 
(intended) popular audience, but Professor Galbraith cannot excuse himself from adherence to 
basic standards of scholarship or honesty. It is thus doubly unfortunate that, in spite of the 
privileged access he had been granted to the television screens of millions, Professor Galbraith 
should have shown so little concern with such standards. In spite of his claim to have prepared 
"careful essays" (3) on the topics of each chapter, The Age of Uncertainty constitutes not an 
honest attempt at popular education but an exercise in crude propaganda. To document this 
charge I propose to examine in detail one chapter (and corresponding television episode) of the 
work. 
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II: The Myth of Social Darwinism 
The second chapter of The Age of Uncertainty deals with "The Manners and Morals of High 
Capitalism". It focuses upon nineteenth century American economic history and on the alleged 
ideology and behaviour (in both business and social life) of the capitalist "rich". Their ideo-
logy, Galbraith claims, was that of "Social Darwinism", a set of beliefs which justified the 
wealth and position of the upper class by analogies to "natural selection" and "survival of the 
fittest". The philosophy of Social Darwinism, originated by Herbert Spencer, "fitted", we 
are told, "the needs of American capitalism, and especially the new capitalist, like the celebra-
ted glove". Spencer's disciples, like William Graham Sumner, were "very numerous" and 
their outlook constituted "very little less than divine revelation" (4). Visually, we are presen-
ted with the figures of Sumner and Spencer enunciating their "stern" doctrine from a pulpit 
against a quasi-ecclesiastical background - the implication of obscurantism, dogmatism, and 
reactionary apologetics being quite unmistakable. In the case of the characterization of Sum-
ner, we observe a hesitant speaker, almost guilt-ridden, certainly one ill at ease with his con-
science. The audience of stuffed dummies representing the rich clap joyously at Sumner's 
apologia for them - and money flutters from their hands. The message is quite clear, indeed 
blatant. Sumner, and the other allegedly numerous advocates of such ideas, were nothing 
more than the mercenary intellectual lackeys of the wealthy business elite. 
How true is Galbraith's account of the intellectual hegemony and moral character of Social 
Darwinism? A curious impression emerges when reading, for example, the classic (and also 
hostile) study by Professor Richard Hofstadter of Social Darwinism in American Thought (5) 
of the curious paucity of the supposedly numerous American apostles of Herbert Spencer. 
With the exception of Sumner (and also of the journalist E. L. Youmans, whom Galbraith does 
not mention) one is really hard pressed to find any other figure of significance systematically 
expounding his philosophy. And among businessmen, with the few exceptions of Rockefeller's 
- much cited! - "American Beauty Rose" analogy (and some occasional statements by 1. 1. Hill 
and Andrew Carnegie) (6), Social Darwinist arguments were largely notable primarily for their 
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absence. In the words of one historian of ideas, James Allen Rogers: 
"[V]ery few businessmen justified their actions by reference to 
Darwinism. If businessmen bothered to rationalize their life style 
at all, it was by reference to the tenets of classical economics 
or Christian morality. Only a few intellectuals and publicists 
popularised the terminology of Social Darwinism and they were not 
imitated by the business community." (7) 
III: The Motive Behind the Myth 
Why, then, should Galbraith fail to take any note of such modern critical scholarship? A 
Harvard professor would surely be aware of the most up-to-date scholarship upon the period 
on which he is writing? Sheer ignorance aside, then, the only answer is that Galbraith is wri-
ting as a political propagandist, not as a true scholar. Because he wishes to paint the period of 
"high capitalism" in the worst possible colours, the supposedly "stern" doctrines of the "survi-
val of the fittest" (we are presented with pictures of snarling tigers) are admirably suited for 
portrayal as the ruling creed of such a "barbarian, savage world". In the use of this tactic he 
certainly does not stand alone. The myth of Social Darwinism is one of long standing, origina-
ting with the nineteenth century intellectual and political opponents of economic freedom, and 
adopted by historians (for example, Hofstadter) equally hostile to "capitalism". However, 
more recent scholarship, by no means concerned with defending either capitalism or Social 
Darwinism, but simply with the recovery of historical fact, have thoroughly demolished such 
historiographical mythology. As Robert C. Bannister has written in The Journal of the 
History of Ideas, the image of Social Darwinist apologetics is a "distortion and exaggeration 
that is perhaps better termed ... a 'man of straw' set up to be knocked down" (8). It was an 
image "constructed and maintained by collectivist writers to [attack] traditional liberalism by 
charging that its tenets of individualism, free enterprise, competition and laissez-faire were 
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merely bogus biology" (9). 
If Galbraith's assertions regarding the predominance of Social Darwinism are incorrect, equal-
ly so is his understanding - or at least, his presentation - of its fundamental character and 
motivation. The" stern doctrine" of Spencer and Sumner in no way condemned, as Galbraith 
implies, the masses to a "wholesome poverty". Quite the reverse. For Sumner it was only a 
laissez-faire economy which would ensure a life of prosperity and justice for all (or rather, for 
all productive individuals and groups). It was economic and social freedom which had pro-
cured "the vast increase in the production of means of subsidence, won at constantly diminish-
ing outlay of labour and capital ... lower[ing] money prices and [making] money wages wortb 
more, and ... at the same time, lower[ing] the rate of interest on capital and increas[ing] the 
demand for labour", and thus securing an increasing degree of "substantial comfort" for all 
(10). And it was precisely the ordinary, hard working common man, the "forgotten man", as 
Sumner called him, who profited most from economic freedom. For Sumner, only economic 
freedom could secure a "clean and simple gain for the whole society" (11) and thus it was that 
"every step which we win in liberty will set the Forgotten Man free from some of his burdens 
and allow him to use his powers for himself and for the commonwealth" (12). Whether 
Sumner was right or wrong in his analysis does not alter, however, the humanely motivated 
character of his thought. That Galbraith undoubtedly does disagree with Sumner's positive 
analysis does not entitle him to represent it in so shamefully an inaccurate fashion. 
IV: Social Darwinist Collectivism 
Ironically, moreover, it was precisely among the opponents capitalism that Social Darwinism 
constituted a socially vigorous movement. And this is hardly surprising to anyone who dwells 
seriously on the matter for a moment. Its deterministic and holistic underpinnings were far 
more akin to movements and philosophies of collectivism. And it was among so-called 
"Reform Darwinists" and collectivists of various hues - from "conservative" corporatists and 
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nationalists, to sociological advocates of scientific elitism and statism, socialists, and even 
some Marxists - that Social Darwinism really flowered, and received its most extensive and 
detailed developments (13). Contemporary libertarians and classical liberals, it is worth no-
ting, are highly critical of the collectivist premises within Social Darwinism (14). For exam-
ple, the historian Clarence B. Carson, in his study of the decline of individual liberty and 
liberal thought, stresses the anti-individualistic, anti-capitalist effect of Social Darwinism, even 
in the hands of genuine libertarians like Sumner: 
"[W]hen the Darwinist outlook was accepted and consistently followed, ideas 
dependent on the older view [i.e. of Liberalism] - natural rights, 
immutable, law, human reason, the worth and dignity of man - had to be 
rejected." (15) 
Similarly, the intellectual historian and political philosopher Shirley Letwin has firmly placed 
Social Darwinism in that "new climate of opinion" of the Victorian period - collectivism. And 
she too has ironically remarked on the way it has been presumed to be, and presented as the· 
sole, or paradigm case, of anti-socialist argument: 
"Oddly enough, though it [Social Darwinism] could hardly have been more 
contrary to what eighteenth century economic theory taught, it came 
to be considered the model of all arguments against Socialism ... 
any defence of a competitive economic system was from then on 
invariably taken to mean advocating a merciless struggle for existence ... " (16) 
The practice of selecting one particular idea and treating it as the sole existing argument in 
favour of capitalism, or as its most characteristic expression or, indeed, as the only justifica-
tion to which it's advocates could have recourse, is an extremely common one (17). That anti-
capitalist writers should invariably select what was not the sole or even predominant position, 
but one which was the weakest, most inconsistent, or most open to misinterpretation, does not 
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perhaps cause one much surprise! Such observations, of course, neither prove or disprove the 
objective truth of either side's ultimate position. But that socialist scholars consistently resort 
to such tactics says little for their intellectual integrity, their knowledge, or the cogency of 
their political ideals. 
V: Confusing the Issues: Galbraith's Characterization of Capitalism 
It is worthwhile, however, continuing our examination of William Graham Sumner a little 
further, for we find the truth not only far-removed from Galbraith's travesty of an account, but 
extraordinarily illuminating concerning his broader treatment of the period. 
Sumner was, in truth, a great scholar, and one of the undoubted founding fathers of American 
sociology. No mere scribbler in defense of vested interests, he was an indefatigable and active 
scholar, critical of what he called "a priori speculation and arbitrary dogmatism" (18). What 
one historian has called his "colossal industry" (19) was based on a mastery of thirteen lan-
guages. His pioneering research into cultural and comparative anthropology left numerous 
cabinets of detailed unpublished notes at his death - compiled, it should be observed, without 
benefit of the lavish foundation grants or financial support enjoyed by modern scholars like 
Galbraith. The latter's disgraceful implication regarding Sumner ill befits one whose own 
writing has brought him both diplomatic appointment and the rewards of an enviably affluent 
life-style. 
However, the major point is that Sumner was not at all a lackey of the business elite and the 
status quo. Quite the reverse. He was a vigorous and outspoken critic of the existing order 
(indeed, his position at Yale was never thoroughly secure), and specifically of precisely those 
features of his time which Galbraith presents as its essentially "capitalist" characteristics. 
What, then, could be the meaning of Galbraith's misrepresentations? 
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VI: Production Versus Predation 
Galbraith argues that, in the world of "old fashioned capitalism", Spencer's "natural selection 
operated excellently on behalf of scoundrels" (20) and labels the system repeatedly as one of 
"capitalist predation" (21). In the history of the construction and operation of the railroads we 
are shown a presumably typical example, which manifest in practice "an interesting choice 
between two kinds of larceny - robbery of the customers and robbery of the stockholders" 
(22). What Galbraith in fact does concerning capitalism is confuse the issue by amalgamating 
two distinct ways of acquiring wealth, what the classical liberal scholars used to call the 
"economic" and the "political means". The former was honest production and trade in the 
marketplace; the latter was the use of the state to acquire special privilege and power, to inter-
vene in the marketplace to protect and exercise dishonesty and coercion. Galbraith thus ig-
nores the option of free market capitalism. All capitalism, for him, is predation and deceit 
and no distinction is allowed between the economic and the political means to wealth (23). 
Thus it was that Sumner was a vigorous and fearless critic of his time and of so many busi-
nessmen precisely because of their use of the political means, their violation of the beneficial 
rules of laissez-faire. A "system of partial interference", he wrote, such as existed in America 
in his time, "is sure to be a system of favouritism and injustice" (24). A clear and frank ana-
lyst of what he called the "class struggles and social war" in both historical and contemporary 
periods (25) Sumner denounced the "class" activities of businessmen no less than those of 
'labour' or any other group (as did most liberals from Adam Smith onwards, a truth socialists 
normally fail to mention). Like Pareto in his denunciations of "bourgeois socialism", or Bas-
tiat in his analysis of the essence of "communism" (26), Sumner identified and attacked preda-
tion and the struggle for privilege in all its manifestations: 
"The robbery of a merchant by a robber baron, the robbery of an 
investor by a railroad wrecker, and the robbery of a capitalist by 
a collectivist, are all one." (27) 
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The "selfishness, cupidity and robbery" which indeed existed in his time was not, for Sumner, 
a characteristic of the system of capitalism he sought, and nor was socialism any solution to 
predatory activities: 
"There is a great deal of clamour about watering stocks and the power 
of combined capital, which is not very intelligent or well directed. 
The evil and abuse which people are grouping after in all these 
denunciations is jobbery. 
By jobbery I mean the consistently apparent effort to win wealth, 
not by honest and independent production, but by some sort of 
scheme for extorting other people's product from them. A large 
part of our legislation consists in making a job for somebody." (28) 
Sumner thus carefully distinguished between free market capitalism and the emerging "pluto-
cracy" of his time. A "plutocrat" he defined as: 
"[A] man who, having the possession of capital, and having the power 
of it at his disposal, uses it, not industrially, but politically; 
instead of employing labourers, he enlists lobbyists. Instead 
of applying capital to land, he operates upon the market by 
legislation, by artificial monopoly, by legislative privileges; 
he creates jobs, and creates and erects combinations, which are 
half political and half industrial; he practices upon the industrial 
vices, makes an engine of venality, expends his ingenuity, not on 
processes of production, but on 'knowledge of men', and on the 
tactics of the lobby. The modern industrial system gives him a 
magnificent field, one far more profitable, very often, 
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than that of legitimate industry." (29) 
Such plutocracy, then, Sumner declared to be "the most sordid and debasing form of political 
energy known to us. In its motive, its processes, its code and its sanctions it is infinitely 
corrupting to all the institutions which ought to preserve and protect society." (30) 
The solution to. the power of plutocracy was, however, not simply 'more of the same' - further 
intervention or socialism - but laissez-faire. "Plutocracy", Sumner wrote, "ought to be care-
fully distinguished from 'the power of capital'. The effect of the uncritical denunciation of 
capital, and monopoly, and trust ... is ... to help forward plutocracy" (31). For, "[if] pluto-
cracy is an abuse of legislation and of political institutions, how can legislation do away with 
it? The trouble is that the political institutions are not strong enough to resist plutocracy; how 
then can they conquer plutocracy?" (32). Sumner's argument has indeed been overwhelmingly 
confirmed by subsequent events. As the analyses of the political and regulatory processes 
conducted by Chicago School economists have shown, regulation of the economy has in gen-
eral been positively sought, and largely controlled, by the very interests which are supposedly 
to be subject to such regulation (33). And the highly detailed research of numerous historians -
New Left, liberal, libertarian or apolitical - has similarly delineated the role of business in 
seeking a "planned society", and in financing the anti-capitalist opinions and movements which 
enabled them to achieve such desired intervention (34). The period Galbraith describes as one 
of "high capitalism" was in reality nothing more than what it remains today - a "mixed eCon-
omy" in which the productive suffer both the depredations of the "political capitalists" and the 
meddlings of the coercive state and its apologists, the socialist intelligentsia. Sumner's conclu-
sion, then, in the light of such experience seems even more worthy of consideration: 
"[T]he wise policy in regard to it is to minimise to the utmost 
the relations of the state to industry. As long as there are such 
relations, every industrial interest is forced more or less 
to employ plutocratic methods ... Laissez-faire, instead of being 
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what it appears to be in the most of the current discussions, cuts 
to the very bottom of the morals, the politics, and the political 
economy of the most important public questions of our time." (35) 
VII: The Case of the Railroads 
But for Galbraith, all capitalist enterprise is inherently predatory. His account is devoid of any 
evidence of truly critical analysis. The distinction between the economic and the political 
means to wealth is apparently far too subtle to occur to him. Instead, so obsessed with hatred 
is he for the businessman that even the slightest pretence at objectivity is disposed of. To 
observe the repeated presentations of capitalists visibly bloating, swinishly indulging in orgias-
tic scenes of gastronomic over-indulgence, vulgar ostentation and "conspicuous consumption", 
is reminiscent of the crudest Soviet propaganda of the thirties rather than appropriate for a 
supposedly educational television series. 
As a concise example (the only one) of capitalist predation Galbraith cites the American rail-
roads, and specifically gives a gloating account of the conflict between the "Erie Gang" (Jay 
Gould, Daniel Drew, and Jim Fisk) and Commodore Vanderbilt over the possession of the 
Erie railroad (a "deplorable, and sometimes lethal, streak of rust"). To be presented with the 
railroads, however, as a supreme example of free enterprise, is to be confronted with a piece 
of scholarly legerdemain that while common, still beggars description. In the words of the 
liberal historian and writer, Albert Jay Nock: 
"Ignorance has no assignable limits; yet when one hears our railway-companies 
cited as specimens of rugged individualism, one is hard put to it 
to say whether the speaker's sanity should be questioned, or his 
integrity. Our transcontinental companies, in particular, are hardly 
to be called railway companies, since transportation was purely incidental 
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to their true business, which was that of land-jobbing and subsidy-hunting. (36) 
The conflict between the Erie Gang and Vanderbilt was indeed a classic one between a group 
of predatory plutocrats (the Gang) and a productive businessman (Vanderbilt), the latter forced 
only to use the state (e.g. bribe judges) in self-defense. Indeed, Vanderbilt suffered repeatedly 
from the harassment of legislatures and politicians whose interventions were introduced with 
the specific intention of soliciting bribes. The history of the railroads was an object lesson in 
conflict between true free enterprise and the interventionist political capitalists. Railroads were 
the areas most subject to government interference, and hence the areas in which fraud, corrup-
tion, and predation were most rife. And it was precisely those who utilized the state for 
economic ends, the political capitalists or plutocrats, who exemplified the predation which 
Galbraith ascribes to the "capitalist" and to "capitalism" per se. As Ayn Rand has succinctly 
put it: 
"The railroads with the worst histories of scandal, double-dealing, 
and bankruptcy were the ones that received the greatest amount of 
help from the government. The railroads that did best and never 
went through bankruptcy were the ones that had neither received 
nor asked for government help." (37) 
There were, in fact, many productive, honest businessmen even in the railroad business. The 
lines constructed by Vanderbilt (and his son) for example, were, in the words of a leading 
economic historian, Louis M. Hacker, "well run; had a splendid roadbed and modern equip-
ment; and were able to survive the depression of 1893-96, paying dividends throughout those 
difficult times" (38). Not a word about 1. 1. Hill, whom Hacker terms "the railroad man par 
excellence" (39) is allowed to enter - and spoil - Galbraith's account of the period. Hill's 
Great Northern was constructed without government grants or special privilege, was financed 
soundly and honestly, constructed safely and efficiently, and charged the lowest rates of all the 
Western railroads. Moreover Hill, recognizing the stake of his system in the prosperity of the 
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surrounding communities in the whole Northwest, vigorously assisted their general economic 
development - helping in their construction, guiding agricultural projects and cattle breeding, 
providing instruction in crop rotation and fertilizer, and opening banks (40). So much for 
Galbraith's view of the two alternatives open to the railroad men - robbery of the public or of 
the stockholders! If any other minority group, blacks or Jews for example, were to be charac-
terized on the basis of the behaviour of a few of its members (in fact, in this case of those who 
should not even be so categorized) Galbraith would probably be among the first to protest. 
That he should feel so free to condemn a whole "class" in such terms indeed confirms Ayn 
Rand's description of productive businessmen as "America's persecuted minority" . 
VIII: The Forgotten Men 
Amidst digression into such trivialities as the love-life of Jim Fisk and the menu of a banquet 
for the dogs of the wealthy, Galbraith deems productive entrepreneurship of no significance. 
Nowhere do we find any admission on Galbraith's part that this was the great age of industria-
lization, nor that this process could hardly have taken place had all businessmen been preda-
tory plutocrats. That the United States became an industrial nation, absorbed millions of 
immigrants, and began the task of raising them from the "wholesome poverty" (which Gal-
braith attempts to identify with capitalism) to the highest standard of living in the world es-
capes his attention. The words of Louis M. Hacker should suffice to remind us of the achie-
vement: 
"The United States of the post-Civil War period, a developing 
country, was transformed in not more than a single generation into 
the greatest industrial nation of the world. At the same time, 
balanced growth took place ... A complete transport net, the 
beginnings of the generation of electrical power and its transmission, 
the creation of new industries, the modernizing of farm plant: 
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all were accomplished in this brief time. " (42) 
And, as Hacker also points out, this was due to "a free market, private accumulation and in-
vestment, and the unhampered activities and leadership of a sizable company of entrepreneurs, 
or innovators" (43). Not a word do we hear from Galbraith of this achievement and of those 
entrepreneurs whom another economic historian has called a "Vital Few" (44). "Producing 
cheap, suppressing competition, and then selling dear" is virtually his sole comment on the 
American businessman of the period. Not a word of the achievements of Vanderbilt or Carne-
gie, or of men like Henry C. Frick in iron and steel, Cyrus H. MacCormick in agricultural 
machinery, George Westinghouse, Thomas Edison and Frank J. Sprague in electrical equip-
ment, Philip Armour and Gustavus F. Swift in meat packing or William Clark (of Singer 
Sewing Machine) in marketing (45). 
IX: The Mores of Capitalism: The Industrial Virtues versus Conspicuous 
Consumption 
Galbraith's failure to display the slightest degree of objectivity or analytical acumen is man-
ifest, moreover, in his lengthy treatment of the manners and mores of the time. Thus he details 
the "conspicuous consumption" of the "leisure class", its displays of over-indulgence and 
waste, and its obsession with aping European aristocratic life-styles. That "conspicuous 
consumption" was hardly restricted to the wealthy of a capitalist period he does at least admit, 
but shows no awareness of the absurdity of categorizing the "leisure class" of the old rich (the 
established business elite, rentiers or landowners) and their behaviour and value-system with 
the standards of the dynamic new economy emerging at that time. Galbraith (like Thorstein 
Veblen before him) describes nothing more than the values of an old economic order (that of a 
landed gentry and a mercantile upper class) and the results of the time-lag before the adoption 
of the "industrial virtues" (Sumner's term) and developing mores of a productive individualis-
tic mass society. As Joseph Schumpeter wrote in his classic and incisive (but relatively neglec-
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ted) exercise in liberal class analysis and sociology: "the social pyramid of the present age has 
been formed, not by the substance and laws of capitalism alone, but by the laws of two differ-
ent epochs ... " (46). As in the concrete political phenomenon - specifically, imperialism - with 
which Schumpeter was concerned, so too in the pattern of social mores. (Ironically, William 
Graham Sumner was also quite well aware of this stage in the historical development of the 
"high bourgeoisie" (47). Once more, Galbraith tries to portray as distinctively capitalist a 
social nexus for which capitalism was in no way responsible, but, on the contrary, was actually 
undermining. 
X: Conclusion 
There is, of course, much more one could criticise in The Age of Uncertainty. Each chapter 
could be subject to the sort of critical analysis I have performed here, and with, I would argue, 
the same effect. Amongst other things one would have to deal with are: 
* Galbraith's total failure to deal with his books' alleged 
subject matter, the actual relevance of economic concepts to 
historical reality, their use in the formation of policy and 
their effects upon that formation and the passage of events. 
* The ludicrous imbalance in the attention given to real 
economists like Adam Smith, and to second-rate hacks like 
Thorstein Veblen. 
* The total misunderstanding of Adam Smith's thought manifest 
in Galbraith's attempt to impugn Smith's principles and motives. 
* The outrageous attempt to portray the highland clearances and 
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the Irish potato famine as consequences of laissez-faire 
capitalism rather than state interventionism. 
* The puerile obsession with sexual innuendo and tittle-tattle. 
* The parti pris displayed in his constant sniping at the 
misdeeds of President Nixon and his supporters, while ignoring 
the amply documented corruption and misdeeds of Presidents Kennedy, 
Johnson and other Democratic politicians (Galbraith is a Democrat 
and not a Republican). 
* Galbraith I s inability to concede the existence of any 
academic criticism of Keynesian theory and policy. 
* The mixture of falsehood, innuendo and invention with a 
(very) few basic facts in order to attack the big corporation 
and the lifestyle of its employees. 
* The ever-present use of stylistic tricks, innuendo, cheap gibes 
and arrogant condescension in order to influence the reader 
(and viewer). 
Just as the twentieth century will be remembered as a notable period of the debasement of 
currencies by nation states, so it will equally be remembered as a period of the debasement of 
academic standards in the cause of political ideologies. Professor Galbraith I s work represents 
a sorry example of the latter phenomenon. 
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of textual investigation, Lewis S. Feuer has also shown how Marx, after 
reading The Origin of the Species, declared that it provided him 
with "a basis in natural science for the class struggle in history". Feuer 
has demonstrated that "Marx in Kapital was indeed writing as a Socialist 
Darwinist; therefore the first generation of his followers, Kautsky, Bernstein, 
Karl Pearson, were right in regarding him as such", "The Case of the 
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example, "Selfishness and Capitalism", Inquiry, 17(3), Autumn 1974, p. 338. 
18. "Sociology", in Stow Persons, op. cit., p. 8. 
19. Harry W. Odum, American Sociology: The Study of Sociology in the 
United States Through 1950, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1950. 
In contrast to Galbraith's presentation of Sumner as a guilty and 
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of his students, who wrote: "The majority of our teachers were 
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to his [i.e., Sumner's] teaching with eager expectations and were 
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Every sentence he spoke was a challenge", William Lyon Phelps, 
"Introduction" to Sumner's Folkways, New American Library, New York, 
1960, p. xi. See also Ronald Fletcher's account of Sumner's 
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Theory, Vol. 1: Beginnings and Foundations, Michael Joseph, London, 
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range of comparative and historical data to substantiate the 
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We should also not allow Galbraith's disparaging treatment of 
Herbert Spencer, another figure of monumental and tireless scholarship, 
to pass unchallenged. While undoubtedly possessing his fair share of 
errors and intellectual weaknesses Spencer was a genuine, and 
humanely motivated seeker after truth. Galbraith's contemptuous dismissal 
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does not inhabit the same universe as Spencer. Even by modern 
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*** 
Originally Published in: The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies (Washing-
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extended version as Historical Notes No.6, Libertarian Alliance, London, 1989. ISBN: 1-
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Textual Note: Various editorial alterations and deletions in the published version have re-
moved and the original text restored. 
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I: Introduction 
The term "New Right" is a label that has, in the last few decades, been applied to intellectual 
and political movements ranging from racism, fascism, socio-biology, the "moral majority" 
and Christian fundamentalists and the like to any expression of anti-socialism, and to the revi-
vals of both classical liberalism and traditionalist conservatism. 
Indeed, it is hard to see the logic behind the customary categorization of "left" and "right". 
Why are, for example, are collectivist, anti-individualist and anti-capitalist exponents of 
racism, anti-semitism, national socialism/fascism lumped together with anti-collectivist, pro-
individualist exponents of free markets and individual liberty as being on something called "the 
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right"? The moral, political and economic premises, and indeed the practices, of fascists and 
national socialists are virtually identical to those of Marxist and Socialist collectivists (1) 
This use of the left-right spectrum appears to be a result of, at best, ignorance or confusion, 
or, at worst, partisan and propagandistic obfuscation. 
Unfortunately, the term "New Right" has of late been once more applied to a very real pheno-
menon, the rise of schools of thought and writers whose common characteristic is a rejection 
of, or critical stance toward, the dominant world view of socialism/Marxism in myriad forms, 
of doctrines of social determinism and social engineering, and of state interventionism in 
personal, political and economic life. Since it is hard to dispose of established usage, no 
matter how misleading, what is understood by the term "New Right" in this essay is essentially 
the broad phenomenon of a school, or rather, schools, of thought whose primary analytical, 
and normative, orientation, is to the concepts of freedom, justice and responsibility. 
Within criminology the established paradigm, albeit with some variations, is, to put it crudely, 
arguably one characterized by an anti-punitive ethics and jurisprudence and a determinist 
model of the causes of crime and of criminal responsibility. The "New Right" as it is under-
stood herein represents a rejection, albeit not a totally unified one, of this paradigm. It can 
largely be seen as consisting of four major streams of thought, namely: 
(i) A radical restatement of natural rights c1assicalliberalism, 
or libertarianism 
(ii) A vigorous application of the conceptual tools of liberal, free 
market economics 
(iii) An restatement of "traditionalist" conservatism 
(iv) An empiricist, primarily "wertfrei" (value free) critique of 
the failure of the established policies. 
I shall deal with each of these four streams of thought in turn. 
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II: The Natural Rights Libertarians 
Although frequently called the "New Right' (2) a more appropriate description of this school of 
thought would be the "New Liberalism" or, as I have argued elsewhere, the "New Enlighten-
ment" (3). It is a revival of 19th century "classical" liberalism, the revolutionary rationalist 
radicalism of the major Enlightenment figures (4). Because of a strange linguistic evolution in 
America, whereby the term "liberal" is applied to doctrines of state interventionism, in contra-
diction to its historical (and elsewhere, contemporary) usage, most adherents of this approach 
now favour the term "libertarian". 
The major school of libertarian thought is a reassertion of Aristotelian, natural rights/natural 
law philosophy. On the basis of an analysis of the nature of man as a volitional and rational 
entity it develops an egoistic/self-actualization moral philosophy of "life, liberty and property". 
Individual freedom should be limited only by the duty not to initiate force against others (what 
Herbert Spencer in the 19th century termed the "law of equal freedom"). The primary source 
of this radical Aristotelianism has been the work of the Russian born philosopher and novelist 
Ayn Rand, which has been applied and extended by writers like Tibor Machan, Eric Mack, 
John Hospers, Murray Rothbard, Leonard Peikoff, and David Kelley amongst others (5). 
The relevance of this approach to both criminology and legal philosophy is obvious. In the 
words of Murray Rothbard: 
"The key to the theory of liberty is the establishment of the rights of 
private property, for each individual's justified sphere of free action 
can only be set forth if his rights of property are analysed and established. 
'Crime' can be defined and properly analysed as a violent invasion 
or aggression against the property of another individual (including his property 
in his own person). The positive theory of liberty then becomes an analysis 
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of what can be called property rights and therefore what can be considered 
crimes ... Since questions of property and crime are essentially legal 
questions, our theory of liberty necessarily sets forth an ethical theory 
of what law concretely should be" (6) 
Thus libertarians reject the whole panoply of "victimless crimes" as not really crimes, and the 
subsequent criminalization and stigmatization of individuals engaged in acts which in reality 
range from foolish or self-destructive, perhaps personally immoral, to the completely legiti-
mate and productive. 
"In 1977 well over five million Americans were arrested not for attacks upon the 
other people or property, but for victimless crimes, acts which the government 
violently (although very selectively) disapproves of, but which do not violate 
anyone's rights; drunkenness, possession of drugs, prostitution, homosexuality, 
vagrancy, loitering, pornography, and the like ... In order to police the 
morals of America and 'protect' these men, women and children from themselves, 
many will be forcibly separated from their homes, families and jobs and thrust 
into a brutal sub-human prison environment, from which they will emerge as 
real threats to others, rather than simply the imagined threats that they were 
to, themselves before incarceration" (7). 
Indeed, it is the State itself which is seen as the major perpetrator of criminal acts, by its 
criminalizing of non-criminal behaviour, and by such coercive acts as conscription, taxation, 
regulation of the economy, censorship and the like. "The disgraceful reality", writes Jarrett 
Wollstein, "is that justice in America today is more often than not injustice; that the aggres-
sions committed by police, judges, juries and jailers are vastly greater than all private Ameri-
can violence; and that the American 'justice' system produces more wholesale destruction and 
carnage than it even remotely begins to prevent" (8). 
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Some English and American libertarians have attempted to trace in details the historical genesis 
of "victimless crimes", for example, the criminalization of sexual "immorality" as result of 
medical paternalism, coercive preventive medicine and various forms of "right wing" and "left 
wing" Social Darwinism, bureaucratic statism, moral purity movements (in conservative and 
feminist guises), and paternalist health crusades (9). Libertarians also vehemently reject the 
assertions of both authoritarian conservatives and socialist feminists that pornography "causes" 
rape or violent behaviour. Such claims are not only refuted by the existence of free will, but 
the alleged scientific studies sometimes cited have been shown to be utterly bogus or mislead-
ing (10). 
The most prolific writer in regard to the stigmatization of the innocent has been the psycholo-
gist Thomas Szasz. The core of his critique has been the concept of free will and its negation 
by concepts of mental illness. In his view, with a very few exceptions of physically caused 
pathologies, "mental illness" (although he rejects even the term itself) is a largely volitional 
process over time. Individuals are responsible for their actions, and not determined by inner 
or outer forces. The consequence of doctrines of mental illness has been "to conceal conflict 
as illness and to justify coercion as treatment" (11). In both the East and the West unpopular 
minorities of every sort, whether sexual or political, have been labelled as mentally ill. The 
language of orthodox psychiatric diagnosis rejected as either meaningless, fallacious and 
always "used to stigmatize, dehumanize, imprison, and torture those to whom they are ap-
plied" (12). 
Moreover, the harmful consequences of psychiatric degradation of individualism are twofold. 
On the one hand it destroys the civil liberties of "offenders", real ones as well as the perpetra-
tors of "victimless crimes". As Szasz concludes: 
"The thesis that the criminal is a sick individual in need of treatment ... 
is false. Indeed, it is hardly more than a refurbishing, with new terms, of the 
main ideas and techniques of the inquisitorial process" (13). 
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But the discrediting of the individual as a "self-responsible human being" also exposes society 
to the depredations of the truly wicked and coercive. 
"The American government is now a threat to the freedom of its own people not 
because it punishes the innocent, nor because its punishments are too harsh, but 
rather because it does not punish the gUilty. One result is an ever increasing 
army of thieves and thugs, muggers and murderers, abroad in the land, preying 
on a people unprotected by their own police and judiciary. Another result is an 
ever-increasing tendency not to punish those who are evil and who commit evil acts 
but instead to treat them for nonexistent illnesses" (14). 
The rejection of the idea of individual responsibility and free will has led to an unwillingness 
"to shoulder the responsibilities for punishing men, women and children who deprive other 
individuals of their life, liberty and property (15). Of course, in reality no real "rehabilita-
tion" or "treatment" goes on in prisons, which, in the USA especially, have become nightmare 
realms of violence and instruction in crime, governed by inmates. Nevertheless, in plea 
bargaining, absurd rules of evidence and procedure, and lax sentencing and parole, punishment 
is minimised. 
In Szasz's view, then, the remedy for crime is to "re-embrace the ethic of a truly dignified 
system of criminal sanctions consisting of minimal but fitting punishments meted out as inexor-
ably and as fairly as possible. In proportion as a decent punitive penology would be realized, 
people would be safe from crime" (16). 
The attack on orthodox criminology becomes even more vigorous in the work of Robert James 
Bidinotto. Demonstrating that a real "crime explosion" has occurred, he argues that this is 
primarily a result of the "excuse-making industry", the social-science establishment as a whole, 
philosophers, psychologists, political scientists, legal scholars, sociologists, and criminologists 
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alike. The legal system has increasingly embodied a view that criminals are not to blame for 
their own actions, that they are determined by environment, poverty, injustice, or by psycho-
logical forces beyond personal control, or by alleged socio-biological drives. Punishment, in 
the orthodox view, is seen as unjust and immoral, deterrence doesn't work, and "rehabilita-
tion", "treatment" or large scale social reform (of a collectivist nature) are the only rational 
answers to crime. It is this ideology, in Bidinotto's view, that has undermined the legal 
system: 
"The issue of free will versus determinism is the key to resolving any argument 
about the causes and cures of crime ... By not taking into account the free will 
of the criminal, it's ignoring the very factor which is decisive to his criminality: 
his responsibility for his actions. Instead, it has shaped the institutions 
of law to excuse him from justice." (17) 
Whilst not denying that individuals are influenced by social "forces" and the social environ-
ment, nothing can remove freedom of will. "To excuse criminals because of poor social 
environments leaves unexplained the crimes of those from good social environments. And the 
sociological excuse is an insult to millions of others from the poor backgrounds, who have not 
turned to crime" (18). Ironically, the culture of excuses, constitutes exactly the sort of envir-
onment which encourages crime. Against those who assert "the crime of punishment", Bidi-
notto sees the victims of crime as the "forgotten people", whose "cries for justice must be 
heard" (19). 
What sort of solutions do the libertarians offer to the problem of crime? 
On the one hand, the traditional concept and practice of incarceration is defended. It serves 
the "goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and punishment" (20). The removal of 
the criminal "from free association with a large segment of society", whether in prisons or 
some sort of geographical "exile", is not seen as either "old-fashioned" or irrelevant. And 
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even if it served no deterrent function, punishment is seen as a good in itself, an inherent part 
of justice as retribution (21). Capital punishment is also generally defended on primarily 
moral grounds, although its clash with the possibility of extracting material restitution to heirs 
and dependents tends to downgrade it as a mandatory punishment (22). 
A more radical aspect of the libertarian approach, however, is its emphasis on the importance 
of enforcing restitution upon the criminal. With the rise of the nation state and doctrines of 
statism, (both in the "King's peace" or "debt to society" form) the older, allegedly more 
"primitive" common law view of crime as an act whereby the criminal incurred a debt to the 
victim (or his heirs and dependents) was superseded. Libertarians favour the reversal of this 
development. A central concern of law should, then, be the attempt to ensure the proper rest-
itution by the aggressor to the victim. 
It is worth noting that a minor dispute does occur here between pure restitutionists, like Barnet 
and Hagel (23), and those like Rothbard, J. Roger Lee and others, representing the mainstream 
of libertarian thought, who see restitution as an essential, but not exhaustive, function of law 
(24). 
Insofar as the state can have any rightful powers (a premise attacked by the anarcho-capitalist 
wing of libertarianism) they can only be derived from the rights of individuals, and certainly 
do not deprive them of right to exercise them individually. Libertarians have defended not 
only the morality but effectiveness and value of private law enforcement, detection agencies 
and "vigilance societies" (25). The radical anarchist wing of libertarianism argues that 
ultimately only a fully privati sed system of market anarchism can fully preserve freedom and 
prosperity. The feasibility of such a system is defended and outlined in a growing body of 
literature (26). 
Similarly, the private ownership of firearms is vigorously defended. Contrary to popular 
belief the evidence demonstrates that ownership of firearms exercises an effective deterrence 
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against aggression and that" gun control" (in practice, the disarming of the victims but not the 
aggressors) is both undesirable and ineffective. Women, minorities and "lower class" individ-
uals are especially harmed by gun control measures, it is argued (27). The broader issue of 
a disarmed citizenry facing ever more mighty state power also lies behind the libertarian de-
fense of the desirability of an "armed citizenry" (28). 
Even libertarian exponents of limited (rather than no) state position have sceptical attitude 
towards the efficacy and honesty of state police forces. Private sector response to rising 
crime, in form of private security, private patrols, voluntary neighbourhood watches and initia-
tives like the Guardian Angels have been widely welcomed (29). Groups like the influential 
Adam Smith Institute in London have thus called for the encouragement, rather than discoura-
gement or persecution, of such private initiatives. Similarly, the privatization of "public" 
space, housing estates, and streets is favoured in itself and as it lends itself to the extension of 
effective private security (30). 
The more militant forms of socialist criminology, which see "capitalism as the cause of 
crime", and no fundamental solution outside of a broader radical social transformation, also 
find their polar opposite in the libertarian position. For the libertarians it is not only the 
determinist premises that underlay most variants of collectivism and statism that cause crime, 
but all the ramifications of collectivist economic, social and political policies. 
In a historic and comparative account Professor Christie Davies has described the remarkable 
achievement of what he calls "Respectable Britain" in the 19th century, a close approximation 
of a crime free society, insofar as that is humanly possible. That condition was attained, in his 
view, by a "moralizing of society" along very specific lines, the rise to predominance of a 
morality rooted in individualism and free market values, and in an ethos of personal respons-
ibility and self control. 
"The decline of Respectable Britain, the eclipse of the era of the law-abiding 
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British, can ultimately be traced to the ever-increasing bureaucratic centralization 
of British society in the twentieth century and the linked, but independent, rise 
of a corrosive ethic of socialist egalitarianism. Both these changes undermined 
the moral fabric of Respectable Britain and eroded its central belief in individual 
personal responsibility" (31). 
The rise of crime is seen as essentially the result of what libertarians generally see as the vic-
tory of the state in the never-ending conflict between state power and "social power", between 
imposed "order" and control spontaneous order and social control. In the words of Christie 
Davies: 
"The state has been pitted against society and the liberty of the ordinary 
citizen constrained by the 'liberation' of violent and anti-social elements ... 
disciplined freedom has been replaced by anomie liberated delinquency" (32) 
The return to a market based order, and the promulgation of a similar morality of autonomy 
and individualism is the ultimate social route to the minimization, if not total eradication, of 
crime. 
This analysis in fact links up with the broader libertarian analysis of the problem of what has 
become called the "underclass". This is a restatement of the problem of the phenomenon the 
19th century liberals termed "pauperization" (33). The effect of indiscriminate welfare 
provision on a small but significant group in the "working class", is to elicit a quite rational 
response from individuals who already share a "high time preference" (ie, unwillingness to 
defer gratification), and value system best characterized as a "culture of poverty" . A moral 
ethos of irresponsibility, passivity, family breakdown, and crime is nurtured and subsidised. 
When combined with a reduced risk of arrest and punishment the effects are exactly what we 
observe in Britain and America, and anywhere else such policies are adopted. 
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Ironically, it is the "honest poor" and the working classes who are the first and worst victims 
of pauperization, which, in the words of Charles Murray, represents "an extraordinary range 
of transfers from the most capable poor to the least capable, from the most law-abiding to the 
least law abiding, and from the most respectable to the least respectable" (34). 
It should be noted that there are some, albeit a minority of, libertarians who take a different 
view from that outlined above. A notable example is the Australian social psychologist John 
Ray. Accepting a utilitarian ethic he argues that "the protection of the community be the sole 
criterion of what is done with any convicted criminal" and that "whenever a criminal is caught, 
he never be released unless there is good reason to believe that he will in future abstain from 
crime" (35). 
III: The Economic Liberals 
At same time as the revival of classical liberal political and moral philosophy was occurring, 
an even more widespread revival of "classical", free market economics has taken place. The 
work of the countless adherents of the "Chicago School" of Milton Friedman and his collea-
gues has established itself as a cutting edge within the discipline of economics. The "Austrian 
School" of free market economics of Ludwig Von Mises and Friedrich Hayek has had a lesser, 
but no means insignificant impact (36). 
One of the demonstrations of the vigour of this revival has been the phenomenon of "economic 
imperialism", as it has been jocularly labelled (37). The "Chicago School" has attempted to 
apply economic analysis to problems and issues customarily conceived as being outside its 
traditional subject matter and scope. Social and political institutions, politics as a whole, how 
we treat our bodies, sexual behaviour, love and marriage, and crime and honesty have become 
part of the "new world of economics". 
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Not surprisingly, since the characteristics of economic reasoning are its analysis of purposeful 
individual and institutional behaviour, of rational action related to objectives to be achieved, 
and the concepts of choice, price, alternatives, and trade-offs, criminality is seen in a very 
different light from the orthodox criminological view (38). The criminal is seen as no less a 
rational utility maximiser, responsive to incentives and disincentives, than any other human 
being. 
"Crime, far from being the result of a sickness or mental disorder, in most 
cases is simply a business oriented economic activity which is undertaken for much 
the same reasons as other types of economic activity" (39). 
By applying economic analysis, it is argued, "the amount of crime actually committed can be 
determined in the same manner as is the amount of any other activity" (40). Moreover, in it 
appears "that professional criminals seem to have made sensible career choices. In other 
words, crime pays" (41). 
The economists have devoted considerable efforts to analysing the issue of deterrence. They 
have examined the existing 'anti-deterrent' sociological research and judged it "very inferior 
work" (42). More recent research, especially when inspired by economic perspectives, 
Gordon Tullock argues, arrives at a more favourable view, although its writers have difficulty 
in getting it "accepted in the more conventional sociological journals" (43). Such findings 
are, for the economists, hardly surprising (the reverse would be) since "The deterrence theory 
of punishment is, after all, simply a special version of the general economic principle that 
raising the price of something will reduce the amount purchased" (44). 
Although many of the economists are also favour libertarian policies on moral grounds, their 
economic analysis alone also lead to the advocacy of the decriminalization of "victimless 
crime" laws. The "considerations of expediency", as Milton Friedman has put, attest to the 
counter-productive effect of any act of prohibition, its worsening of the situation for addict and 
255 
non-addict alike, and its corrupting effect on all institutions of law enforcement (45). Along 
with the libertarians the free market economists now constitute the strongest lobby for drug 
legalization and have produced a large body of literature on the issue (46). 
Economic analysis has also produced some unusual perspectives on the nature of crime. On 
the one hand, Godfather-fed visions of the prevalence of "organized crime" seem to be misled. 
"Organized crime" appears not extensive, and the market structure of criminal enterprise tends 
to small and relatively ephemeral enterprises (47). Ironically, this may not be a good thing. 
From society's point of view "organized", and consequently monopolized crime, would be 
better than disorganized crime. Monopoly results in the restriction of output. While we do 
not favour restriction in the supply of goods, we certainly do favour restriction in the supply of 
"bads" (48). 
It should also be noted that application of economics to law has a much wider scope than that 
of criminology. In such works as the seminal Economic Analysis of Law, by Richard A. 
Posner (49), and in a growing body of literature, legal doctrines and procedural rules can be 
given explanations, rationalizations and improvement in the light of economic analysis. There 
are also interesting disputes between what we might term "economic efficiency" theorists 
(adhering to a utilitarian or pragmatic ethic) and natural rights based analysts (50). 
The Economists' arguments have not been without effect upon sociologists. In their work 
The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control (51) Norvall Morris and Gordon Hawkins 
accept a large part of the economic critique, albeit in somewhat less rigorous form. The 
limitations of mental illness as a legitimate plea, the general efficacy of deterrence, and the 
disastrous nature of victimless crime laws are all highlighted. It is the latter area, however, in 
which their advocacy is most spirited and clear: 
"The prime function of the criminal law is to protect our persons and property; 
these purposes are now engulfed in a mass of other distracting, inefficiently 
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performed, legislative duties. When the criminal law invades the spheres of 
private morality and social welfare, it exceeds its proper limits at the cost 
of neglecting its primary tasks. This unwarranted extension is expensive, 
ineffective, and crimogenic" (52). 
IV: The Traditionalist Conservatives 
In Europe Conservatism was ideologically a collectivist movement, sharing with the socialism 
an opposition to the individualistic, allegedly "atomised" society of capitalism. The radical 
rationalism and individualism of capitalism was rejected in favour of the "organic society" and 
the alleged wisdom of tradition. (53). Anglo-American conservatism has been rather a dif-
ferent creature, symbolized by the ambiguities in its founder, Edmund Burke, between his 
acceptance of Adam Smith's liberal economics and his own endorsement of certain illiberal 
social values. Anglo-American Conservatism has largely eschewed extreme and mystical 
forms of anti-rationalism and traditionalism, favouring instead a more defensible view of 
spontaneous order akin to that held by liberals. While rejecting a consistent libertarianism or 
individualism, it has, in the face of such enemies as Fascism and Marxism, been increasingly 
driven to an orientation toward liberty, albeit not without ambiguities. 
Not surprisingly there are many similarities between post-War Conservative thought on crime 
and that of the Libertarians. 
Much of the work of the leading Conservative writer on these issues, Ernest van den Haag, has 
this been characterized by a defence of the efficacy of deterrence and a reaffirmation of the 
existence of individual free will and responsibility (54). 
In line with the greater emphasis on "social order" generally found in conservative rhetoric 
there tends to be a greater emphasis in conservative writing on the role of punishment as a 
257 
broader sanction of social mores, its symbolic effect in establishing "moral solidarity" and 
stigmatising of criminal behaviour. 
"Because most offenders are not significantly different from the rest of the 
population, society must reinforce resistance to temptation by punishment and 
by stigmatizing crime as odious, so that most people will not yield to the 
temptation no society can eliminate" (55). 
Capital punishment is vigorously defended. Its abolition, van den Haag argues, is "perceived 
symbolically as a loss of nerve: social authority no longer willing to pass an irrevocable 
judgment on anyone. Murder is no longer thought grave enough to take the murderer's life. 
Respect for life itself is diminished, as the price for taking it is. Life becomes cheaper as we 
become kinder to those who wantonly take it." (56). 
The Conservatives also tend to emphasise the moral crisis involved in the widespread (especial-
ly amongst intellectuals generally, and criminologists specifically) manifestation of sympathy 
for criminals beyond that shown (if at all) for victims. In the words of Walter Berns, 
"compassion is felt for the criminal and ... anger is directed at society" (57). (Although liber-
tarians have also noted and criticised what it sees as an anti-life transvaluation of values at 
work in sympathy with criminality). "A just society", the Conservatives very vigorously 
proclaim, "is one where everyone gets what he deserves, and the wicked deserve to be pu-
nished - they deserve 'many sorrows', as the Psalmist says - and the righteous deserve to be 
joyous" (58). 
However, it should not be assumed that the Conservatives are merely embodiments of an 
excessively punitive tough-mindedness, as some opponents would like to portray them. The 
determinist and rehabilitationist approach is also seen by the Conservatives, as by the Libertar-
ians, as a real threat to justice and liberty. 
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For example, writing about the Children and Young Persons Act of 1969 in Britain, which lays 
out the "treatment" of juvenile delinquency, Colin Brewer makes two points. "Treatment" 
programmes have been demonstrated to be ineffective. "The old fashioned approach was much 
more effective than giving the child to the care of social workers, in terms of reducing both 
truancy and associated crime" (59). 
Moreover, the system is horrendously unjust. The allegedly humanitarian decriminalisation of 
juvenile offences, the granting of impunity to crime, has actually provided a total mandate for 
potentially unlimited intervention into the lives of children and parents. Children can be 
imprisoned (although it is not called that) as result of non-judicial kangaroo courts, on eviden-
tial basis that would not convict an adult. "Compulsory measures of care" as the Act's termi-
nology would have it appear as euphemistic as the "treatment" for political dissidents in the 
Soviet Union. Indeed, the two juvenile Acts in Britain are, as Patricia Morgan puts it, 
"examples of the tendencies of rehabilitative systems to destroy legal rights and spawn injus-
tices, while essentially segregating a large measure of society's crime into realms of impunity" 
(60). 
In reality, the extravagant claims regarding rehabilitation and therapy are fanciful. Social work 
practice is generally characterized by "tolerance of unhelpful behaviour as part of the diagnos-
tic and healing process". The evidence regarding rehabilitative endeavours, it is argued, 
demonstrates that "none are more effective than traditional penalties in reducing recidivism" 
(61). 
Similarly, regarding adults, the parole system rests upon positivist assumptions, sanctioning an 
indeterminacy of sentencing which is "predicated upon an acceptance of executive justice that 
is inconsistent with a concept of open justice" and more consistent with totalitarian states (62). 
The key to understanding both the cause and cure of crime lies for the Conservatives in 
undermining of moral values by the myriad forms of socialism and interventionist statism. In 
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Patricia Morgan's words, the "quasi-moral distaste for the imposition of norms" (63) character-
ises theory and practice in much sociology, criminology and jurisprudence, as well as in the 
welfare and administrative practice of the contemporary state. The result has been a massive 
failure of civilized socialization, the toleration of a "new barbarism", the endorsement of moral 
relativism and the unwillingness to publicly affirm real moral values in the face of aggression 
and insulting behaviour. 
In Morgan's view it is especially ironic that many sociologists and criminologists seem to view 
crime and violence as revolutionary expressions of the "working class". In reality, it is the 
"working class" which is the most immediate victim of crime. The elements romanticised by 
some writers are not the real working class, characterized by an ethos of productiveness, but 
the "underclass" o~ petty criminals, thugs and parasites on the labour of others. 
The answer to this moral crisis can only be, in the words of David Marsland, "at least a degree 
of re-moralisation of social life" (64). "We have to challenge immoralist permissivism with 
beliefs and values to which young people can commit themselves positively and actively" (65). 
Although there is clearly much common ground between the Libertarians and the Conserva-
tives, there are clearly differences. In van den Haag's work there is a clear Willingness to 
accept the use of law to attain ends other than justice. "Thus", he declares, "justice may be 
impaired to preserve or enhance another value, or the social order as a whole" (66). Else-
where he has explicitly rejected the concept of natural rights, has endorsed censorship of 
pornography, and called for the death penalty for drug pushers. However, in this latter area 
is it interesting that he has more recently, in company with a growing number of prominent 
Conservatives, recognized that the "war on drugs" has been lost, and prohibitionist policies 
proved both futile and disastrous. He has accepted the pragmatic case made by the Libertar-
ians and the Economists (67). 
Although libertarians would accept much of the argument made by the conservatives for a "re-
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moralization" of society, one suspects that there would be some disputes as to what constitutes 
morality in certain areas (especially relating to sexual behaviour). Moreover, the libertarians 
adhere to a stronger belief in the beneficence of spontaneous order. In the absence of the 
perverse incentives and disincentives established by state interventionism, libertarians would 
have confidence in the evolution of socially beneficial and harmonious practices. Amongst 
conservatives, however, there is a tendency toward a more activist support for particular prac-
tices. This is manifest in Patricia Morgan's endorsement, for example, of stricter laws con-
cerning divorce (68). 
V: The New Realists 
While both the libertarians and the conservatives started out from a clear commitment to par-
ticular rival values, and the economists did so with a conceptual apparatus already methodolo-
gically at variance with determinism, another group of writers arrived at a similar critique of 
the reigning paradigm from a very different starting point. 
In his model of paradigm change Thomas Kuhn argues that at a certain time any established 
paradigm will begin to confront "anomalies" that cannot be explained in its own terms. What 
happened in the 1960s in America was precisely the emergence of such anomalies in the Great 
Society/interventionist/statist model. Quite simply it became obvious that interventionist 
policies were not working as they were supposed to. 
A growing number of scholars and writers who had previously accepted the ruling assumptions 
became increasingly critical of them. These were individuals whose criticisms of the estab-
lished paradigm came not from the premises of a rival system but largely or entirely from an 
empirical and pragmatic observation of the failures of the former. Subsequently, some of 
these writers have been termed "neo-Conservatives" (some of them accepting the label, some 
of them not). A better term, in my view, would be "New Realists". Although some have 
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come to endorse a rival ideology many still share the basic assumptions of interventionist stat-
ism. What they reject are the specific policies favoured by orthodox interventionists. 
Who are these writers? They include individuals like Martin Anderson, Norman Podhoretz, 
Irving Kristol, Daniel P. Moynihan, Edward Banfield, Jay Forrester, Theodore Lowi, James 
Q. Wilson and Jane Jacobs, amongst others. In relation to criminology the most relevant are 
Jacobs, Banfield and Wilson. 
In her work The Life and Death of Great American Cities (69), Jacobs demonstrated the 
counter-productive role of planning and regulation. As well as being economically detri-
mental such planning had a directly crime-creating result by its destruction of natural social 
controls exercised in natural neighbourhoods. Similar observations on the criminogenic 
consequences of high rise municipal housing were made in Britain by Alice Coleman (70) 
In The Unheavenly City (71), Edward Banfield outlined an analysis of the problems created 
by the "lower class" value system (ie, a culture of poverty), of the pauperizing effects of 
welfare, and the rational effects of incentives and disincentives to crime (ie, the reality of 
deterrence) . 
By far the most significant writer in relation to criminology, however, was James Q. Wilson. 
Certainly no libertarian, he explicitly accepted paternalist and welfarist duties by the state, 
opposes individual ownership of firearms, and still supports the criminalization of drugs to this 
day. Neither were Conservative values obviously prominent in his work. 
Nevertheless, his empirical observations fully support the criticisms offered by both libertar-
ians, economists and conservatives. Poverty does not cause crime, he declared in Thinking 
About Crime (72). Indeed, crime has risen with increasing affluence. Instead, crime is seen 
as resulting from the breakdown of civic socialization of young people, a "failure of commun-
ity", and by family disorganization. The "subjective forces - ideas, attitudes, values" (73) 
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must also be taken into account. The orthodox view of the inefficacy of deterrence is rejected, 
and is not borne out, in his view, even by the scholarly work of the orthodox themselves (74). 
Wilson thus concludes his work: 
"Wicked people exist. Nothing avails except to set them apart from innocent 
people. And many people, neither wicked nor innocent, but watchful, dissembling, 
and calculating of their opportunities, ponder our reaction to wickedness 
as a cue to what they might profitably do. We have trifled with the wicked, 
made sport of the innocent, and encouraged the calculators. Justice suffers, and 
so do we all" (75). 
Although from within psychology and psychotherapy a whole new wave of anti-determinist 
thinkers has arisen since the war (like Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers, and myriad forms of 
"humanistic", "third force", existentialist, self-actualization and "human potential" schools) 
very few devoted any attention to criminological issues. 
The one major exception to this consists of the work of Samuel Yochelson and Stanton Same-
now in their two volume study The Criminal Personality (1976177), and the one volume 
popularization by Samenow, Inside the Criminal Mind (76). Both started as orthodox 
Freudians, committed to the mental illness theory of criminality and to their work in the 
"rehabilitation" of prisoners. As a result, however, of their decades of work inside prisons, 
both became what they termed "reluctant converts" to a philosophy of autonomy and non-
determinism. 
In Samenow's own words: 
" ... criminals choose to commit crimes. Crime resides within the person 
and is 'caused' by the way he thinks, not by his environment. Criminals think 
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differently from responsible people. From regarding criminals as victims we saw 
that instead they were victimisers who had freely chosen their way of life ... 
Criminals cause crime - not bad neighbourhoods, inadequate parents, 
television, schools, drugs, or unemployment. Crime resides within the 
minds of human beings and is not caused by social conditions" (77). 
Habits are not compulsions, there are no over-powering forces, within or without him, that 
causes him to act. What causes criminal activity is simply the freely chosen actions of individ-
uals, and the ideas they develop about themselves, others and the world at large. The criminal 
mind is characterized by ideas which are coercive, self-delusionary, irrational and irrespons-
ible. 
VI: Conclusion 
Although, as I have demonstrated above, there are differences in analytical emphasis and moral 
orientation amongst libertarians, economists, conservatives and new realists, I hope I have 
demonstrated sufficient common ground amongst all three to justify gathering them under one 
label. Whether their shared critique of the existing paradigm in criminology is found convin-
cing, and whether it will be more fully developed and refined is yet to be seen. 
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10: THE MORAL CASE FOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
"The New Intellectuals must fight for capitalism, not as 
a 'practical' issue, not as an economic issue, but, with 
the most righteous pride, as a moral issue. That 
is what capitalism deserves, and nothing less will save it. " 
Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual. 
*** 
The Socialist Moral Tradition 
The Moral Abdication of the Liberal Tradition 
The Virtue of Selfishness: The Moral Case for Private Enterprise 
*** 
To examine the nature of the socialist tradition and the socialist case against private enterprise 
and the free market is a daunting task. Under its common banner we find many and diverse 
themes and motivations. And yet, amidst the diversity we can distinguish one common, and, I 
would argue, predominant theme - that of the moral evil of private ownership, the profit 
motive, and "selfish" private enterprise. 
We thus find that socialists and Marxists are rarely content to rest their case against capitalism 
on a simple "exploitation" argument: that the individual is being robbed of his rightful proper-
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ty, and that the masses are unjustly being prevented from obtaining the good things in life. 
This approach would be - is - an individualistic moral position. Its premises are that the indi-
vidual is the rightful owner of his self and his property, should profit from it (be the rightful 
beneficiary of his own actions), and is rightfully concerned with obtaining material goods and 
the pleasures of the world (1). However, what we find in countless thinkers and writers is a 
moral attack on private enterprise as constituting individualism and selfishness. The individ-
ual, it is held, should serve others, "society" or some greater collective good rather than be 
concerned with his own interest. 
I: The Socialist Moral Tradition 
We can trace this socialist moral tradition through virtually the whole range of socialist think-
ers (and so-called precursors of socialism) (2). It runs clearly through the earliest of "utopian" 
socialists like Mably and Morelly, Babeuf and Buonarotti, through Fourier to the more 
"modern" and allegedly "scientific" pre-Marxians like the Saint-Simonians and Auguste 
Comte. It was the latter, of course, who actually coined the term "altruism" to denote the 
placing of others and their interests before self, and who sought the "scientific" and total 
subjugation of the individual to the collective. The tradition continued through the collectivist 
nationalists like Mazzini, who were equally vehement in their denunciation of the "fatal crime 
of egotism". And in the German philosopher Fichte the hatred of "selfishness" becomes, as 1. 
L. Talmon points out, a "yearning for self-surrender" and "the utter annihilation of the indi-
vidual" (3). 
The relatively recent scholarly concentration on Marx's early writings, particularly the Paris 
Manuscripts and the Grundrisse, clearly demonstrates, however, the ethical motivation and 
normative content which later tended to be obscured by the structure of so-called "scientific 
socialism" and historical materialism (4). In the early Marx we are almost swamped by the 
incessant denunciation of the "egoism of trade", of man as "private individual" and "fractional 
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being" in "civil society". Thus Marx rejected contemptuously the "rights of man" as (quite 
correctly, of course), the rights of "egoistic man". In his notorious essay "On the Jewish 
Question" the "anti-social element" of Judaism - "practical need, self-interest" was taken as 
symbolic of capitalism in general. This anti-social selfishness, in Marx's view, thus "sever(s) 
all man's species-ties, substitute(s) egoism and selfish need for those ties, and dissolve(s) the 
human world into a world of atomistic, mutually hostile individuals" (5). The ideal for Marx 
was man as "species being", in a state of collectivist, non-egoistic consciousness in which even 
his senses would be "emancipated" and "truly human" and when "need or satisfaction have ... 
lost their egoistic nature" (6). 
The same anti-egoism was as vehement in German National Socialism (Nazism), the manifesto 
of the National Socialist Workers Party of Germany proclaiming that "The activities of the 
individual may not clash with the interests of the whole, but must proceed within the frame of 
the community and be for the general good ... THE COMMON INTEREST BEFORE SELF" 
(7). Hitler himself was, in Mein Kampf, as vigorous as Marx in his denunciation of "greed 
and materialism", and called for "not material selfishness, but readiness for sacrifice and joy in 
renunciation" (8). Likewise, Italian Fascism, as enunciated by Benito Mussolini, was funda-
mentally concerned with "suppressing the instinct for a life enclosed within the brief round of 
pleasure in order to restore within duty a higher life free from the limits of time and space: a 
life in which the individual, through the denial of himself, through the sacrifice of his own 
private interests, through death itself, realises that completely spiritual existence in which his 
value as a man lies " (9). 
In Britain, our own distinctively less dramatic and more boring varieties of socialism manifest 
such as Fabianism were equally hostile to "selfishness" and materialism. For Sydney Webb 
"the perfect and fitting development of each individual is not necessarily the utmost and highest 
cultivation of his own personality, but the filling, in the best possible way, of his humble func-
tion in the great social machine" (10). Indeed, in Beatrice Webb that hostility to individualism 
and egoism reaches a pathological extreme, calling for "the sacrifice of individual life and 
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happiness ... the greatest of human characteristics, the power of self-sacrifice in the individual 
for the good of the community" (11). Fascinated by the Buddhist state of Nirvanic self-obli-
teration she declared that "to me, human personality as I know it - myself and others - is a 
tragedy ... I long to rid myself of my personality (12). 
At the present time the socialist moral consensus is virtually unchallenged. The works of the 
late Richard Titmuss, with their tediously expounded message of the "supreme ethic of service 
rather than the mundane aim of profit" (13) provide the substance of countless University 
degrees in social policy and administration. And the constant refrain of the Labour "Left" is 
against the "selfish, avaricious, materialistic philosophy of capitalism which says every man 
for himself" (as Joan Maynard MP put it) (14). 
II: The Moral Abdication of the Liberal Tradition 
Tragically, however, the liberal defenders of private enterprise and capitalism have almost 
universally abdicated from the tasks of replying to the socialist moral critique. Their argu-
ments have largely centred on the economic superiority of capitalism - its ability to "deliver 
the goods" - while, at best, ignoring moral issues, or, at worst, even conceding the socialists' 
premises. 
Even Adam Smith, the very founder of both free market economics and the modern liberal 
political tradition, could declare, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, that "man was made to 
promote ... the happiness of all" (15). As one Smith scholar has observed: 
"It was not to serve the selfish benefit of the individual that he 
should be given his head .,. the belief that Smith was primarily an 
individualist .,. is the very reverse of the truth. For him ... 
the interests of society were the end. (16) 
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And thus, even at the height of their intellectual predominance, liberals failed to challenge the 
moral case of their rising socialist opponents. In that bastion of militant liberalism, the 
Cobden Club Essays, we find Joseph Gostick attempting to reply to socialism in the following 
manner: 
"The error of communistic theories is that they seek to gain, 
by a change of formal institutions, results that, if ever attainable, 
can be reached only by a long and severe education of human nature. 
When these results are obtained, when the three higher principles -
sympathy, benevolence and self-sacrifice - have gained a sure and 
final predominance over the four lower - egotism, acquisition, emulation, 
and legal strife - then communistic theories, requiring the industrious 
to work for the idle, and the able to sacrifice themselves for the incapable 
may be found possible, but at that time we shall want neither these nor any 
other theories, we shall be simply translated into Paradise." (17) 
An impractical, but nevertheless noble ideal! Such was the general liberal view of socialism. 
William Lecky lauded the "nobler motives", the "conception of the purely disinterested ... the 
noblest thing we possess, the celestial spark that is within us". The "moral elevation of an 
age" he judged by the intensity of the spirit of self sacrifice. And the "love of wealth", al-
though admittedly "beneficial in its consequences", is "far less noble" and "contract(s) and 
indurate(s) the character" (18). Similarly, Henry Sidgwick the liberal economist and political 
philosopher, contrasted unfavourably the so-called "selfish struggle of individuals" with the 
"mutual service and general diffusion of public spirit" (19). Although "admittedly advantag-
eous to production" it was quite clear that Sidgwick abhorred what he saw as "the anti-social 
temper and attitude of mind, produced by the continual struggle of competition". This "moral 
aversion to private enterprise", Sidgwick admitted, was an important motivation "in the im-
pulses that lead thoughtful persons to embrace some form of socialism" . Even for those - like 
himself - who were not socialists, Sidgwick continued, and who "(regard) the stimulus and 
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direction of energy given by the existing individualistic system as quite indispensable to human 
society as yet present constituted, yet feel the moral need of some means of developing in the 
members of a modern industrial community a fuller consciousness of their industrial work as a 
social function, only rightly performed when done with a cordial regard to the welfare of the 
whole society ... " (20). 
It would not be going too far to say that liberalism as an ideology committed suicide. Who 
after all - and especially among young people - will crusade for a movement and a way of life 
which declares itself morally flawed, practical but basically immoral? 
And yet the few contemporary alleged defenders of private enterprise and capitalism are still 
plowing the same barren furrow. Peregrine Worsthorne actually praises capitalism for being 
"such a uniquely modest economic system in terms of moral pretensions" and claims that "the 
capitalist system is a non-moral or amoral way of organising and distributing wealth" (21). 
Edward Norman, who, marginally more ambitious, declares that "the morality of capitalism is 
about the morality of choice" does not get to grips with the fundamental issues. And, similar-
ly, he labels the moral outlook of capitalism as, contrary to "Humanism", an unoptimistic one 
which regards men as "inherently defective"! (22). Even amidst the ranks of today's most 
gifted liberal scholars we find little more than demolition of the economic idiocies of social-
ism (23) or, in Hayek's essay "The Moral Element in Free Enterprise" (24), a discussion of 
generally secondary matters. 
Yeats' lines sum up, probably better than any others the bleak situation resulting from liberal-
ism's failure - one where 
"The best lack all conviction while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity. " 
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III: The Virtue of Selfishness: The Moral Case for Private Enterprise 
As paradoxical as it might seem then, the American liberal Rose Wilder Lane was fundament-
ally correct when she declared that the classical liberals "[have] not grasped [the] basic indi-
vidual principle at all ... [their] basic assumption is communist." (25) 
But if the liberals abdicated from the task of a vigorous moral defence of capitalism we can at 
least thank our enemies for their frank and correct identification of the central issues. For it is 
precisely the selfishness of private enterprise that constitutes its moral virtue, its moral glory. 
Put aside for the moment the immense moral stigma - and intimidation - so successfully injec-
ted into the term selfishness by generations of collectivist propagandists, and consider the real 
meaning of the moral dichotomy between socialism and capitalism. 
Capitalism holds that the individual possesses the right to exist for his own sake, the right to 
life, liberty and property. Socialism quite clearly does not, but rather holds the view that indi-
viduals are duty bound to sacrifice their life, liberty and property for the good of some collec-
tive, whether "the people", "the nation", "the race", "the fatherland" or whatever, depending 
upon the particular brand of socialism. Marx was quite right, then, in declaring the capitalist 
liberal concept of individual rights as "egoistic rights". Either the individual exists as an entity 
of value, for his own sake, as an end in himself and not a means to the end of others, or he 
exists as a creature bound to work for the sake of others. There is a word for those comman-
ded to exist and labour for the sake of others - slaves. The morality of socialism is the moral-
ity of slavery. 
The barbarities of the countless "noble" and "unmundane" socialist experiments, the atrocities 
of Hitler, Lenin, Stalin, or the Cambodian communists, are not, then, simply historical acci-
dents; they are the logical, inevitable products of altruist morality, the creed of "unselfish-
ness". As the American philosopher Ayn Rand has put it: 
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"If service and self-sacrifice are a moral ideal, and if the 'selfishness' 
of human nature prevents men from leaping into sacrificial furnaces, 
there is no reason . .. why a dictator should not push them in at the point 
of bayonets - for their own good, or the good of humanity, or the good of 
posterity, or the good of the latest bureaucrat's latest five year plan. 
There is no reason that (socialists) can name to oppose any atrocity. 
The value of a man's life? His right to exist? His right to pursue his 
own happiness? These are concepts that belong to individualism and capitalism 
- to the antithesis of altruist morality." (26) 
Of course, socialists will try to drag the inevitable red herrings across the path of this argu-
ment. The immediate image they manage to link to the term selfishness is one of brutal rapa-
city, dishonesty, lack of concern for the rights of others, etc. In fact, since the term means 
literally concern for one's self-interest, their reaction is really a rather telling confession of 
their view of what is in their interest, and of their inability to conceive of a society in which 
non-sacrificial, non-violent, non-compulsory co-operation and co-existence is possible between 
individuals - where individuals are not forced to be either hammers or anvils, victims or exec-
utioners. It is not, of course, in the individual's interest, either physically or psychologically, 
to live in such an unhuman (and inhumane) manner. The glory of capitalism is that it is preci-
sely the system - as economic analysis and historical experience have repeatedly demonstrated 
- in which all individuals profit and prosper by "serving" each other in the market, where their 
selfish seeking of profit guides them, as if by an "invisible hand" as Adam Smith so notably 
put it, to provide each other with goods and services. 
The other red herring inevitably to be met is, of course, of the "Wouldn't you help an aban-
doned baby found in the streets?" sort. It is an argument which equates any benevolence, 
good will or assistance to others with self-sacrifice and altruism. In fact, helping others rests 
predsely upon the individualist, selfish premise, that human beings are values and ends in 
themselves. It is altruism which in fact devalues lives and holds them as objects of sacrifice 
281 
for others or some alleged greater good. 
It is a monument to the immense and unchallenged authority built up by the altruist morality 
that hardly anyone penetrates the almost idiotic mystifications, false consciousness, and illogi-
calities inherent in it. For example, if it is good to work for the sake of others, and not for 
personal private profit, one is actually left in a sort of circular position where 'A' works for 
'B' who works for 'C' and so on ad infinitum. But why should 'B' enjoy the good provided 
by 'A' when he is forbidden to enjoy the same good if he provides it for himself (but in turn 
has to provide it for 'e')? In fact, it seems clear from their words that many socialists seem to 
find material goods wicked in themselves. Their "morality" is one of austerity, asceticism, 
renunciation and poverty. It provides a fitting ideology for the reality of life under socialist 
planning and all forms of actually-existing socialism. 
Moreover, the socialist morality of altruism provides a tremendously useful ideological dis-
guise for all forms of tyranny. For if sacrifice is to be its watchword and policy, then there 
has to be someone be either dictating or at least collecting the sacrifice. And since "society", 
"the public interest", "the state", etc. do not exist as concrete entities, it will be their self-
appointed spokesmen who will be receiving the benefits. 
It is impossible, of course, in this brief essay to outline fully the philosophy of "ethical ego-
ism" and its epistemological roots and validation, which underlies the private enterprise sys-
tem. Fortunately there is now a growing number of intellectuals and academics who, follow-
ing the seminal work of the American philosopher and novelist Ayn Rand, have recognised the 
moral code implicit in capitalism and are systematically expounding and elaborating it (27). 
For the first time in centuries the "virtue of selfishness" and "capitalism the unknown ideal" 
are being recognised and a moral battle is being fought for them. 
With its banner at last unfurled with moral pride and idealism, capitalism is now attracting the 
commitment and support of young people who recognise the wisdom of Ayn Rand's words: 
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"The world crisis of today is a moral crisis - and nothing less than a moral 
revolution can resolve it .,. let those who care about the future, those willing 
to crusade for a perfect society, realise that the new radicals are the fighters 
for capitalism .... to win requires your total dedication and a total break with the 
world of your past, with the doctrine that man is a sacrificial animal who exists 
for the pleasure of others. Fight for the value of your person ... fight with the 
radiant certainty and absolute rectitude of knowing that yours is the Morality 
of Life and that yours is the battle for any achievement, any value, any grandeur, 
any goodness, and any joy that has ever existed on this earth." (28) 
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IV: Co-operation Without Sacrifice 
V: The Self In Self-Interest 
Notes 
*** 
Richard P Hiskes' book Community Without Coercion: Getting Along in the Minimal State 
(University of Delaware Press, Newark/Associated University Press, London, 1982; bracketed 
page references in the text refer to this work) is both heartening and infuriating. At a time 
when so much scholarship is little more than internal disputations between rival sects in the 
textual exegesis of Marxism, we find a new recruit (an assistant professor at the University of 
Connecticut) explicitly declaring his adherence to libertarianism as a philosophy "with which to 
organize the contemporary political world" (p. 17). Moreover, Professor Hiskes develops his 
thesis out of an analysis not only of the contemporary libertarian philosopher, Robert .Nozick 
but of two neglected historical figures, Herbert Spencer and Benjamin Tucker (and he pays 
attention to those even more obscure nineteenth century English liberal anarchists, Auberon 
Herbert and Wordsworth Donisthorpe). While so many writers tend to take Mill or Bentham 
as paradigmatic representatives of liberalism, it is particularly refreshing to see such neglected, 
but important representatives of the more radical (and in my view, more viable) tradition 
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within liberalism, being resurrected. 
What is infuriating however, is that in spite of his intellectual goal - a contemporary restate-
ment of libertarianism - in spite of his use of many interesting historical sources, and in spite 
of occasional flashes of insight, Hiskes manages to get into an appalling analytical mess. 
I: What is Community? 
Hiskes' theme in Community Without Coercion is, while accepting as the defining character-
istics of libertarianism the ultimate moral principle of the intrinsic value of the individual, and 
the concept of free will and autonomy, to demonstrate that "individualist political thought is a 
communitarian as well as a libertarian doctrine" (p.12, my emphasis). He thus argues that 
"community" is also a "cardinal ideal" of libertarianism, and that libertarianism only has an 
"anticommunitarian appearance" (p. 14, my emphasis). 
What exactly does Hiskes mean by "community"? 
He recognises that the term is indeed "a rather murky political concept" (p. 21) with a pro-
found "ideological cast" (p. 21). Thus, while the term "society" generally serves well as the 
designation for the totality of human relationships at the larger or "macro" level, "community" 
might seem merely a useful designation for small distinguishable groups "within" society (i.e., 
as in local "communities", villages, or communities of individuals practising a common trade, 
or sharing a particular characteristic or outlook). But Hiskes himself, in considering the work 
of both sociological theorists and socialist anarchists demonstrates the way in which "commun-
ity" shifts from being merely a descriptive label into a normative, value laden concept. 
For example, in the more methodologically individualist work of Robert Maciver (1) com-
munity is used as the descriptive term for subsets of interest relations or social structures 
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determined by such interests. For Ferdinand Tonnies (2), one of the founding fathers of socio-
logy, community (gemeinschaft) eventually becomes, in Hiskes' words, "a moral imperative 
to be concerned with one's neighbours" (p. 27). Much the same attitude is (albeit with less of 
Tonnies' Germanic mystical holism) in Raymond Plant's work (3). In sum, as Hiskes puts it, 
in common usage, "community denotes a moral commitment between persons that transcends 
self-interest and is in no way related to it" (p. 41, my emphasis). 
The political aspect of this usage becomes even clearer in the work of socialist anarchists, with 
their myriad attacks on "the pathology of privacy", their militant anti-individualism and 
"communitarian" assertions. Hiskes is quite clear that in this common usage community as a 
concept has moved from a "semantic meaning" - i.e., one which strives for "clarity and eradi-
cation of emotive meaning" to "poetic meaning" - i.e., one which strives for the "inclusion of 
a moral perspective" (p. 53, quoting Joseph Gusfield). "Community" has, for much of acade-
mic scholarship, as well as for partisan political movements, become completely normative, an 
"object of quest", a "relationship" to be valued, a synonym for "caring". (4) 
II: Ethical Appeasement 
One might think that the natural libertarian response to the way in which "community" has 
been rendered into a partisan weasel word, yet another piece of conceptual camouflage and 
propaganda for the brutalities and human degradation of collectivism, altruism, and statism, 
would be obvious. It should be one of justifiably angry exposure of such semantic dishonesty, 
and an analysis of the pathological processes of what Oakeshott has so penetratingly called the 
"militant anti-individual ... the individual manque", the individual who seeks to escape the 
alleged burdens of individuality, of personal responsibility and effort, for a realm of guaran-
teed . "identity " , status and security (5). 
But this is not Hiskes' response. Why then does he want to demonstrate the strikingly para-
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doxical view that normative "communitarianism", "community of caring", is a constituent of 
libertarianism? Fortunately he is quite candid in his intellectual motivation. He makes it utter-
ly clear that he sees the success of libertarianism as dependent upon a demonstration that 
"individualism place(s) a high value on the achievement of true community even to the point of 
individual sacrifice"! (p .17). In his view, "to prove individualism capable of such community 
is to raise its image considerably" (p. 55, my emphasis). Indeed, "the efficacy and moral 
acceptability of individualism as a philosophy with wish to organise the contemporary political 
world" (p.17, my emphasis) is dependent for Hiskes upon a demonstration of libertarianism's 
alleged "communitarianism". In other words, individualism can only be made acceptable to 
Hiskes's significant others (his fellow academics?) only if it ceases to be individualistic! 
What is so striking, so paradoxical, and indeed, so productive of infuriating intellectual gyra-
tions is thus Hiskes' continuation of a formal avowal of libertarianism with an adherence to 
values and ideas diametrically opposed to it. He speaks about the alleged "harsh insistence 
[by libertarians] on rights and nonviolation of the individual" (p.142, my emphasis), as if it 
were the protection of individual freedom which constitutes "harshness", rather than the histor-
ical panoply of despotisms, statisms, dictatorships and Gulags erected upon or justified by the 
myriad ideologies of community and collectivism. Referring to the libertarian vision of a 
society based upon natural rights Hiskes comments that "such a description of human relations 
admittedly does not 'inspire'" (p. 136). 
III: Co-operation Without Community 
It is at this point that one really questions Hiskes' degree of acquaintance with libertarianism, 
either contemporary or historical. Indeed, one's suspicions are raised somewhat by his 
comments that, in taking Spencer, Thcker and Nozick as representative figures one 
"embrace(s) all significant arguments presented today under the title of individualism" (p. 16). 
A reading of the most influential contemporary libertarian thinker, Ayn Rand, amazingly 
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absent from the above troika would - even without accepting her philosophy in full - certainly 
have helped clear up some of his confusions regarding egoism. It is particularly striking how 
Hiskes implicitly seems to accept the view of egoism and individualism as representing some 
sort of endorsement of individual isolation, in which individuals have no interest in, or con-
cern with, others, with social relationships or with the "rights" of individual, per se. 
Individualism and the libertarian movement broadly conceived has never had, in either analyti-
calor normative terms, any view of the individual as an "isolated monad". Individualism does 
not decry or disvalue social co-operation or social relationships. What it holds is that such co-
operation and such relationships exist only for the sake of the individual, not for the sake of 
some (non-existent) entity or process (whether termed society, state, nation, race, history etc). 
As the contemporary libertarian philosopher Eric Mack puts it, in his significantly titled essay 
"Society's Foe", the essence of libertarianism holds to a: 
" [R] adical distinction between society, a complex network of free relationships 
among individuals and freely formed groups and the State, a coercive entity 
that directs people's actions, associations, and lives". (6) 
The whole tradition of classical and free market economics is, of course, based on the analysis 
and advocacy of the benefits of co-operation within the market. As the free market economist 
William Smart put it in 1906, it is precisely the free market which creates a society of "service 
through competition" where "we are all servants of each other" in the process of production 
and trade (7). Indeed, as one of the greatest French libertarian economists, Frederic Bastiat 
put it in his essay "Justice and Fraternity ", it is particularly ironic that those who call them-
selves "socialists" are those who beHeve in the antagonism of human interests, and the necess-
ity of compulsory "artificial organisation", while individualists support "the necessary and 
progressive harmonization of man's interests" within a free society, the free market (8). 
Hiskes seems totally oblivious to such core values of libertarianism. It is doubly ironic that 
even the phrase "community without coercion" can be found in one major libertarian work, 
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Citadel, Market and Altar by Spencer Heath. Heath's book is in fact a peaon of praise to the 
"socialization" of human energies from their "pre" - actually "anti-social" condition of preda-
tion and conflict into the condition of "reciprocal voluntary services" (9). He explicitly defines 
"sociality" as that nexus of relationships resulting from non-coercive market exchanges: 
"The distinctively societal process is that of rationally, or numerically balanced, 
free and reciprocal energy transfers between and among members. This is the 
basic function or social metabolism whereby the societal life-form grows and is 
maintained ... In the market we find the social institution by which in 
a civilized community a substantial portion of the available population energy is 
transferred and transformed into services and into realizations of the common will 
and of individual desires." (10) 
It is quite absurd for Hiskes to sound surprised when he finds individualists like "Spencer, 
Donisthorpe and Herbert, [recognizing] the need for communal arrangements in human rela-
tions and ... vigorous in their support for the goal of community" (p. 68). It is also confusing, 
for Hiskes thus shifts into using the term in its analytical/semantic, and not its normative/poetic 
sense. In fact, Hiskes repeatedly loses track of the specific meaning adhering to the term 
community throughout the book. At one moment community is taken in its "poetic" sense 
("real community in the sense of caring", ie the submission of the individual to "society" and 
its alleged spokesmen), the next moment he is referring to someone's "propensity toward 
communalism" and "concern for community" merely because they recognize (as how can they 
not!) the importance of social co-operation. 
IV: Co-operation Without Sacrifice 
Also totally at variance with libertarianism is Hiskes' apparent belief that some sort of sacri-
fice is necessary for the functioning of a free and as he terms it, "communal" - society. Hiskes 
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seems to accept a portrayal of rights which "stipulates the sacrifice of varying degrees of 
autonomy in order to provide for the social exercise of personal rights and implies a need for 
interdependence as well as interaction between persons" (p. 126). Likewise, he seems to 
believe that "community" must somehow necessitate "sacrificing interests and possibly even 
rights for" (p. 142). Hence he declares that "What must be provided, then, if individualists 
like N ozick are to be shown as true and sincere communitarians is a conception of rights and 
interests that allows for the demands and sacrifices forced upon them by communal relation-
ships." (p. 142). In other words, for libertarians to be recognised as caring and legitimate 
thinkers acceptable to statists and collectivists they must abandon the libertarian defence of 
individual rights and libertarianism itself! Hiskes thus contrasts the view of Spencer, Tucker 
and Nozick, that "the bottom line of co-operation in the individualist society" is "the benefits 
to be gained thereby for the individual who is concerned primarily for his own welfare" (p. 
146) with "the sacrifice of that freedom, which is at times necessary for the advancement of 
the 'caring' communal relation" (p. 146). 
In fact, it is quite unclear from Hiskes exactly what these "rights and interests" are that 
demand sacrifice, but the question is beside the point. In the libertarian view no such sacrifices 
are necessary to preserve an individualist order. To quote Eric Mack once more: 
"Society is the exercising, and the modes and means of exercising, individual 
rights. In exercising these rights people acquire and define property, enter 
into contracts, and forge allocations of all sorts ... Individuals may even 
create institutions designed to help them to protect and exercise their Lockean 
rights [i.e. life, liberty, and property]. But such institutions are, at most, 
tools. They are not needed to work any essential transformation of the 
network of legitimate actions and relationships. These institutions merely 
secure freedom and peace by securing the natural rights of individuals. (11) 
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V: The Self In Self-Interest 
But perhaps the fundamental weakness of Hiskes' analysis lies in his constant, unexamined 
assumption regarding human self-interest, the underlying equations of self-interest/selfishness 
with human isolation, rapacity, indifference to others or to their rights. Here, of course, some 
sort of acquaintance with the Aristotelian/Objectivist/Ethical Egoist components of libertarian-
ism - the approaches of Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard, the principal contemporary expo-
nents of libertarianism whose existence seems to have escaped Hiskes' attention - would have 
put Hiskes onto a sounder path. As Tibor Machan has put it, the concept of self-interest is 
only meaningful in relation to a standard, "a standard ... possible by reference to the kind of 
selfhood in question" (12). 
While many exponents of statism and collectivism attempt to use loaded concepts of human 
nature (in which selfishness is equated with bestiality) and reflected visions of society to posit 
inherent clashes between self-interest and human co-operation, for ethical egoists in the Aristo-
telian or objectivist mode there is no such clash - and hence no need for alleged sacrifices. As 
Erich Fromm - of all people - put it, the confusion largely arose from "the change from the 
objectivist into the erroneously subjectivist approach to self-interest. Self-interest was no 
longer to be determined by the nature of man and his needs; correspondingly the notion that 
one could be mistaken about it was relinquished and replaced by the idea that what a person 
felt represented the interests of his self was necessarily his true self-interest" (13). 
Ironically, just when one is beginning to totally despair of Hiskes, he does seem to stumble 
upon this sort of insight. In his final chapter he does recognize that we must not ignore "the 
self in self-interest" (p. 159). He thus declares that "self-interest can be a moral motivation ... 
because of a particular conception of the self by the self-interested individual, the half of 'self-
interest' usually ignored by political and ethical theorists" (p. 158). What he terms an "objec-
tivization of the self", a full recognition of the reality of other persons, hence results in an 
"individualist community ... a possibility stemming solely from the rational pursuit of self-
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interest" (p. 167). Hiskes concludes that this sort of analysis demonstrates how "the normative 
predicates of community can be extracted from the concept of self-interest and those predicates 
translated into a genuine concern for others that does not trounce upon the basic individualist 
concern with the freedom to pursue individual self-interest" (p. 171). Indeed, this is precisely 
what Rand, Rothbard, Machan, and the other Aristotelian libertarians do. But for reasons 
better known to himself Hiskes has chosen to ignore the work of such major libertarian think-
ers in favour of his own confused meanderings and exercises in ethical and political appease-
ment. 
Although, superficially at least Hiskes does seem eventually to arrive at a position akin to that 
of ethical egoist/natural rights libertarians, his passage to this destination is so wobbly and 
confused that one finds it hard to recommend to anyone. His constant and confusing usage of 
"community" in different senses (one moment communitarian "caring", the next as social co-
operation), his equation of humane behaviour with altruism (the doctrine that moral actions 
must primarily serve others) do nothing but to confuse the issues under discussion. After 
repeated comments about the necessity of "sacrifice", in the final chapter this theme is abruptly 
dropped to be replaced by a whole new orientation (albeit basically correct in my view) regard-
ing true self-interest. Moreover, it is surely only adding confusion to confusion to equate the 
sort of "community" (social order) that Hiskes apparently wants with the tradition of "commu-
nitarianism" advocated by both sociologists and various kinds of socialists, imbued as it is with 
virulently anti-individualistic values. It would surely be wiser to abandon the term "commun-
ity" to those who have so thoroughly colonized it. Co-operation, as libertarians have repeated-
ly shown, requires none of the compulsion, coercion, collectivism, or submersion of the indi-
vidual and his self-interest which the prophets of "community" have for centuries so vigorous-
ly advocated. 
In all, Hiskes' book can only be judged, in my view, as a most disappointing failure. Confu-
sion, rather than clarity, abounds and what value accrues to the reader will come more, I 
believe, from his own critical dissection of the text than from the author's analytical prowess. 
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NOTES 
1. Robert MacIver, Community, Macmillan, London, 1917. 
2. Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society, Michigan State University Press, 1957. 
3. Raymond Plant, Community and Ideology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1974. 
4. A whole book, let alone an essay, could be written on the use of "community" in 
collectivist, statist, and anti-libertarian propaganda. Whilst writing this essay 
I encountered a particularly interesting example in a work by the American 
political scientist Henry S. Kariel. In his Beyond Liberalism, Where Relations 
Grow, Chandler and Sharp, San Francisco, 1977, the author blames his own feelings 
of personal despair, inconsequence, and futility on capitalist society. A 
vague and fatuous vision of a new community of "interconnectedness" and 
"open-ended" processes is presented as an alternative to capitalist alienation. 
See also Robert P. Wolffe, The Poverty of Liberalism, Beacon Press, Boston, 1968, 
Chapter 5, "Community", pp. 162-195, for a further example. And see Graeme 
Duncan "Comments on Some Radical Critiques of Liberal-Democratic Theory", in 
P. Birnbaum, et aI., eds., Democracy, Consensus and Social Contract, Sage 
Publications, London, 1978, for a critically sympathetic overview of the communitarian 
tradition. 
5. See Michael Oakeshott, "The Masses in Representative Democracy", in Albert 
Hunold, ed., Freedom and Serfdom: An Anthology of Western Thought, D. Reidel, 
Dordrecht, Holland, 1961, pp. 151-170; reprinted in William F. Buckley Jr., ed., 
Did You Ever See a Dream Walking?: American Conservative Thought in the 
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Twentieth Century, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1970, pp. 103-123; and in K. S. 
Templeton, Jr., ed., The Politicization of Society, Liberty Press, Indianapolis, 
1979, p. 326. 
6. Eric Mack, "Society's Foe", Reason, 8(5), September 1976, p. 34. 
7. William Smart, The Return to Protection: Being a Restatement of the Case for 
Free Trade, Macmillan, London, 1906, 2nd. edn, pp. 4, 1. 
8. "Justice and Fraternity" (1848) in Frederic Bastiat, Selected Essays on 
Political Economy, Foundation For Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, 
N. Y., 1964, p. 136. For Bastiat the central message of liberalism and economic 
science was the enunciation of "economic harmonies", to "prove undeniably the natural 
existence of the law of solidarity", Harmonies of Political Economy, Oliver and Boyd, 
Edinburgh, n.d., p. 489. See also Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and 
Sociological Analysis, Jonathan Cape, London, 1951, p. 310 for a similar point on 
the truly social, uniting qualities of liberalism and private property. And 
see also Friedrich Hayek, The Confusion of Language in Political Thought, 
Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1968, on the concept of spontaneous order. 
Given the way in which socialists consistently portray liberalism and the free market 
(or the alleged case of its supporters) in the language of war, conflict or 
zero-sum games (e.g. the "rat race", "the law of the jungle", "dog-eat-dog", "nature 
red in tooth and claw", the "social darwinist" smear etc), it is interesting to note 
older and fairer historians of thought commenting on the liberal emphasis on 
social solidarity, its "discovery of the law of solidarity" in the free market, 
and the "extravagant ... eulogiums which [liberals] bestowed upon its working". 
See Charles Gide and Charles Rist, A History of Economic Doctrines, 
George G. Harrap, London, 1915, p. 607; and see also pp. 344-5. 
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9. Spencer Heath, Citadel, Market and Altar, Science of Society Foundation, 
Baltimore, Maryland, 1957, p. 39. 
10. Ibid, pp. 48, 45. Heath develops the organismic analogy in a most interesting 
manner which does, in my view, seem to underline its core of truth without abandoning 
methodological individualism. Thus he writes: "In fact, the ultimate function of 
socialization of the human society unlike that of insects and animals, is the 
fulfilment of itself through service to, and the self-realization and fulfilment of, 
the individual units of which it is composed". (p. 209) 
11. Eric Mack, "Society's Foe", op. cit, pp. 35-36. 
12. Tibor R. Machan, Human Rights and Human Liberties, Nelson Hall, Chicago, 
1975, p. 85. 
13. Erich Fromm, Man For Himself: An Enquiry into the Psychology of Ethics, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1971, p. 134. Fromm's work, of course, 
is dominated by precisely the "fear of freedom", of the alleged burdens of 
individuality and autonomy, that he professed to explore. 
14. In passing I must also take issue with one other point. On page 16 Hiskes 
makes the odd comment that N ozick does not make clear his debt to "Spencerean 
and anarchist varieties of individualist thought". Nozick's footnotes and 
bibliography render this observation palpably false. 
*** 
Originally Published in: Free Life: A Journal of Classical Liberal and Libertarian 
Thought, Vol. 3, No. 3/4, July 1983, pp. 5-9. Also reprinted under the same title as Philo so-
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Textual Note: Some minor grammatical and stylistic alterations have been made. 
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Many advocates of freedom favour the idea of a Bill of Rights. Surely it must be a good idea, 
they think, to enshrine basic freedoms in such a document as a bulwark against collectivism 
and the expansion of state power. (1) Doesn't one of the freest societies in the world, the 
United States, owe much of its freedom to precisely such a Bill of Rights, embedded in a 
written constitution? 
In my view such advocates of freedom are mistaken. They misunderstand the nature of how 
freedom in society is both attained and maintained, and are advocating a constitutional cam-
paign which is in reality either irrelevant or positively harmful to the cause of individualliber-
ty. 
I: The Importance of Ideas 
An immediate riposte to the notion that a Bill of Rights is necessary for a free society is to 
point to the fact that other predominantly free societies, notably the United Kingdom, have 
enjoyed equally substantial liberties without such documents, or, indeed, even a written consti-
tution. (2) But we must go further, and demonstrate why this is the case. 
Freedom is attained in social life only when the ideas favourable to freedom gain intellectual 
predominance or hegemony. Freedom cannot be imposed mechanistically, so to speak. It is 
the product of an evolutionary process. I am not advancing an exclusively "intellectual inter-
pretation of history" here. The role of economic interest, the role of predatory violence (both 
at an individual level and as exercised through those social agencies we term government or 
the "State") all play their part. Indeed, what is so depressing in the study of human history is 
precisely the contingent nature of human freedom, the remarkable convergence of so many 
favourable, but exceptional, factors to create the "European miracle", humanity's most free, 
rational, humane - highest - civilization so far. (3) 
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Ultimately, however, it is the fundamental ideas and values of a society which dictate its insti-
tutional form. The point about the American Constitution and its Bill of Rights (4) is that 
these were the manifestation of a long tradition of Anglo-American ideas, ideas which had 
gained a virtual hegemony in both countries. The views of the 18th Century Commonwealth-
men, the Levellers, John Locke, Natural Law, the Scottish Enlightenment, emerging free 
market economic theory - these were just some of the myriad forms and varieties of classical 
liberalism which had permeated society from top to bottom. The American Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights were simply the triumphal keystone, the manifestation of this ideological 
power. (5) 
II: Intellectual Hegemony 
N ow a keystone might be necessary, but you do not attempt to erect a keystone without the rest 
of the arch. What is precisely lacking today is the rest of that ideological arch. Classical 
Liberalism/Libertarianism does not possess ideological hegemony. Only within the last 20 
years has its fateful decline been reversed and an intellectual revival taken place. (6) There 
are many grounds for optimism. The renaissance of liberalism grows stronger with every 
day. In many parts of the world that revival is already being manifest in policy terms, in 
privatization and "creeping capitalism". Everywhere the crisis of socialism, in both theory 
and practice, becomes more apparent. But we don't have hegemony yet. 
The only case for a Bill of Rights is in terms of my "keystone" analogy, as a mark of our 
victory. But to positively campaign for such a Bill now is fatuous. All such a campaign 
would do would be to divert scarce energies and resources from the real battle, that of re-
establishing the intellectual and academic predominance of libertarian ideas. It would have no 
chance of enshrining real liberties in law. In reality such a campaign would attract every 
crank and panacea monger who would want to add his favourite "right" to the Bill. Because 
we do not yet have intellectual hegemony even our very concept of rights has been stolen and 
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distorted. Instead of the liberal concept of rights, the "negative" view of a social order in 
which individuals are freed from invasive force, most people conceive of rights as "positive" 
claims upon the life, liberty and property of others - hence a right to a job, a good education, 
welfare benefits, medical treatment, housing etc etc. If any Bill of Rights was actually put 
into practice it would at present invariably be a mishmash of real rights and such positive 
"rights". What good would that do the cause of liberty? Nothing whatever. 
In fact, the world is already full of such pointless or positively harmful declarations. Article 
25 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains precisely such an 
assertion, that "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and neces-
sary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disabil-
ity, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control". (7) 
And, of course in many cases constitutional rules and Bills of Rights are, as in the cases of the 
Soviet Union or most of the "Third World" tyrannies, simply ignored. Equally typical is the 
inclusion of clauses of the sort proclaiming that all rights are void when the government sees 
good cause to ignore them! The European Convention on Human Rights is a particularly 
amusing example of this. Almost every ringing declaration of freedom is fraternally coupled 
with the following words: 
"There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others". (8) 
In other words, we can take away your rights whenever we want to! 
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Until libertarian hegemony is established it is exactly abortions like this that we would most 
probably be landed with if a campaign for a Bill of Rights was successful. 
III: Do Bills of Rights Maintain Freedom?: The Real Power of Social Forces 
Bills of Rights do not actually maintain freedom. To put it crudely, if the civic order is 
dominated by liberal mores and ideas then a Bill of Rights isn't necessary. If it is not then a 
Bill of Rights won't help you. The Bill of Rights advocates basically suffer from a form of 
social reification. The Bill of Rights is simply a document, it has no reality except as a piece 
of paper outside of the ideas and behaviour of individuals. It was not the paper "checks and 
balances" of the American Constitution which maintained American freedom, it was the "invis-
ible", but actually more real ones manifest in the ideas and actions of millions of Americans. 
The fact that people would rather go hungry than accept state welfare, that individuals simply 
would not put .up with the sorts of interventionism now accepted as commonplace by contem-
porary Americans - this is the real power of ideas as social forces. It is the power of the 
social order, of civic society, not scraps of paper, that limited the American state. (9) 
This is not, it should be added, a solely or distinctively libertarian insight. The American 
political scientist Robert Dahl, points out in his classic work, A Preface to Democratic 
Theory (10) that Machiavelli, "who was not a soft-headed observer of human behaviour, 
evidently believed that the basic check to tyranny was not so much a set of legal formulas 
about the prescribed distribution of certain controls - i.e., a formal constitution - as a network 
of habits and attitudes inculcated in the society". (11) Dahl himself persuasively explicates this 
view. The (constitutional) "separation of powers", so beloved of James Madison and the 
other American Founding Fathers has, in countless other constitutions, been of nought in 
preventing powerful minorities from exercising tyrannical power. "Whether or not powerful 
minorities or mass-based dictatorial leaders have refrained from establishing tyranny is clearly 
not related to the presence or absence of constitutional separation of powers ... The Madiso-
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nian argument ... underestimates the importance of the inherent social checks and balances 
existing in every pluralistic society. Without these social checks and balances, it is doubtful 
that the intragovernmental checks on officials would in fact operate to prevent tyranny." (12) 
It is the presence or absence of "certain social prerequisites" which results in freedom or 
tyranny, and it is to these "first and crucial variables" (13) to which the political scientist, in 
Dahl's view, should pay attention. "The evidence ... of the contemporary world, the extent to 
which minorities are bedevilled by means of government action is dependent almost entirely 
upon non-constitutional factors; indeed, if constitutional factors are not entirely irrelevant, 
their significance is trivial as compared with the non-constitutional." (14) It is precisely be-
cause these social factors are somehow less concrete than scraps of paper that people find it 
hard to conceptualize them. It is the abstract, mental "chains" upon ourselves which largely 
dictate our behaviour - the rules and habits generated by our family structures, moral values 
and "sense of life" and embedded in every aspect of our individual and corporate life. 
It is singularly ironic that it should prove necessary to point this out to many conservatives. 
For it is this insight that lies at the core of, for example, Michael Oakeshott's conservative 
philosophy. Oakeshott's critique of "the ideological style of politics" rests on the argument 
that political practice, and genuine theory, grow out of experience or "tradition", rather than 
the reverse. Constitutionalism of the sort advocated by the exponents of Bills of Rights shares 
in exactly the same fallacy as other radical and revolutionary forms of politics. Although not 
directly addressing this question Oakeshott's own words about the "ideological style" are 
equally relevant to constitutionalism. "(I)ts defect becomes apparent when we consider the 
sort of knowledge and the kind of education it encourages us to believe is sufficient for the 
activity of attending to the arrangements of a society. For it suggests that a knowledge of the 
chosen political ideology, and a political education confined to learning a catechism, can take 
the place of a tradition of political behaviour ... The arrangements of a society are made to 
appear, not as manners of behaviour, but as pieces of machinery to be transported about the 
world indiscriminately". (15) 
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IV: The American Constitutional Experience as a Test Case 
American political and constitutional history offers ample evidence for the case against a Bill 
of Rights. When liberal hegemony was lost in America (from the turn of the century) and the 
social mores and predominant ideas became more collectivist and statist, then the American 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights simply did not serve as a bulwark of freedom. 
What happened to the much vaunted Rights in the face of triumphant collectivism? 
Firstly, they were simply amended. This option can never be prevented by bald declaration 
enshrined in a Bill of Rights. The 16th Amendment, authorizing direct national income tax, 
is a prime example of this. Or they were simply ignored. Various constitutional innovations 
can equally well occur without even the sanction of amendment. The establishment of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887) was the first 
major ominous step of this sort, in which Congress delegated broad powers of a quasi-legisla-
tive, quasi-executive, quasi-judicial nature to a new entity. A fundamental departure from the 
separation of powers, the example was followed in such bodies as the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the Federal Communications Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
the National Labour Relations Board. As one liberal historian has stated, they had "the 
cumulative effect of bringing to nought the means set up in the Constitution for disarming 
[factional interest] groups". (16) 
Breaking the power of what they termed "faction" had always been a major goal of the Found-
ing Fathers in their constitutional designs. (17) Those designs did not prevent the rise of fac-
tion (ie., special class interest). The establishment of the economic regulatory agencies (large-
ly at the behest of the special interest themselves) and the raising to cabinet rank of the De-
partment of Agriculture in 1889, to be followed by Commerce and Labour 1903 were further 
milestones in the establishment of the quasi-corporatist system that now exists in America. (18) 
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The development of the party system itself was also an extra-Constitutional development which 
some Founding Fathers hoped would not occur and whose role was certainly not envisioned in 
the Constitution. Their role, as Clarence Carson further pointed out (19) was to further 
empower faction by enabling them to determine policy across the lines of electoral districts. 
Madison had hoped that a large federal system would prevent the formation of large, nationally 
dominant factions. 
V: The Role of "Interpretation" 
It might be plausibly argued that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights slowed down the 
governmental manifestation of collectivism in America, but I doubt if it could be shown that 
this was of any great magnitude. Although it might also be argued that collectivism and stat-
ism had to adopt certain judicial disguises, to dress themselves in constitutional terms, this was 
no great problem for them. (20) 
The Founding Fathers must be spinning in their graves at the tortured interpretations and 
perversions of their constitutional creations. Again, to quote Clarence Carson: 
"Much of the huge Federal establishment has been built by the exercise of 
powers that were not granted in the Constitution. Most of the regulations, 
restrictions, expenditures (excepting for defense) and far flung activities 
were not authorized by the Constitution. Nor have they been authorized by 
amendments. Instead, they have been acquired by reading into the Constitution 
what is not there, and promUlgating mystifications about what is there." (21) 
The general welfare clause has been interpreted as if it were a grant of power, and, in the 
historian's words, "Courts have turned limitations upon governments into requirements that 
governments provide some service". (22) The regulation of commerce clause (Article I, Sec-
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tion 8) is perhaps the most notable example of flexible interpretation. 
Only the wilfully blind can do other than conclude with Edwin 1. Vieira, that "the Constitu-
tion, founded in natural law as an embodiment of and protection for individual rights, has been 
transformed into an instrument for the subordination of rights to an effectively unlimited 
government ruled - or, perhaps, driven is more descriptive - by the very passions the Founders 
most feared: avarice, ambition, and the love of power". (23) 
VI: The Role of the American Supreme Court 
Although, ironically, the Founding Fathers perceived little if any role for judicial review the 
role of the Supreme Court as a bastion of liberty has boded large in the arguments of constitu-
tionalists. But yet again the actual historical record of the American Supreme Court provides 
rather less than an overwhelming case for the efficacy of this mechanism. 
As Robert Dahl has declared: 
"[T]he policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of 
line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of 
the United States. Consequently it would be most unrealistic to suppose 
that the Court would, for more than a few years at most, stand against any 
major alternatives sought by a lawmaking majority". (24) 
Elsewhere Dahl goes into some detail. Up to 1956 the Supreme Court had declared Congres-
sionallegislation unconstitutional in 77 cases. In almost a third of these cases the aims of the 
legislation were achieved by other means; in one fifth of the cases this occurred in four or less 
years. In only four cases were more than 20 years required. (25) "There is", he concludes 
no case on record where a persistent law-making majority has not, sooner or later, 
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achieved its purpose". (26) 
One is tempted to say that the Supreme Court was of least use precisely when it was most 
needed. Hence Article 13, which outlaws slavery and involuntary servitude, and which clearly 
rules out conscription, was blatantly disregarded. The Supreme Court refused to accept 
appeals in those terms, claiming it was a "political issue" (which, of course it was, and which 
was precisely what the Court was there to decide). 
And when the New Deal 'revolution' occurred the Supreme Court turned out to be a frail 
guardian of liberty. Judges who still adhered to the older views died, were intimidated by 
political threats and pressures of various sorts, or simply succumbed to what they saw as an 
inevitable tide in the affairs of men. (27) 
A government of laws is of necessity law made and administered by men. The judiciary 
proved no more immune than any other part of society to the rise of collectivism which applied 
itself to redefining and reconstructing legal thought. (28) 
As Clinton Rossiter has written, "the Court's power of judicial review is least useful when 
most needed ... The fact is that the Court has done more over the years to expand than to 
contract the authority of the President ... ". (29) 
In fact, the ineffectiveness of the Supreme Court in defending civil liberties does not date from 
merely the New Deal. One hardly has to approve of the respective causes penalized to recog-
nize the reality of one legal scholar's observation that "[the] 140 Years between ratification of 
the First Amendment and Near v. Minnesota span a period when almost all the civil liberties 
of individuals were denied to citizens who were also abolitionists, religious zealots, suspected 
Confederate sympathisers, foreign-born members of the Industrial Workers of the World (or 
even obstreperous native IWWers), pacifists, conscientious objectors, supporters of the new-
born Soviet Union, labour leaders, or suffragettes". (30) 
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VII: A Symbolic Function? 
Nigel Ashford has argued (31) that Bills of Rights and constitutions can have symbolic and 
propagandistic value. He echoes here the sentiments expressed by Founding Father Edmund 
Randolph, for whom a Bill of Rights in the Virginia Constitution was "a perpetual standard ... 
around which the people might rally". (32) Dissidents can appeal even to the Soviet Constitu-
tion or the UN Universal Declaration of Rights. But these are, as we have already argued, 
grievously flawed documents. Why not appeal to some more consistent and more radical 
Natural Law or some body of philosophic thought, and in the process, popularize and expound 
those ideas? Appealing to a flawed and ambiguous document might seem a clever tactic in the 
short run but does not further one's long range goal, the unambiguous establishment of one's 
values. Other forms of reliance on symbolic politics tend to be even more fatuous. Ironically, 
America was in many respects more free when the cult of the Constitution was less predomi-
nant than after it reached, in the words of one historian "a position of near sacredness". (33) 
Veneration for a document like the Constitution frequently goes hand in hand with either 
ignorance of its content or a lack of interest in its application. 
Again we return to the our constant refrain that the bulwark of liberty rests only in the opi-
nions of the public. It is interesting that many of the American Founding Fathers opposed the 
inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Although many of them were motivated by a 
hidden agenda (stronger government) their opposition was not entirely disingenuous. Alexan-
der Hamilton argued about the difficulty of making cast iron, unambiguous definitions regard-
ing, for example, liberty of the press, that could not ultimately be evaded. "I infer that its 
security", he argued, "whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting 
it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the 
government. And here, after all ... must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights". 
(34) Another Federalist argued that although there was no way to predict in advance what laws 
may be necessary and proper "this we may say - that, in exercising those powers, the Congress 
312 
cannot legally violate the natural rights of an individual". (35) It is, in my view, precisely 
the standard of natural rights that must be raised, not simply on one piece of paper, but perpe-
tually and universally, in the art, culture, ethics and scholarship of a society. Nothing less 
than total hegemony for individualism can secure individual liberty. 
Interestingly enough a recent writer, Herbert J. Storing supports the Federalist contention. 
Would America have been less free without the Bill of Rights? He replies: 
"Without a Bill of Rights our courts would probably have developed a kind of 
common law of individual rights to help to test and limit governmental power. 
Might the courts thus have been compelled to confront the basic questions 
that 'substantive due process', 'substantive equal protection', 'clear and 
present danger', etc., have permitted them to conceal, even from themselves? 
Is it possible that without a Bill of Rights we might suffer less of that 
ignoble battering between absolutistic positivism and flaccid historicism that 
characterizes our constitutional law today?". (36) 
VIII: Contradictions in the Case For Constitutionalism 
When we examine the detailed arguments of constitutionalists and advocates of Bills of Rights 
we generally find them rife with inner contradictions. 
Let us examine the case made by the turn of the century classical liberal, William Sharp 
McKechnie, in his study of the decline of British freedom and the rise of democratic despot-
ism, The New Democracy and the Constitution. (37) 
McKechnie concedes that: 
313 
"Legal restraints are likely to prove bonds of paper, if unaccompanied 
by the moral qualities that enforce them, and by the spirit of compromise 
and watchfulness that recognises, in an invasion of the rights of one man, 
an invasion of the rights of all. If public opinion and respect for the 
spirit of the constitution do not actively support the safeguards 
contained in legal documents, these are likely to prove mere dead letters. 
The electors need, for their own good and that of the commonwealth, education 
in the principles of political science ... Constitutional restraints, without 
an enlightened sense of citizenship, are thus far from being the whole 
solution". (38) 
Precisely. 
But McKechnie then proceeds to argue that such restraints "are one essential element in that 
solution. Further, their mere existence helps to induce in the nation a more equitable frame of 
mind". (39) He points to the American Constitution as a desirable model to contrast with the 
"unrestrained omnipotence of a one-chambered Parliament". "The mere existence", he claims, 
"of a written Constitution raises a series of barriers to restrict the ascendancy of the many over 
the few. Fundamental principles ... cannot suddenly be upset by the insertion of a few words 
in an ordinary act of the Legislature, as may be done in England. Under any form of written 
Constitution, individuals are sure of, at least, a few fixed cities of refuge that cannot be en-
gulfed by revolutionary legislation". (40) 
McKechnie may be forgiven for not foreseeing just how ineffective that Constitution was to 
become as a dam against the tidal wave of revolutionary legislation. We also profit from the 
countless contemporary examples of exemplary constitutions (including even that of the Soviet 
Union) which possess no significance whatsoever for the social and political realities of their 
respective nations. He was at fault in not considering how the creation of a new constitution, 
or written constitutional safeguards, was possible when that "enlightened sense of citizenship" 
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was already increasingly absent. Modern exponents of the same position have no such ex-
cuse, however. 
Writing later, and from a Liberal Conservative position, James Beck in his The Constitution 
of the United States (41) argued as follows: 
"The British Constitution has as its only sanction the acquiescence of the 
living generation; for there is no feature of the British Government and 
no principle of liberty which the House of Commons may not now, by a bare 
majority, impair or destroy". (42) 
The American Constitution, in his view, represents in contrast "the most conspicuous and 
effective manifestation of a higher law ... a noble and serviceable temple of Liberty and Jus-
tice". (43) 
Yet as he himself admits, the Constitution can be amended, and he further concedes that such 
amendments are necessary to adapt governmental forms to the alleged requirements of a 
"complex age". (44) But amendments can be "foreign to its nature and destructive to its 
purposes", especially when supported "by an aggressive and well-organized minority". (45) 
He even further admits that the Constitution has "been profoundly modified by public opinion" 
and that "(a)s a result, many of its essential principles have been ... subverted, and many 
others are today threatened by direct attack". (46) Yet again, he admits that as "a sanctuary 
against confiscation" (of property) the Constitution has "only been partly successful", and that 
in some respects the existence of the Constitution has "not only thrown men of property off 
their guard" but has actually "lessened the spirit of constitutional morality". (47) In his final 
pages Beck concedes virtually the entire burden of our argument. The Constitution, he 
concedes, "can have no inherent vigour to perpetuate itself. If it ceases to be of the spirit of 
the people, then the yellow parchment, whereon it is inscribed, can avail nothing. The Ameri-
can people must write the compact, not with ink upon parchment, but with 'letters of living 
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light' - to use Webster's phrase - upon their hearts". (48) 
Yes indeed, but what then remains of the case for constitutionalism and a Bill of Rights? 
IX: Constitutionalism as a Sign of Desperation 
Libertarian and Conservative advocates of Bills of Rights sometimes point to the hostility of 
socialists to such documents as proof of their value. During the late 1960s the Labour Party 
opposed various Conservative proposals to introduce a Bill of Rights. Labour MP Alex Lyon 
thus opposed the establishment of any, as he saw it, conservatively motivated body (like a 
constitutional or supreme court) as regressive, since the subsequent "inflexibility of our ma-
chinery for changing the law when obvious social injustice appeared, would make it a gravely 
retrograde measure for human liberty". (49) Similar statements have recently been made by 
Deputy Labour Party leader Roy Hattersley, who opposed current proposals for a constitution-
al Bill of Rights by claiming that "True liberty requires action from the government", and that 
a Bill of Rights would obstruct the achievement of positive freedom. (50) Another socialist 
writer, Janet Daley, also attacked such proposals. A Bill of Rights would, in her view, 
"create a cumbersome, reactionary monolith which slows government response to public opi-
nion, sometimes fatally". In her view such a Bill could only be a potential obstacle to the 
extension of "democratic rights", by which she makes it quite clear that she means positive 
claims upon the property of others and interference in the voluntary decisions of individuals. 
(51) 
And a jolly good thing too, might any libertarian conclude. But we should not take our poli-
cies merely from a reversal of our opponents positions. Rather, we need to look at the dis-
putes over constitutions and Bills of Rights in their full political and historical contexts. 
It is noticeable that the great movement for a Bill of Rights amongst British anti-socialists took 
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off during the late 1960s. It was then that Conservatives like Lord Hailsham (Quintin Hogg) 
attacked "Elective Despotism" and Lord Lambton introduced a Ten-Minute Bill for a Bill of 
Rights to "preserve the rights of the individual", specifically against "anti-racist" infringements 
of freedom of speech, Labour policies threatening private education, the powers of factory and 
health inspectors, and the Town and Country Planning Acts. (52) This was a period in which 
liberals were in despair. The ratchet of socialism seemed irreversible. Socialism, trade 
union power, socialist violence - all seemed supreme and undefeatable. Constitutional 
manoeuvrings appeared the only way in which the process of decline could be delayed or 
brought to some sort of a halt. 
But now the reverse is the case. It is the so-called "left" which is in despair against the 
growing reversal of socialism both politically and intellectually. The voices of Roy Hattersley 
and Janet Daley are the exceptions. It is now the socialists who have formed an organization" 
Charter 88, to campaign for a written constitution and Bill of Rights to protect "social progr-
ess" and "freedom" against the alleged authoritarianism of Margaret Thatcher. (53) 
What this underlines is how Bill of Rights campaigns tend to be little more than a desperate 
flaying around when one has been politically defeated. We should welcome Socialism's 
recent orientation to such nostrums. It is a welcome sign of their growing demoralization and 
a self-imposed distraction from any more serious intellectual counterattack on their part. For 
libertarians or conservatives to now get involved in this sort of campaign would be at the 
present time a veritable seizing of defeat from the jaws of victory. 
X: A Good Campaign Issue? 
But wouldn't campaigning for a Bill of Rights be a good idea? No! The Libertarian and 
Conservative movements following the Second World War have been plagued by the constant 
error of going for the "quick fix": sometimes it is a constitutional amendment, sometimes it is 
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a populist campaign, sometimes it is nobbling a few politicians, sometimes setting up a new 
political party, sometimes an excessive concentration on immediate policy issues, sometimes 
pouring millions into glossy 'professional' magazines which lack any real readership or sup-
port. (54) Campaigning for a Bill of Rights is simply another variation on the same theme, 
and it would be as equally ineffective as all the other nostrums. Ironically, the real political 
impact that the libertarian revival has had has been as the result of the percolation of the ideas 
expounded by mere scribblers and theorists. This is not to argue that there is nothing that can 
be done to assist this process. Far from it. A pro-capitalist Engels could have as much of an 
impact as the original one. But that impact can only be achieved by the financing and promo-
tion of the struggle for broad ideological hegemony. A Bill of Rights campaign can only divert 
our scarce resources from the countless intellectual tasks (in sociology, history, psychology, 
economics, foreign policy, political science etc) that are necessary to regain intellectual 
hegemony. It is a pointless lUxury we cannot afford. (55) 
XI: Conclusion 
I am aware, of course, that the case I have presented here has some fairly broad implications 
for liberal political philosophy as a whole. The case against A Bill of Rights is largely a case 
against constitutionalism per se, and the classical liberal concept of the limited state usually 
rests upon a doctrine of the constitutional limitation of state power. It is obviously apparent 
that I believe that no such limitation can be effective, and that liberal constitutionalism is 
fundamentally flawed in its understanding of power and the state. Liberalism and libertarian-
ism need to look elsewhere for the means by which the aggressive use of force is minimised 
and individual rights respected. Those means, in my view, lie in the strengthening of what 
we might term "social power" and the whole moral and psychological structure of society, and 
by what Proudhon called "the dissolution of government in the economic organism". (56) 
The demonstration of this positive alternative is obviously out of the question in a short essay 
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such as this. Nevertheless, I believe I have demonstrated my negative case, the case against a 
Bill of Rights, and I hope that this demonstration will deter anyone presently set upon embark-
ing on the pursuit of this political holy grail. 
In summary then, for advocates of free enterprise, individual freedom and the open society to 
launch into enthusiastic campaigns for a Bill of Rights would be a major, perhaps catastrophic, 
mistake. The advocates of such a scheme fatally misunderstand the real social dynamics that 
maintain, or fail to maintain, freedom. Any campaign for such a Bill can only result, in the 
present ideological correlation of forces, in ineffective and/or confused scraps of paper pos-
sessing no social force. Worse, such campaigns can only divert resources and efforts from 
the real route to ultimate political victory over the forces of collectivism and statism - the 
establishment of massive intellectual hegemony. Any diversion of resources, in terms of 
finance or personnel, would be a tragic error. 
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13: LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE STARS: 
THE IDEOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SCIENCE FICTION 
"It is in the methodology of scientific thought that 
the salvation - if any of humanity rests. I Isaac Asimov. (1) 
In Defence of Science 
Political Rationalism 
"Applied Science Fiction" 
The Choice for Humanity 
*** 
*** 
The very name "science fiction" is no accident, no mere matter of semantic contingency. As 
the author of one critical history of the genre has put it, "science fiction . .. is really not so 
much a literary genre as a point of view" (2) and that point of view is overwhelmingly a scien-
tific and metascientific one. 
The unifying feature that runs throughout most Science Fiction is not a literary characteristic, 
involving matters of style, form or symbol, it is primarily an ideological one, a nexus of 
values and views regarding man and the universe. Colin Wilson has summed it up incisively in 
his The Strength To Dream: Literature and the Imagination: 
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"Science fiction sprang from the progressive beliefs that are the essence of 
science. The spirit of science is a spirit of enterprise ... [Science Fiction] 
is an attempt to communicate the authentic vision of science through fiction." (3) 
I have employed the term metascientific deliberately, since Science Fiction is not merely a 
literary exploration of particular scientific, cosmological or technological ideas, extrapola-
tions of the individual or social effects of particular inventions or social trends (although it can 
be all these things) but because it embodies what Peter Medawar has called "the new spirit", 
the intellectual outlook which can be "thought of not as scientific, but something conducive to 
science" (4). It embodies the Faustian or Promethean impulse, the spirit of individualism, of 
self-confident rationality, of bold conjecture and refutation, the assumption of the accessibility 
of reality to human intelligence and the possibility and desirability of enhancing human exis-
tence. 
It is no accident that Science Fiction emerged as a distinct genre (or, rather, was perceived as 
such) while "mainstream" literature became fixated upon delineations of character, the novel 
of manners as an aesthetic summum bonum, or upon doctrines of "naturalism" and "realism" 
which consigned the individual to the role of a victim or plaything of forces beyond his con-
trol. Literature became dominated by the ethos of an "Age of Defeat", in Colin Wilson's 
phrase, of either "the unheroic hypothesis" or the "discussion of triviality" (5). Literary and 
stylistic experimentation seemed devoted only, as one American has put it, to "disillusionment, 
cynicism, disgust and gnawing envy" or in "making delicate picture-puzzles out of the butt-
ends of life" (6). So called avant-garde forms increasingly reflected "the flight from reason" 
and "disgust ... with the idea of science" (7), dominated by, and voking, epistemological and 
perceptual chaos. 
While a voluntaristic and rationalistic image of man was preserved to some degree in what 
Ayn Rand had called "bootleg" forms of romanticism, in adventure, detective and thriller 
genres, these forms were generally intellectually - and sometimes aesthetically - second rate. 
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Only Science Fiction was characterized by a concern with higher intellectual horizons. It is 
most accurately defined as, in John J. Pierce's phrase, "eschatological romanticism", an intel-
lectual orientation to "first and last things" (8). 
It is important to realize that even the crudest sub-forms of Science Fiction, the so-called 
"space opera" adventure story as found in the "pulps" of the 1930s and 1940s and still with us 
today, is not without philosophic significance. The characteristic of "action, conflict and sus-
pense" are reflections of the Aristotelian, volitionist view of man, in which "purpose", as 
Science Fiction author Jack Williamson has put it, is "the distinguishing quality of life" (10). 
I: In Defence of Science 
Many Science Fiction authors and critics have been quite explicit in their commitment to sci-
ence and the voluntaristic concept of man. Critic P. Schuyler Miller has put it as follows: 
"In the present mode of mainstream fiction (Everyman) is a symbol for a 
humanity to whom the world - society, the system, the Establishment -
does things. He may struggle; he may fight back; he will certainly 
scream and make speeches; but he is essentially passive, a born loser. 
The Everyman of science fiction, on the contrary, does things to the 
world. He is the subject, not the object of the action. He schemes, 
he fights, and he may talk too much, but he assumes that he can and 
will win ... and usually does. " (11) 
Robert A. Heinlein was even more scathing in his rejection of the "sick literature being ped-
dled by the 'mainstream"', and emphasized the didactic value of Science Fiction in encoura-
ging rationalist attitudes: 
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"[Science Fiction] preaches the need for freedom of the mind and 
the desirability of knowledge; it teaches that prizes go to those 
who study, who learn, who soak up the difficult fields such as 
mathematics and engineering and biology. And so they do! The prizes 
of the universe go only to those able and equipped to reach out 
for them. In short, science fiction is preparing our youngsters to 
be mature citizens of the galaxy ... as indeed they will have to be. " (12) 
Against the prevalent mainstream literary themes of "alienation" and "I am a stranger and 
afraid in a world I never made", Heinlein replied: 
"Not true! 'I am not a stranger and I am not afraid in a world I am 
happy to make ... and I am damned from here to eternity only if I 
abandon my human intelligence and, sheepishly, give up the 
struggle! That is the answer of science fiction, and that is why 
it is alive when most of our current literature is sick and dying." (13) 
Similarly, Isaac Asimov has argued that while Science Fiction can and does explore dangers in 
science and technology and progress, its fundamental attitude is still constructive: 
"Knowledge has its dangers, yes, but is the response to be a retreat 
from knowledge? Are we prepared then to return to the ape and forfeit 
the very essence of humanity? Or is knowledge itself to be used as a 
barrier against the danger it brings. " 
Whether individual scientists are treated as heroes or villains, Asimov continued: 
"[S]cience and intelligence, as abstract forces, are represented sympathetically. 
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Scientific research is presented, almost invariably, as an exciting and 
thrilling process; its usual ends as both good in themselves and good 
for mankind; its heroes as intelligent people to be admired and respected." (14) 
II: Political Rationalism 
"A conscious or unconscious conception of human nature underlies every choice of social or 
political values," declared political philosopher Ellen M. Wood in her book The Mind and 
Politics (15). It is hardly surprising, given Science Fiction's philosophic orientation that poli-
tical themes have boded large, nor that these themes have generally been of a liberal, or liber-
tarian, sort. Although, of course, the rationalist outlook can express itself in the form of a 
technocratic socialism (as in H. G. Wells, for example) (16) most Science Fiction authors 
have recognized the pseudo-scientific or "scientistic" nature of the politics of "social engin-
eering" and "planning" (17), and the link between science and freedom, the "open mind" and 
the "open society" (18). 
In Robert A. Heinlein's voluminous work there is a constant exploration of the issues of indi-
vidual liberty versus the "parasitic" and "'fumbling" state, rationality versus religious dogmat-
ism and theocratic politics, individual merit versus racism, individual happiness versus anti-
sexual pathology ("the most mammoth hoax in history") (19), and constant opposition to the 
myriad doctrines of the "organic society", whether in its left or right wing forms. There is a 
strong note of pessimism in Heinlein's work, an awareness of the fact that there is only an 
"extremely tiny fraction who think regularly, accurately, creatively, and without self-delusion" 
(20). He has thus never ceased exploring different political and institutional means to en-
courage individual freedom and responsibility, from the "armed citizenry" of Beyond This 
Horizon, the restricted franchise of Starship Troopers (which attempts to link "ultimate 
authority" to "the maximum responsibility") and the "rational anarchy" of The Moon is a 
Harsh Mistress. 
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The note of pessimism is more pronounced in the work of H. Beam Piper, whose own fictional 
"future history" is one of the cycle of the rise and fall of civilizations, the apparently inevitable 
abandonment of the responsibilities of rational citizenry and the rise of the "barbarians ... the 
people who don't understand civilization, and wouldn't like it if they did. The hitchhikers. The 
people who create nothing, and who don't appreciate what others have created for them and 
who think civilization is something that just exists and all they have to do is enjoy what they 
can understand of it - luxury, a high standard of living, and easy work for high wages. Re-
sponsibility? Phoey! What do they have a government for ... ?" (21). 
Poul Anderson has also made his commitment to classical liberal and libertarian views explicit 
and explored the endless struggle between irresponsibility and irrationalism and responsibility 
and rationalism. Thus he has declared: 
"Collectivism, under whatever name, is as old as the neolithic god-kings; 
while it was a mere two centuries ago that Thomas Jefferson wrote of 'life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness' as being human rights ... I 
have an intellectual suspicion that the 18th century British-American idea 
of government by contract is so profoundly revolutionary that a thousand years 
would scarcely serve to exhaust its potentialities, and that it might conceivably 
move us onto an entire new level of social evolution." (22) 
What are the social contexts most conducive to liberty, rationality and responsibility? Frontier 
conditions like the asteroid based society of Tales of the Flying Mountains seem to be one. 
But it takes "toil and grief" and the conscious practice of "keen and critical science" to both 
defend or extend "the unnatural state called civilization and freedom" against the "revolt of 
the primitive mind" (23). For Anderson there seems to be no foolproof guarantee for the 
preservation of civilization. The enlightened liberal social engineering of the Psychotechnic 
Institute in one series of "future history" stories, the mercantile civilization of the "Poleso-
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technic League" stories - all social and institutional forms have their distinctive weaknesses and 
seeds of destruction. "Why has every free human society been so short-lived?", the question he 
asks in his short story The Master Key, thus remains the constant question throughout 
Anderson's work. 
In recent years the work of the Russian-born American novelist and philosopher Ayn Rand has 
had a major influence on Science Fiction writers, as it has done on a growing number of philo-
sophic and political thinkers. Rand has developed an extensive systematic neo-Aristotelian 
philosophy, attempting a radical defence of reason, science and individual liberty, which has 
been the principal impetus to the modern libertarian movement (24). Amongst the younger 
writers influenced by her work one should note F. Paul Wilson's "La Nague Federation" 
novels, Healer (1976) and Wheels Within Wheels (1978), L. Neil Smith's "North Ameri-
can Confederacy" novels, The Probability Broach (1980), The Venus Belt (1980), Their 
Majesties Bucketeers (1981), and The Nagasaki Vector (1983), 1. Neil Schulman's Along-
side Night (1979), and The Rainbow Cadenza (1983), and David Houston's Gods in a 
Vortex (1977) and Wing Master (1981). The libertarian and rationalist ideas explored in such 
works are more vigorous, more optimistic and more militant in tone than most of the older 
writers (25). 
III: "Applied Science Fiction" 
It is significant that most Science Fiction authors and critics have taken a strongly "activist" 
view on the role of the genre. "Science Fiction", as John 1. Pierce has put i, "is not only 
speCUlating about the future, but helping to create it". In a period in which a large number of 
writers are stressing the alleged "limits of growth", and calling for the abandonment of reason, 
science, and the open society in favour of the allegedly more satisfying life of the "organic 
society", mysticism, and despotic tribal society (27), a large number of Science Fiction 
authors have explicitly joined battle against this "anti-industrial revolution". 
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In the UK, George Hay has been in the forefront of the advocacy of what he calls "applied 
science fiction", working through such organizations as The Environmental Consortium, The 
Science Fiction Foundation, and The Free Space Society as well as in literary exposition to 
encourage the recognition of the "illimitable New Frontier" of scientific research and space 
exploration: 
"[In] a Ceasarist world such as ours, one increasingly falling under the 
influence of intellectual and political thugs, it is inevitable that 
increased responsibility must accrue to anybody insisting that futures 
exist or can be created ... The writer's role is precisely to dramatise 
the leading edge of his society's unuttered but potent thoughts. Science 
fiction writers did not cause man to reach the moon but they legitimised in 
the minds of millions of taxpayers the notion that it was desirable for 
them to do so." (28) 
In America, this revolt for reason has gone much further and has become well organized. The 
monthly journal Claustrophobia (29) reports on the wide range of pro-technology, pro-sci-
ence, life extension, pro-space research and space industrialization writings and projects. The 
L-5 society and the Sabre Foundation both promote and explore commercial development and 
exploration of space by governmental and free market initiatives (30). Many Science Fiction 
authors have involved themselves in the explicitly political activities of the Libertarian Party 
and the Libertarian Futurist Society (31). 
Jerry Pournelle's work is a paradigm case of such applied Science Fiction. In such fictional 
works as Lucifer's Hammer (1977) and Oath of Fealty (1981), the central themes are the 
conflict between hysterical and coercive environmentalists and progressive technologists and 
scientists and the dramatization of the choice: 
"[B]e good peasants, safe peasants, superstitious peasants - or 
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have worlds to conquer again. To control the lightening". (32) 
Pournelle has written a number of non-fiction expositions of science and libertarianism, such 
as his A Step Further Out (1979). He has also been active within High Frontier, the cam-
paign both to develop a space-based defensive system for the West, and to commercially 
explore and develop the resources of space (33). 
IV: The Choice for Humanity 
In their work The Sociology of the Future the American sociologists W. Bell and J. Man 
explicitly commented on the role of images of the future as determinants of the future (34). 
The historic role of Science Fiction is, in an age when forces of irrationalism, mysticism, and 
tyranny have never been so close to extinguishing the ideals of science, progress, and the open 
society, to hold aloft, to dramatize those ideals. When a large portion of the academic intelli-
gentsia has embraced reactionary and anti-scientific values, Science Fiction still offers the 
vision that our establishment intelligentsia has so fatefully abandoned. Will it be the poetry of 
Science Fiction that becomes an unacknowledged legislator of the world, or will it be the 
siren songs of reactionary, tribal nostalgia? 
As Ray Bradbury has put it: 
"Challenge and response. Response and challenge. Toynbee's voice ghosts us 
down the years ahead. What do I hand you now, traveller? A suitcase stuffed 
with spirits to last beyond Alpha Centauri? Or a shovel for your grave? 
Choose one. Move or dig." (35) 
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14: ERNEST HEMINGWAY AND THE FAILURE OF NIHILISM 
" ... au fond des querelles litteraires, i1 y a toujours une 
question philosophique." Emile Zola (1) 
Disillusionment 
Social Commitment 
Technique and Sense of Life 
A Failure of Thought 
*** 
Values and Literary Achievement 
*** 
Since virtually everything that can be said about Ernest Hemingway has been said, any 
further exercise in the analysis of his work really ought to offer some self-justification. 
While not claiming to voice any startlingly original insights into the work of the writer, I do 
hope to demonstrate the value - and validity - of that theory of art enunciated by Ayn Rand 
(2). Rand defines art as a "selective re-creation of reality according to an artist's metaphysi-
cal value-judgments" (3). Those metaphysical value judgments can range from sophisticated, 
systematic and intellectual to crude, haphazard and unconscious, but they always manifest 
themselves in an artist's "sense of life", as she calls it. She continues: 
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"The truth or falsehood of a given artist's philosophy as such, is not an aesthetic 
matter; it may affect a given viewer's enjoyment of his work, but it does not negate 
its aesthetic merit. Some sort of philosophic meaning, however, some implicit 
view of life, is a necessary element of a work of life ... The fact that one agrees or 
disagrees with an artist's philosophy is irrelevant to an aesthetic appraisal of 
his work qua art. One does not have to agree with an artist (nor even to enjoy 
him) in order to evaluate his work. In essence, an objective evaluation requires that one 
identify the artist's theme, the abstract meaning of his work ... then evaluate the 
means by which he conveys it - ie by taking his theme as criterion, evaluate the 
technical mastery (or lack of it) with which he projects (or fails to project) his 
view of life". (4) 
However, we can go further, it seems to me. We can also examine the impact of an author's 
specific sense of life upon the boundaries of artistic achievement open to him. For in my view 
Hemingway's work constitutes a particularly graphic demonstration of the consequences, in 
this case detrimental, of an author's fundamental view of himself and of existence. 
I: Disillusionment 
The dominant tone of Hemingway's work was undoubtedly a sense of the bankruptcy of va-
lues, a quasi-nihilistic despair of finding any meaning or value in a "universe of chance". 
It reflected in part the widespread disillusionment affecting so many intellectuals after World 
War I. Thus, in his illuminating study of the literary and intellectual world of the 1920' s, 
Frederick Jay Hoffman chose as his illustrative text for the section on "The War and the 
Postwar Temper" Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises (5). This disillusionment was perhaps 
summed up best, however, by the statement of the protagonist of A Farewell to Arms, 
Frederic Henry: 
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"I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice 
and the expression in vain ... There were many words that you could not stand 
to hear and finally only the names of places had dignity. Certain numbers 
were the same way and certain dates and these with the names of places were 
all you could say and have their mean anything. Abstract words such as glory, 
honour, courage or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, 
the numbers of regiments and the dates" . 
The sense of a meaningless, uncaring - if not positively malevolent - universe was likewise 
conveyed in Frederic's musings on how he had once burnt a log full of ants and observed, 
like an unmoved God, their frantic efforts to escape. Man too, we are supposed to think, is 
ultimately doomed to the same sort of meaningless death as the ants. "You always feel trapped 
biologically", says Frederic to his lover Catherine. And to underline the point Catherine 
herself dies in an equally gratuitous manner, another biological accident - the result of 
childbirth and the fact of her narrow hips. "If people bring so much courage to this world," 
reflects Frederic, "the world has to kill them to break them, so of course it kills them. The 
world breaks everyone and afterward many are strong at the broken places. But those that will 
not break it kills. It kills the very good and the very gentle and the very brave impartially. 
If you are none of these you can be sure that it will kill you too but there will be no special 
hurry" . 
I termed Hemingway's sense of life quasi-nihilistic, for there is some vague concept of 
metaphysical value present. Sometimes, value is attributed to the realm of Nature - the wind 
rippling the corn field appears in almost everything he wrote as an image of life, of harm-
ony, peace, and permanence. The existence of the peasantry, living in harmony with their 
surroundings also appears to have some metaphysical value attributed to it. And, of course, 
there is the famous Hemingway "code", the ethos of the "stiff upper lip" as exemplified most 
notably in the protagonists of The Sun Also Rises, those psychically or physically scarred 
individuals such as Jake Barnes, Bill Gorton, Count Mippipopolous, and Lady Brett. 
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If the world is unmistakably one of meaningless suffering and death, then one can - in the 
Hemingway worldview - at least maintain in the face of it a certain self-control and detach-
ment. Like the matador's consummate skill and grace while confronting painful death it is, 
in Hemingway I s view, this maintenance of dignity and self-control which constitutes the most 
and the best man can hope for. 
II: Social Commitment 
Hemingway did, of course, make forays into what some critics, usually those of marked 
socialist leanings, have seen and praised as "social commitment". Thus, although the ending of 
To Have and Have Not is still largely pessimistic, many have seen in it and in the last words 
of its dying, "rugged individualist" hero, a recognition of the necessity of social action to 
rectify the injustices of the corrupt status quo. "A man ... One man alone ain't 
got. No man alone now ... No matter how a man alone ain't got no bloody ... chance". 
And in For Whom the Bell Tolls critics have also seen an abandonment of what they term 
Hemingway's customary "philosophy of atomistic individualism and irresponsibility" (6). 
Rather than declaring a "separate peace" as did Frederic Henry in A Farewell to Arms, 
Robert Jordan confronted and accepted the issues of duty and sacrifice in spite of the surround-
ing social disintegration. Jordan comes to Spain as soon as the Civil War breaks out, and 
had, as he put it himself, "fought that summer and that fall for all the poor in the world, 
against all the tyranny, for all the things that you believed and for the new world you had 
been educated into". Yet Jordan becomes profoundly aware of the deceit and treachery 
and courage existing on both sides, of Communist duplicity, and of the fact that his values, 
"Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity ... Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness" were 
hardly those of his allies. On the mission which ends in his death Jordan is well aware not 
merely of its danger, but of the fact that it was probably both insignificant in the long run 
and doomed to failure. However, he proceeds with his task, even when aware of his be-
trayal. For many critics this has been interpreted as the final message of the novel, the 
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assertion of the value of idealistic commitment in the face of defeat and despair. Yet it is 
easy to overlook a profoundly pessimistic point, Jordan's observation that "[if] this war is 
lost all of these things [ie., Liberty, Equality etc.] are lost". The novel was written after 
the Civil War, and the war had been lost. At most, For Whom the Bell Tolls can stand as 
a testament in support of commitment in the future. Hemingway wrote it at the start of the 
Second World War and it may well be a plea for commitment as a value in and for itself, with 
the bleak warning that the struggle could be fruitless. 
III: Technique and Sense of Life 
Simply delineating an author's sense of life and fundamental philosophy does, of course, 
constitute only the beginning of the critical task. For the realm of literary criticism, of 
objective aesthetic appraisal, it is necessary to describe and evaluate the means by which an 
author conveys his theme. In the words of Ayn Rand, taking the author's theme as criter-
ion one must "evaluate the purely aesthetic elements of the work, the technical mastery (or 
lack of it) with which he projects (or fails to project) his view of life" (7). However, the 
nature of an author's sense of life remains a fundamentally important issue, not only in 
determining one's personal, emotional response to his work, but in determining the degree 
of his objective and general literary achievement. My analysis of the achievement and 
failure of Ernest Hemingway will demonstrate, I hope, exactly why this should be so. 
In evaluating Hemingway as a writer Lionel Trilling has indicated one fruitful line of 
approach. In his essay "Contemporary American Literature In Its Relation To Ideas" (8) 
Trilling has commented on the curious. failing of so many American novelists, a failure of 
intelligence, of the intellectual grasp of problems. Regarding Hemingway, Trilling perceived 
"a deficiency of conscious mind, an inadequacy of the talent of disquisition". 
Maxwell Geismer, in Writers and Crisis, also partially formulated this point when he 
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commented specifically on Hemingway's intellectual failure in For Whom the Bell Tolls. 
The latter he judged far inferior to similar European novels like Malraux's Man's Fate, 
Silone's Bread and Wine, and Koestler's Darkness at Noon. These works were, in 
Geismer's view, "filled with penetrating insights in the patterns of social crisis, the gains and 
losses worked by such crises upon the human temperament "(9). Indeed, in contrast 
Hemingway's intellectual stature does appear strikingly less than that of his European con-
temporaries. There is simply no adequate exploration throughout his work of the issues with 
which he is fundamentally concerned, no analysis of the personal crises of his characters or 
of the crisis of values which he, and so many of his contemporaries felt. Rather, all we find 
is a suffor:;ating atmosphere of self-pity, and, alternatively, emotional repression. Can the sort 
of internal monologue delivered by Frederic Henry in A Farewell to Arms, which we have 
already quoted, seriously he considered as anything other than immature, self-pitying, and 
essentially vacuous? I for one can understand the exasperation which drove Wyndham 
Lewis to his withering denunciation of the Hemingway "hero" as a "dullwitted, bovine, 
monosyllabic simpleton, [a] lethargic and stuttering dummy", and of most of his characters as 
"puppets ... leaves, very violently blown hither and thither, drugged or at least deeply intoxica-
ted phantoms of a sort of matter-of-fact shell shock" (10). 
Hemingway's own partial solution to the dilemmas of the "Lost Generation" , the "Hemi-
ngway code", can hardly be considered a substitute for serious thought. The "stiff upper-lip" 
ethos imprisoned him within walls of his own making. He became in his own life as well as 
his art an incarnation of the myth of hairy-chested masculinity - to the point of self-parody. 
The self-conscious masculinity of Colonel Cantwell in Across the River And Into the Trees 
was the quite logical conclusion of the path that he, Hemingway, had taken. The shal-
lowness of thought in Hemingway, the typically immature confusion of masculine sexual 
normality with virtue, is apparent throughout all of his work. Just how seriously can one 
take an author who, in a supposedly "socially conscious" novel like To Have and Have Not, 
presents his wealthy and "bad" characters as universally alcoholics, homosexuals, drug 
addicts, vi masturbators. All are in some way or another impotent, perverted, or frustrated. 
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Needless to say, the ruggedly masculine hero, Harry Morgan, is apparently the only one who 
can provide a good lay. 
IV: A Failure of Thought 
Writing in Men at War of his love of War and Peace Hemingway criticised Tolstoy's 
"ponderous and Messianic thinking" and stated that he "learned from him to distrust my 
Thinking with a capital 'T' ... ". It was tragic that Hemingway came to this conclusion, for it 
was precisely some deeper thinking that his work needed. Hemingway, and the Hemi-
ngway code, manifest one of the worst forms of anti-intellectualism - that of the intellectua1. 
"I was not made to think," declared Frederic Henry in A Farewell to Arms, "I was made 
to eat. My God, yes. Eat and drink and sleep with Catherine". It was hardly insignificant 
that Helen Gordon - of To Have and Have Hot - in her outburst against her husband, 
accuses him of having got his "dirty little tricks" out of books, or that she ends with the 
most abusive term she, or presumably the author, could think of - "You writer!". It was 
Hemingway's anti-intellectualism, his distrust of the very role and responsibilities of the 
intellectual, that makes his work so fundamentally unsatisfying and which prevented him from 
creating a truly great art. 
V: Values and Literary Achievement 
But if the limitation of intellectual horizons, the deeply felt distrust of the intellect, partly 
explains Hemingway's failure, can we not also trace that failure to something more funda-
mental, to the author's own "sense of life"? I think we can. Our basic question must be, 
how far can nihilism provide an adequate foundation for sustained artistic endeavour? 
The answer is surely that it cannot. As D.S. Savage has pointed out: 
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"[N]ihilism precludes the possibility of organic and interesting development. 
The Hemingway world is one of mechanical repetition, and in the series 
of Hemingway's nine or ten books there is no inward continuity to keep pace 
with the chronological sequence". (11). 
To put it crudely - to have read one Hemingway novel is virtually to have read them all! 
Hemingway created a distinctive protagonist and taciturn style which embodied his sensibil-
ity undeniably well. In this lay an undoubted literary achievement. But it was an extremely 
limited one. Unable or unwilling to explore the issues with which he was concerned, he also 
failed to develop a broader, more fertile vision of life which alone could lead to sustained 
literary creativity. He thus said all he had to say, and did very much all he could do, III 
his first few stories and novels. The rest are repetitive in theme, derivative in style, and 
all thoroughly superfluous. 
Robert Penn Warren, writing in the Kenyon Review, has defended Hemingway on the grounds 
that he "is essentially a lyric rather than a dramatic writer, and for the lyric writer virtue 
depends upon the intensity with which the personal vision is rendered rather than upon the 
creation of a variety of characters whose visions are in conflict among themselves" (12). 
Such an argument does contain an element of truth. The Hemingway "hero" remains 
essentially the same throughout the novels and most of the short stories. Jack Barnes, Freder-
ic Henry, Robert Jordan, Nick Adams - all are cut from the same cloth. Few of the 
minor characters (with the possible exception of those in For Whom The Bell Tolls) ever 
take on much of the substance of real life. It is the brooding Hemingway sensibility which 
dominates each work. Likewise, the "Hemingway landscape", from "Hills Like White 
Elephants", through The Sun Also Rises to Across the River and Into the Trees remains 
very much the same, the mirror of the protagonist's own psychological state. Richard K. 
Petersen, in a perceptive study of Hemingway's style, has also pointed to the recurrence 
throughout his work of the imagery of the "cool, clean, light and well-ordered", of objective 
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terms rendered evaluative. The constant repetition of the "cool and clean" in A Farewell To 
Arms is especially striking: the "cool and clean" taste of the martinis in the hotel bar at Stres-
sa, the "cold and clean" air coming through the window of Frederic Henry's room at Gutin-
gens, the railroad gondola car loaded with guns and smelling "cleanly of oil and grease", 
and even the "clean smell of dried dung" in the barn in which Frederic and his compa-
nions hide during the retreat. 
Yet once we have identified the key Hemingwayesque images and motifs we know what to 
expect in each successive story. Hemingway's artistic resources - his technique as a writer -
are simply not rich enough to sustain indefinite interest. In that mania of modern criti-
cism, hunting the symbol, some critics, of whom Carlos Baker is the most notable, have 
attributed a "controlling symbolism" to Hemingway's work. Baker has perceived, for 
example, certain "elemental images" of the Mountain - "life and the home" - and the 
Plain - "war and death" (13). But if there is some general substance to such an interpreta-
tion, Baker's case rests upon a misreading of the opening paragraph of A Farewell to 
Arms. As E. M. Haliday has pointed out (14), Baker is simply mistaken as to the posi-
tioning of mountain and plain, a fact which demolishes his case for a controlling symbol-
ism. However, even conceding a more general, less strict, validity to Baker's view of 
Hemingway's symbolism, might it not be better termed a controlling cliche? Hemingway's 
symbolism of purity and escape can hardly be considered either especially original or illu-
minating. Similarly, his attempt in The Old Man and The Sea to create a more allegori-
cal dramatization of his theme of "A man can be destroyed but not defeated" is marred by 
a crude, and most culpable, unilluminating, Christian symbolism. We are thus shown the 
old man struggling up the hill with his mast, staggering and falling, stretched out beneath 
its weight, or sleeping with his arms outstretched, as if on a cross, with his hands marked by 
the stigmata of his battle with the marlin. 
Hemingway's work must be judged, in my view, as a failure. The failure was undoubt-
edly an intellectual one. But more fundamental, surely, was the "question philosophique". 
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Hemingway's failure to create truly great art can ultimately be traced to his sense of life. It 
was a failure of nihilism. For, as Nietzsche once observed: 
"[W]hat does all art do? Does it not praise? Does it not glorify? 
Does it not select? Does it not bring things into prominence? 
In all this it strengthens or weakens certain valuations. 
Is this only a secondary matter? An accident? Something 
in which the artist's instinct has no share? Or is this not rather 
the very prerequisite which enables the artist to accomplish something?" (15). 
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